


# AIR TRAINING BULLETIN

## AIR INTELLIGENCE

July 1951

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
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
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Two types of material may be submitted for publication: (1) Stories and illustrations relating to intelligence activities, sections or functions conducted by organizations and, (2) original articles of a noncontroversial but informative nature.

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## SOVIET BLUEPRINT FOR GERMANY

A thorough analysis of Soviet aims for complete control of Germany

BEFORE THE LAST SHOTS OF THE EUROPEAN WAR HAD BEEN FIRED, THE BIG THREE, ROOSEVELT, STALIN AND CHURCHILL SAT DOWN AT LIVADIA PALACE, FORMER SUMMER HOME OF THE CZARS AT YALTA, AND BEGAN DISCUSSIONS WHICH WERE TO SET THE STAGE FOR THE OPENING CURTAIN OF THE POST-WAR DRAMA. THE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN CALLED TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON THE DUNBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS FOR WHAT LATER BECAME KNOWN AS THE UNITED NATIONS. BUT THE RAPIDLY DEVELOPING MILITARY SITUATION PRESAGED A QUICK END TO THE WAR. BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT THE MEETING OPENED WITH A DISCUSSION OF WHAT WAS TO BE DONE WITH GERMANY.

MARSHAL STALIN AT ONCE MADE IT APPARENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD VERY POSITIVE OPINIONS ABOUT THE QUESTION AT HAND. HE IMMEDIATELY INDICATED HIS DESIRE THAT THE SCOPE OF THE DISCUSSION BE MADE WIDE ENOUGH TO COVER THE TERMS OF THE GERMAN

SURRENDER, THE FUTURE FORM OF THE GERMAN STATE, AND THE AMOUNT AND KIND OF REPARATIONS. THESE FACTS WERE NOT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANCE. IN THE MONTHS THAT WERE TO FOLLOW WHILE THE UNITED STATES VEERED FIRST TOWARDS THE MORGANTHAU PLAN FOR AN AGRARIAN GERMANY THEN BACK TOWARDS A MORE REALISTIC STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW AND THE BRITISH PEOPLE WERE MORE CONCERNED WITH COMPLETELY OBLITERATING THEIR OLD WAY OF LIFE FOR SOCIALISM THAN DECIDING GERMANY'S FATE, THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO HAMMER AWAY AT THEIR WELL-DEFINED OBJECTIVES.

IT WAS APPARENT EVEN THEN TO THE SHREWD OBSERVER THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD A BLUEPRINT FOR GERMANY, ONE THAT TRANSCENDED THE VAGUE PLATITUDES OF IDEALISTIC VICTORS, ONE THAT WENT RIGHT TO THE HEART OF THE NEW POWER LINE-UP OCCASIONED BY THE HUMILIATION OF FRANCE AND THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY.



FOR THE SOVIETS WERE MEN HARDENED IN THE SCHOOL OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. FROM OCTOBER 23, 1917, THE DATE OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION, UNTIL THE EARLY 1930'S THE BOLSHEVIK STATE HAD BEEN OUTLAWED BY THE WORLD COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1918, TROOPS OF THE ALLIED POWERS DESCENDED UPON THE RUSSIAN PORTS OF ARCHANGEL, VLADIVOSTOK AND BAKU AND FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE CIVIL WAR INTERVENED ON BEHALF OF THE WHITES OR ANTI-BOLSHEVIK FORCES SUPPLYING THEM WITH MUNITIONS AND TECHNICAL AID AND AT THE SAME TIME ENFORCING A STRICT BLOCKADE AGAINST THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. FOLLOWING RECOGNITION BY THE MAJOR POWERS IN THE EARLY THIRTIES MOSCOW ENJOYED ONLY A SHORT PERIOD OF RESPECTIBILITY, FOR THE BLOOD PURGES OF THE LATE THIRTIES, BY WHICH STALIN LIQUIDATED DISLOYAL COMMUNISTS, SHOCKED THE SENSIBILITIES OF OTHER NATIONS OF THE WORLD. THE MUNICH AGREEMENT OF 1938, PART OF FRANCE AND BRITAIN'S APPEASEMENT OF HITLER BY WHICH THE LATTER WAS GIVEN A FREE HAND IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BADLY UNDERMINED THE SERIES OF NON-AGGRESSION PACTS THE SOVIETS HAD ENTERED INTO WITH THE COUNTRIES ON HER BORDERS. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY MUNICH "ASSUMED IN RUSSIAN EYES THE IMAGE OF A DARK PLOT TO REMOVE THE OBSTACLES TO AN EARLY GERMAN ASSAULT ON THE SOVIET UNION." BOTH BRITAIN AND FRANCE TURNED DOWN ALL MOSCOW'S ATTEMPTS TO APPLY COLLECTIVE PRESSURE ON HITLER THROUGH THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. AT THIS POINT STALIN REVEALED THE EXTREME FLEXIBILITY OF SOVIET POLICY WHEN HE SIGNED THE NOW FAMOUS PACT OF THE SUMMER OF 1939 WITH HITLER.

ONE NEED NOT ENTER INTO THE WRANGLE CONCERNING SOVIET INTENTIONS IN MAKING THIS MOVE. WHETHER VIEWED AS A CO-CONSPIRATOR IN A PLOT TO DIVIDE UP EUROPE OR MERELY AS A MAN DESPERATELY STALLING FOR TIME IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT STALIN REVEALED

HIMSELF TO BE ABOVE ALL A SHREWD REALIST. UNHAMPERED BY THE MORAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE MADE THE JOINING WITH HITLER AN IMPOSSIBLE MOVE FOR ANY RESPONSIBLE BRITISH OR FRENCH STATESMAN, HE MOVED TO ACT IN WHAT HE FELT WERE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

THUS IT WAS STALIN THE REALIST WHO SAT DOWN AT YALTA AND DISCUSSED SUCH MUNDANE THINGS AS REPARATIONS TO BE PAID THE SOVIET UNION WHILE STETTINIUS PRESENTED PAPERS ON RIGHTS OF LIBERATED PEOPLES AND EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR THE RELIEF OF DISTRESSED PEOPLES. TO A MAN WHO HAD DELIBERATELY STARVED MILLIONS OF HIS OWN PEOPLE IN ORDER TO ENFORCE COLLECTIVIZATION THIS LAST MUST HAVE SEEMED SOMEWHAT ACADEMIC. EVEN WHILE AGREEING TO THE U.S. STAND ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER, STALIN MUST HAVE BEEN ALREADY WELL AWARE OF HIS OWN GOVERNMENT'S PLANS TO RUTHLESSLY EXPEL SOME SEVEN MILLION PEOPLE FROM POLAND, THE POLISH-ADMINISTERED TERRITORY OF GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND HUNGARY. (THE NUMBER RECEIVED AND CARED FOR BY THE WESTERN ZONES OF GERMANY BY THE END OF 1946). THIS MAN HAD NOT COME TO CHAMPION THE CAUSE OF FREE MEN EVERYWHERE. SUCH A COURSE WOULD HAVE BEEN INIMICAL TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF A DICTATOR. HE HAD COME TO FIRE THE OPENING SHOTS IN THE POSTWAR STRUGGLE FOR NOTHING LESS THAN THE CONTROL OF ALL EUROPE. AND GERMANY WAS THE PAWN THAT MIGHT WELL DECIDE THE FINAL OUTCOME.

THIS PAPER WILL NOT UNDERTAKE TO PROVE THE THESIS THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW ENGAGING IN AN AMBITIOUS PROGRAM OF IMPERIALISTIC AGGRANDIZEMENT. INDEED IT HARDLY SEEMS NECESSARY TO GO THROUGH THE FORMALITIES. SOVIET ACTION SINCE 1945 HAS BEEN MORE BLUNT THAN SUBTLE. FEW WESTERN STATESMEN WOULD HESITATE TO DEFINE THE PROGRAM AS LIMITED TO MEASURES



IMMEDIATELY ESSENTIAL TO THE DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN HOMELAND. BACK IN 1924 WHEN SOVIET IMPERIALISM WAS NOT EVIDENCED IN OVERT ACTS, STALIN FELT FREE TO MAKE THIS OFT-QUOTED OBSERVATION, "...WE ARE LIVING, NOT MERELY IN ONE STATE, BUT A SYSTEM OF STATES; AND IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE SOVIET REPUBLIC SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST INTERMINABLY SIDE BY SIDE WITH IMPERIALIST STATES. ULTIMATELY, ONE OR ANOTHER MUST CONQUER. PENDING THIS DEVELOPMENT, A NUMBER OF TERRIBLE CLASHES BETWEEN THE SOVIET REPUBLIC AND THE BOURGEOIS STATES MUST INEVITABLY OCCUR." IN 1946 HOWEVER, WITH ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, ALBANIA, AND RUMANIA ALREADY UNDER SOVIET CONTROL; AND POLAND, HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA SCHEDULED TO ENJOY THE SAME FATE WITHIN TWO YEARS, STALIN DECIDED THAT, "...A DEMOCRACY, SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES (CAN) LIVE SIDE BY SIDE IN PEACE IN THIS WORLD WITH A COMMUNIST FORM OF GOVERNMENT, SUCH AS THE SOVIET UNION." IT APPEARS CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIET LEADER HAS NEITHER CHANGED HIS MIND NOR REFORMED. THE APPARENT CONFLICT IN VIEWS CAN ONLY BE EXPLAINED AS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A UNIQUE PHILOSOPHY OF OPPORTUNISM WHICH MAKES ALL DECEIT MORALLY JUSTIFIED IF PRACTICED IN THE FURTHERANCE OF COMMUNIST GOALS. BUT IF WE ARE NOT NOW CONVINCED OF THE SINISTER NATURE OF STALIN'S PLOTTING, WE MUST THEN HAIL HIM AS A GREAT PROPHET. FOR HOW ELSE CAN ONE EXPLAIN THIS STARTLING DESCRIPTION OF TODAY'S WORLD DIVIDED AS IT IS BETWEEN EASTERN COMMUNISM AND WESTERN DEMOCRACY, GIVEN BY STALIN 24 YEARS AGO? "...IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION THERE WILL EMERGE TWO CENTERS OF WORLD SIGNIFICANCE: A SOCIALIST CENTER, DRAWING TO ITSELF THE COUNTRIES WHICH TEND TOWARD SOCIALISM, AND A CAPITALIST CENTER, DRAWING TO ITSELF THE COUNTRIES THAT INCLINE TOWARD CAPITALISM. BATTLE



YOUNG COMMUNIST parading in the Red sector of Berlin; are reminiscent of Hitler regime

BETWEEN THESE TWO CENTERS FOR COMMAND OF WORLD ECONOMY WILL DECIDE THE FATE OF CAPITALISM AND COMMUNISM IN THE ENTIRE WORLD."

GERMANY'S ROLE IN AIDING THE SOVIET UNION TO DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF THIS LIFE AND DEATH STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM, OR MORE PRECISELY, THE EASTERN WAY OF LIFE AND THE WESTERN, MUST OF NECESSITY BE A MAJOR ONE. THIS WILL BE MADE MORE CLEAR IN THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWS. IF WE WERE FORTUNATE ENOUGH TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE INNER COUNCILS OF THE KREMLIN, STALIN'S PLANS FOR GERMANY WOULD BE REVEALED TO US. OF COURSE THEY REMAIN CLOSELY GUARDED SECRETS. BARRING THIS, ONE MUST EMPLOY A PROCESS OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND ATTEMPT TO DISCERN THE PLANS FROM WHAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SO FAR DONE IN GERMANY AND FROM A PRECISE CALCULATION OF WHAT A GERMANY ORIENTED TOWARDS RUSSIA COULD MEAN TO THE SOVIET CAUSE. IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES WILL BE MADE AN ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT: (1) THE COMPLETE CONTROL OF GERMANY IS ABSOLUTELY INDISPENS-



ABLE TO THE SUCCESSFUL CULMINATION OF SOVIET PLANS FOR WORLD DOMINATION, AND (2) THE SOVIETS HAVE FOLLOWED A CONSISTENT POLICY TOWARDS GERMANY SINCE YALTA IN WHICH THE PARAMOUNT AIM HAS BEEN TO SECURE ALL OF GERMANY TO THE SOVIET BLOC. FORTUNATELY FOR THE WEST, POSITIVE ACTION BY DETERMINED MEN HAS RESULTED IN A CONSTANT FRUSTRATION OF THIS SOVIET POLICY TO DOMINATE GERMANY. TODAY THE CHANCES FOR SUCH A SUCCESSFUL MOVE APPEAR REMOTE INDEED. NOTHING SHORT OF VICTORY IN A FULL SCALE THIRD WORLD WAR COULD BRING ABOUT THIS END, AND WITHOUT THE FULL PRODUCTION OF GERMANY ALREADY IN THEIR CAMP, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN GAINING SUCH A VICTORY.

#### GEOPOLITICS OF SOVIET GERMAN POLICY

THIS BRIEF REVIEW OF GEOPOLITICS WILL REVEAL WHY GERMANY HAS ASSUMED SUCH GREAT IMPORTANCE IN SOVIET PLANS FOR FUTURE EXPANSION. IRONICALLY ENOUGH, VERY LITTLE ORIGINAL THINKING HAD TO BE DONE BY THE SOVIETS IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSIONS THAT FOLLOW, FOR THEY WERE SPELLED OUT BY ADOLPH HITLER AND HIS INSTITUT FUR GEOPOLITIK UNDER GENERAL HAUSHOFER AT MUNICH, BOTH BEFORE AND DURING WORLD WAR II. ONE NEED ONLY REVERSE THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF TO ARRIVE AT A SOUND PLAN FOR SOVIET AGGRESSIVE ACTION TODAY. THE NEAR SUCCESS OF THE GERMAN ACTION ATTESTS TO THE VALIDITY OF ITS PREMISES.

HITLER'S GRAND STRATEGY IN THE CAMPAIGN FOR EUROPE EMBRACED TWO OBJECTIVES. FIRST, THE CONTROL OF THE SEA APPROACHES TO THE CONTINENT EXERCISED BY GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES HAD TO BE SHATTERED. THIS WAS TO BE DONE BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF A VAST FLEET OF UNDERSEA CRAFT SO TECHNICALLY ADVANCED AS TO ENABLE IT TO WIN THE BATTLE OF THE

ATLANTIC. ONCE WON, THE INDUSTRIAL MIGHT OF THE NEW WORLD WOULD BE KEPT FROM THE BATTLE FIELDS OF EUROPE AND THE GERMAN BLITZKRIEG COULD SWEEP UNOPPOSED TO THE CHANNEL. HOW CLOSE HITLER CAME TO WINNING THE SEA WAR WITH HIS SUBMARINES IS WRITTEN IN THE SHIPPING LOSSES OF THE EARLY WAR YEARS. BRITAIN FACED STRANGULATION AS EARLY AS 1940 AS THE STEALTHY U-BOATS WRECKED THEIR HAVOC. CHURCHILL WROTE AFTER THE WAR, "TOWARDS THE END OF 1940 I BECAME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE OMINOUS FALL IN IMPORTS. THIS WAS ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE U-BOAT ATTACK. NOT ONLY DID WE LOSE SHIPS, BUT THE PRECAUTIONS WE TOOK TO AVOID LOSING THEM IMPAIRED THE WHOLE FLOW OF MERCHANT TRAFFIC. THE FEW HARBOURS ON WHICH WE COULD NOW RELY BECAME CONGESTED. THE TURN-AROUND OF ALL VESSELS AS WELL AS THEIR VOYAGES WAS LENGTHENED. IMPORTS WERE THE FINAL TEST. IN THE WEEK ENDING JUNE 1, DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE BATTLE IN FRANCE, WE HAD BROUGHT INTO THE COUNTRY 1,201,535 TONS OF CARGO, EXCLUSIVE OF OIL. FROM THIS PEAK FIGURE IMPORTS HAD DECLINED AT THE END OF JULY TO LESS THAN 750,000 TONS A WEEK. ALTHOUGH SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT WAS MADE IN AUGUST, THE WEEKLY AVERAGE AGAIN FELL, AND FOR THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF THE YEAR WAS LITTLE MORE THAN 800,000 TONS." AS THE GREAT BRITISH WARTIME LEADER POINTED OUT LATER, "THE ONLY THING THAT EVER REALLY FRIGHTENED ME DURING THE WAR WAS THE U-BOAT PERIL."

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT BUT THAT STALIN HAS TAKEN HIS CUE FROM THESE WORDS. WHEN A NUMBER OF ADVANCED GERMAN SCHNORKEL SUBS WERE CAPTURED BY THE ALLIES FOLLOWING THE NAZI DEFEAT THEY WERE DIVIDED BETWEEN BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND THE U.S. WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THEY WOULD BE DESTROYED. THE AMERICANS AND BRITISH PROMPTLY SANK THEIRS WHILE THE RUSSIANS USED THEIR QUOTA AS A NUCLEUS



AROUND WHICH TO BUILD THE PRESENT POWERFUL SOVIET UNDERSEAS FLEET REPUTED BY SOME TO BE THE WORLD'S LARGEST.

HITLER'S SECOND OBJECTIVE, REALLY THE FIRST IN TIME AND IMPORTANCE, WAS TO GAIN CONTROL OVER THOSE MAN-POWER AND PHYSICAL RESOURCES OF EURASIA NEEDED TO WIN AN ALL-OUT WAR. THIS PROGRAM EXTENDED OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. THE FIRST STEP WAS TO GAIN BACK THE CONTROL OF THE SAAR, TURNED OVER TO FRANCE UNDER LEAGUE SUPERVISION FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I. USING PROPAGANDA AND COERCION HITLER HAD NO TROUBLE IN WINNING THE PLEBISCITE HELD IN 1935 TO DECIDE ITS FUTURE CONTROL. HE WAS NOW IN POSSESSION OF THE VALUABLE COAL MINES AND HEAVY INDUSTRY OF THE SAAR VALLEY. HE NEXT MOVED TO SECURE THE PRIZE MILITARILY. GERMAN TROOPS MARCHED INTO THE RHINELAND, THE HERETOFORE DEMILITARIZED AREA, AND THE BORDERS WERE CLOSED TO THE FRENCH ARMIES.

IN THE EAST AN EVEN GREATER PRIZE BEAKONED. IN 1918 GERMAN FORCES HAD SUCCEEDED IN OCCUPYING THE DONETZ INDUSTRIAL REGION AND A LARGE PART OF THE CAUCASUS. BY THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK GERMANY SPELLED OUT HER LONG-CHERISHED AIMS. THE VAST AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL RESOURCES OF SOUTHERN RUSSIA WERE TO BE GERMAN FOREVER. THE UKRAINE WAS SET UP AS A PUPPET STATE TO RAISE GRAIN FOR THE GROWING FATHERLAND. GERMANY'S DEFEAT BROUGHT A CLOSE TO THESE PLANS BUT THE IDEA NEVER LEFT GERMAN MINDS. HAUSHOFER STUDIED CAREFULLY THE WRITINGS OF SIR HALFORD MACKINDER WHO WARNED THE BRITISH IN 1919 THAT EVEN THOUGH GERMANY HAD BEEN DEFEATED "IF THE SCIENTIFIC TALENTS, DISCIPLINE, AND ORGANIZATION WHICH HAD MADE GERMANY THE STRONGEST POWER IN EUROPE WERE TO BE JOINED WITH THE VAST RESOURCES OF RUSSIA, GERMAN STATECRAFT MIGHT YET FORGE A MILITARY POWER WITH WHICH TO CONQUER AND


RULE THE WORLD."

THE USEFUL FINDINGS OF MACKINDER WERE APPROPRIATED BY THE MUNICH SCHOOL AND "IMPROVED" UPON. THE CONCEPT OF "LIVING SPACE" WAS BLENDED IN WITH THE DOCTRINES OF "SPACE AND POWER" TO FORM A WIERD, SEMI-MYSTICAL VERSION OF GEOPOLITICS. NEVERTHELESS THERE WAS NOTHING ETHEREAL ABOUT THE HEARTLAND CONCEPT. IT REMAINS AS VALID TODAY AS IT WAS WHEN HAUSHOFER WAS DAZZLED BY ITS POSSIBILITIES.

#### THE HEARTLAND IN GEOPOLITICS

IN RECENT YEARS A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSING NONSENSE HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT THE GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. YET GEOPOLITICS NEED NOT BE EITHER CONFUSING NOR NONSENSE. THE FIRST REALLY OUTSTANDING GEOPOLITICIAN WAS THE BRITISH GEOGRAPHER, SIR HALFORD J. MACKINDER. HIS FIRST SIGNIFICANT WORK WAS A BOOK CALLED DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY WHICH APPEARED IN 1919. IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AS AN ANSWER TO ALFRED MAHAN'S THEORIES ON THE SUBJECT OF THE HISTORICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN SEA POWER AND LAND POWER. MAHAN HAD WRITTEN A BOOK IN 1890 (THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY) WHICH PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCED NAVAL THINKING AND CONSEQUENTLY THE NATIONAL POLICIES OF MOST OF THE MAJOR MARITIME POWERS. INDEED, WE PROBABLY CAN HOLD MAHAN AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AMERICAN ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES AS ANY OTHER SINGLE MAN. HIS BELIEFS CENTERED AROUND THE CONCEPT OF THE CONTINUED DOMINANCE OF SEA POWER OVER LAND POWER. THIS SUPERIORITY SPRANG FROM THE VERY NATURE OF THE SEAPOWERS POSITION, HE MAINTAINED. THE SEA TO HIM WAS A VAST PLAIN TRAVERSED BY INNUMERABLE HIGHWAYS ON WHICH GREAT FREIGHT CARRIERS COULD SUPPLY THE LOGISTICS FOR ANY MAJOR ENGAGEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME THE MARITIME NA-





TIONS, BEING LARGELY INSULAR, FOUND IT UNNECESSARY TO MAINTAIN LARGE LAND ARMAMENTS TO DEFEND EXPOSED LAND FRONTIERS. SINCE CONTINENTAL POWERS MUST ALWAYS DEVOTE THE BULK OF THEIR ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH TO THIS LATTER CONCERN IT FOLLOWED, HE REASONED, THAT THEY COULD NEVER WREST CONTROL OF THE SEAS FROM THE MARITIME POWERS. MAHAN LIVED LONG ENOUGH TO SEE AT LEAST PART OF HIS PREMISE THREATENED. GERMANY, UNDENIABLY A LAND POWER, HAD NOT ONLY GROWN TO THE POSITION OF A GREAT MILITARY POWER BY 1914 (THE YEAR OF MAHAN'S DEATH) BUT WAS CHALLENGING GREAT BRITAIN FOR SUPREMACY OF THE SEAS. MAHAN HAD READ INTO BRITAIN'S INSULAR POSITION MUCH THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CREDITED TO HER INDUSTRIAL POSITION.

IT WAS THIS VERY POINT THAT MACKINDER WAS SEEKING TO ESTABLISH WHEN HE PUBLISHED DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY. HE WARNED THAT BRITAIN'S POSITION WAS NOT BASED ENTIRELY UPON STRATEGIC POSITION, AND THAT IF HER INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT LAGGED, HER STATUS AS A GREAT NATION WOULD SUFFER. OF COURSE, TODAY IT IS FAR EASIER TO SEE

THE LOGIC OF THIS POSITION THAN IT WAS 30 YEARS AGO. WE OBSERVE THE MUCH REDUCED POWER OF THE PRESENT BRITISH NAVY, SO COMPLETELY ECLIPSED BY THE AMERICAN, AND REALIZE THAT NOT GEOGRAPHY BUT ECONOMICS HAS BROUGHT PROFOUND CHANGE.

BUT MACKINDER'S VISION REACHED EVEN FURTHER INTO THE FUTURE. "HE SAW THAT GERMANY AND RUSSIA WERE SO SITUATED ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE THAT, SHOULD THEY COMBINE OR SHOULD EITHER ACQUIRE CONTROL OF THE OTHER, THEY WOULD RULE THE WORLD. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT MODERN TRANSPORTATION WAS REDUCING CONTINENTS TO ISLANDS. EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA CONSTITUTED NOT THREE CONTINENTS BUT ONE—THE "WORLD ISLAND." THIS WORLD ISLAND IS THE TRUE CENTER OF GRAVITY OF WORLD POWER, THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE BEING ONLY AN ISLAND OF LESSER PROPORTIONS, LESSER MANPOWER, AND LESSER NATURAL RESOURCES. THE "HEARTLAND" OF THIS WORLD ISLAND IS...SO SITUATED GEOGRAPHICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY THAT IT COULD DOMINATE THE WORLD ISLAND AS A WHOLE. HENCE HIS CLASSIC WARNING WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:



WHO RULES EAST EUROPE, COMMANDS THE HEARTLAND;

WHO RULES THE HEARTLAND, COMMANDS THE WORLD-ISLAND;

WHO RULES THE WORLD-ISLAND, COMMANDS THE WORLD.


IT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A BELIEF IN THIS DOCTRINE THAT TURNED GENERAL HAUSHOFER TO HIS INTENSE STUDY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HEARTLAND. THESE STUDIES SEEMED TO BEAR OUT ALL THAT MACKINDER HAD WRITTEN. TO THE GENERAL THE QUESTION WAS NOT WHETHER GERMANY SHOULD ACQUIRE ALL OF THE HEARTLAND, A GOOD PART OF WHICH WAS RUSSIAN TERRITORY, BUT HOW. SEEING LITTLE HOPE OF ACHIEVING THE DESIRED END BY FORCE HE WORKED OUT A DETAILED PLAN OF PARTNERSHIP FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS WAS TO BE A DEVICE BY WHICH GERMANY WOULD EVENTUALLY ASSUME VIRTUALLY ALL CONTROL OVER THE ECONOMIC WEALTH AND POLITICAL DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET UNION.

HITLER, NO LESS CONVINCED BY THE UTTERANCES OF MACKINDER, WROTE IN MEIN KAMPF THAT GERMANY WOULD BE A

"WORLD POWER" OR NOTHING AT ALL. TO BECOME A WORLD POWER GERMANY MUST HAVE MORE SPACE, A LARGER AND MORE POPULOUS INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY BASE. THIS WAS NOT TO BE FOUND IN THE "SOUTH AND WEST" OF EUROPE BUT IN THE LANDS OF THE EAST." "IF THE URALS WITH THEIR INCALCULABLE WEALTH OF RAW MATERIALS, THE RICH FORESTS OF SIBERIA, AND THE UNENDING CORNFIELDS OF THE UKRAINE LAY WITHIN GERMANY, UNDER NATIONAL SOCIALIST LEADERSHIP THE COUNTRY WOULD SWIM IN PLENTY."

ALTHOUGH HITLER FAILED TO MAKE POLITICAL REALITY OUT OF GEO-POLITICAL THEORY, IT MUST BE CONCEDED THAT HIS DEFEAT WAS A NARROW ONE. THE NUMBER OF TIMES VICTORY ALMOST WENT TO GERMANY STILL MAKES MEN SHUDDER TODAY. BUT EVEN AS THE VICTORS SAT BACK TO ENJOY THE PEACE, OTHER MEN WERE LEARNING A FEW SOUND LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE STRUGGLE.

AS FAR BACK AS EARLY 1943, JOHN SPYKMAN OF YALE UNIVERSITY WAS BUSY GATHERING MATERIAL FOR A BOOK WHICH WAS TO DRAW MANY SOUND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE GEOPOLITICS OF WORLD WAR II.





THE AUTHOR DID NOT LIVE TO SEE HIS BOOK PUBLISHED, YET TIME WILL RECORD THE SOUNDNESS OF HIS VIEWS. MR. SPYKMAN LED OFF WITH A STATEMENT THAT THE FUTURE FRAMERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PROBABLY CONSIDERED HERESY AT THE TIME IT WAS WRITTEN. "IT IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE NO SUPERSTATE TO GUARANTEE TO THE MEMBERS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY LIFE, PROPERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DEPEND PRIMARILY ON OUR OWN NATIONAL STRENGTH, FOR WE KNOW THAT THE FAILURE OF A GREAT STATE TO CONSIDER POWER MEANS ITS EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION AND CONQUEST." WHILE IT WAS AN AMERICAN WHO WAS MAKING THESE OBSERVATIONS IT APPARENTLY WAS THE RUSSIANS WHO WERE READING THEM, FOR WHEN THE WAR HAD BEEN WON THE UNITED STATES ALONG WITH FRANCE AND BRITAIN STEADILY REDUCED THEIR MILITARY POSITION WHILE PLACING FULL CONFIDENCE IN A UNITED NATIONS "SUPERSTATE."

SPYKMAN WAS SPEAKING OF NATIONAL POWER, NOT IN THE METAPHYSICAL SENSE OF THE HAUSHOFER SCHOOL WHERE "GOD GIVEN RIGHT" AND "GERMANY'S DESTINY" WERE MINGLED WITH PARANOIC ILLUSIONS OF THE SUPERIORITY OF THE NORDIC RACE, BUT IN A FAR MORE CONCRETE WAY. HE WAS DEALING WITH SUCH FACTORS AS POPULATION DENSITY, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF PEOPLES, THE NATURE, FORM, AND EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENTS, AND THE AVAILABILITY OF NATURAL RESOURCES. HE POINTED OUT THAT ONLY COUNTRIES WITH ADEQUATE RESOURCES OF MEN AND MATERIALS CAN EXERCISE A DIRECT INFLUENCE ON WORLD POLITICS. A NATION WITHOUT A TEMPERATE CLIMATE AND RAINFALL ADEQUATE TO THE PRODUCTION OF WHEAT OR RICE IS DOOMED TO A SECONDARY ROLE IN WORLD POWER RELATIONS. OF EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE ARE THE INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES WHICH DETERMINE THE MAXIMUM MILITARY STRENGTH OF A COUNTRY. HE ISSUED A WARNING THAT "...THE POSITION OF THE NEW WORLD IS NOT SO OVER-

WHELMINGLY GOOD THAT WE CAN BE COMPLETELY INDIFFERENT TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST." APPLYING THE TEST OF HIS OWN CRITERIA FOR GREAT POWERS HE POINTED OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS SURROUNDED GEOGRAPHICALLY BY THE EURASIAN LAND MASS PLUS THE CONTINENTS OF AFRICA AND AUSTRALIA, AN AREA THAT IS TWO AND ONE-HALF TIMES THE SIZE, TEN TIMES AS POPULOUS, AND ABOUT EQUAL IN TERMS OF ENERGY OUTPUT AS THE NEW WORLD. IN 1942 THE THREAT IMPLIED IN THESE FACTS ALMOST BECAME AN ACTUAL REALITY WITH THE INITIAL SUCCESSES OF THE GERMAN AND JAPANESE WAR MACHINES. AS SPYKMAN POINTED OUT, "WE WERE THEN CONFRONTED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPLETE ENCIRCLEMENT, IN WHICH CASE WE MIGHT HAVE HAD TO FACE THE UNIFIED POWER OF THE WHOLE EURASIAN LAND MASS. THE STRENGTH OF THE POWER CENTERS OF THE EASTERN HEMISPHERE WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN OVER-POWERING. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO PRESERVE OUR INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY."

DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR HE POINTED OUT THAT MODERN GLOBAL WARFARE MEANS THAT WARS CAN NO LONGER BE WON FROM NAVAL BASES ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE GREAT CONTINENTAL LAND MASSES OF EURASIA. MAHAN'S DOCTRINES OF QUESTIONABLE VALUE BEFORE, NOW WERE ALTERED BEYOND ALL VALIDITY. LAND POWER WAS A REALITY THAT COMPELLED ACCEPTANCE. BRITISH AND AMERICAN EFFORTS WOULD HAVE BEEN FUTILE WITHOUT THE ARMIES OF CHINA AND RUSSIA TO ENGAGE THE BULK OF THE AXIS TROOPS. AIRPOWER WITHOUT BASES WOULD HAVE BEEN WORTHLESS. EVEN WITH BASES, HUGE LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS DEMANDED A GREAT INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT AND EFFICIENT TRANSPORTATION. BUT MORE IMPORTANT, THE ALLIES FIGHTING FOR THEIR LIVES FELT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UNIFIED CONTROL AND OF ONE DOMINANT STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL CONCEPTION IN THE POWER OF THE AXIS



ATTACK.

THE "HEARTLAND" OF MACKINDER, SHORNE OF ALL ITS MYSTERY, IS SIMPLY THE AREA WITHIN THE "WORLD ISLAND" (THE EURASIAN LAND MASS) WHICH BY VIRTUE OF ITS PREPONDERANCE OF THE VARIOUS FACTORS OF POWER DESCRIBED BY SPYKMAN PROVIDES THE WAR MACHINE CAPABLE OF SUBDUING, NOT ONLY THE SURROUNDING NEIGHBORS, BUT ULTIMATELY, WITH THEIR HELP, ALL THE WORLD. IN THE ACCOMPANYING MAPS THERE IS DRAWN WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS "MACKINDER'S HEARTLAND." WITHIN THIS "HEARTLAND" OR "VITAL TRIANGLE" THERE IS FOUND THE TECHNICAL SKILL, TRAINED MANPOWER, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, RAW MATERIALS, FOOD SUPPLY, AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES TO EQUIP A MILITARY FORCE INVINCIBLE ON THE EURASIAN CONTINENT. THE APEX OF THIS TRIANGLE IS GERMANY; THE BASE, THE SOVIET UNION. WITH THIS TRIANGLE UNDER THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF ONE POWER (HITLER'S AIM) THE REST OF EUROPE AND ASIA MUST QUICKLY FALL UNLESS THE COUNTERING PRODUCTION OF THE NEW WORLD CAN COME TO ITS AID IN TIME. NEITHER INSULAR POSITION NOR NATURAL TERRAIN CAN STOP A SUPERIOR WAR MACHINE FROM IMPOSING ITS WILL BY LAND, SEA, AND AIR. THERE ARE NO GEOGRAPHIC BARRIERS THAT CAN TURN BACK A DETERMINED FOE WHOSE TECHNOLOGICAL PRODUCTION HAS ENABLED HIM TO EQUIP HIMSELF WITH THE PROPER WEAPONS IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO DO THE JOB. MODERN WARS HAVE INDEED BECOME STRUGGLES OF THE PRODUCTION LINE.

WITH THESE HARD FACTS IN MIND, STALIN TURNED IN 1945 TO THE MECHANICS OF WINNING GERMANY.

SOVIET WAR POTENTIAL  
AND THE NEED FOR GERMAN PRODUCTION

WHEN A NUMBER OF WESTERN WRITERS SIEZED UPON THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT THERE REMAINED BUT 3 GREAT POWERS AT THE CLOSE OF WORLD WAR II THEY WERE MERELY PUBLICIZING A FACT THE SOVIET

UNION HAD ALREADY TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF IN ITS LONG-RANGE PLANNING. FRANCE HAD CONCEDED HER RELEGATION TO A SECONDARY ROLE WHEN SHE COLLAPSED BEFORE THE GERMAN ONSLAUGHT IN THE SUMMER OF 1940. A SURVEY OF INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY POTENTIAL CONDUCTED WITHOUT SENTIMENTAL BIAS WOULD HAVE SHOWN THIS TO BE INEVITABLE EVEN WITHOUT THE POLITICAL DETERIORATION THAT HAD OCCURRED FROM WITHIN. ONE POSITIVE INDEX OF HER DECREASING STRENGTH COULD BE NOTED IN HER DECLINING POPULATION. IN 1936 THIS TOOK 45 MILLION PEOPLE; BY 1940 IT HAD DROPPED TO 41 MILLION. STALIN COULD NOTE WITH SATISFACTION IN 1946 THAT CURRENT PROJECTIONS ESTIMATED A FURTHER DECLINE TO ABOUT 37 MILLION BY 1980. HE EXPRESSED HIS SHREWD UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION WHEN HE BLANDLY DECLARED AT YALTA THAT FRANCE SHOULD HAVE NO SHARE IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY. BRITAIN BARELY EARNED THE RIGHT TO JOIN THE SELECT GROUP. HER ECONOMIC PLIGHT SEEMED CRITICAL ENOUGH TO PLUNGE HER INTO A SHARP POWER DECLINE. FINANCIAL RESERVES WHICH HAD BEEN ADEQUATE BEFORE THE WAR QUICKLY DIMINISHED IN THE STRUGGLE. THE DEPLETION OF INCOME FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF THESE INVESTMENTS HAD A TELLING EFFECT. SHIPPING LOSSES ALSO TOOK OVER 500 MILLION DOLLARS IN YEARLY SHIPPING RATES FROM THE NATIONAL INCOME. THE TOTAL DEBT TO OTHER NATIONS BECAME 17 BILLION DOLLARS BY THE END OF THE WAR. PLANT DEPRECIATION AND WAR DAMAGE HAD RESULTED IN A LOSS OF ABOUT 6 BILLION DOLLARS. THE SUPPORT OF A LARGE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT SEEMED IMPOSSIBLE AS IMPORTS CONTINUED TO EXCEED EXPORTS AND THE COAL PITS SEEMED NEAR EXHAUSTION.

THE UNITED STATES, ON THE OTHER HAND, OBVIOUSLY DESERVED HER BIG-TIME POSITION. THE WAR HAD MATERIALLY INCREASED HER PRODUCTION OUTPUT. WHILE RUSSIA FINISHED THE WAR WITH



HER ECONOMY DAMAGED TO THE EXTENT OF ONE-FOURTH THE TOTAL NATIONAL WEALTH AND BRITAIN WAS CRIPPLED TO THE EXTENT OF 6 BILLION DOLLARS, THE UNITED STATES HAD BROKEN ALL FORMER PRODUCTION RECORDS. BY 1946 SHE WAS PRODUCING 50% OF THE WORLD'S CORN SUPPLY, 40% OF ITS IRON, AND OVER 50% ITS TOTAL ENERGY. CLEARLY SUCH WAR POTENTIAL IN THE HANDS OF A FUTURE ADVERSARY POSED A SERIOUS THREAT TO SOVIET POST-WAR EXPANSION PLANS. SOVIET PRODUCTION ITSELF HAD TO BE INCREASED RADICALLY AND SOON.

IN THE FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS NEW PRODUCTION GOALS (SPRING 1946) THE KREMLIN REVEALED ITS PLANS FOR SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN THE VITAL INDUSTRIES. HEAVY INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT WERE SCHEDULED FOR AN INCREASE TO 50% ABOVE 1940 BY 1950. STALIN PROPOSED TO RAISE SOVIET PER CAPITA OUTPUT OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS TO A LEVEL EQUAL WITH OR ABOVE THAT OF THE OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. MEN AND MACHINES WERE DRIVEN TO AN EXTENT WHICH ONLY RUTHLESS GOVERNMENT CONTROL COULD PERMIT. YET THERE WERE LIMITS TO WHAT COULD BE DONE. EVEN IF ALL WENT WELL AND ALL GOALS WERE REACHED (SOMETHING EVEN STALIN DIDN'T BELIEVE POSSIBLE) SOVIET PRODUCTION WOULD STILL FALL CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF THE UNITED STATES PREWAR SCHEDULES.

THE DISPARITY IN STEEL AND VEHICLE PRODUCTION, TWO KEY WAR ITEMS WAS ALARMINGLY LARGE. EVEN IF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN POWERS COULD BE KEPT FROM THE AMERICAN CAMP BY THREAT, INTIMIDATION, AND POLITICAL INTRIGUE (THROUGH MILITANT COMMUNIST PARTY ACTION FROM WITHIN) AMERICAN PRODUCTION ALONE WOULD BE OVERWHELMING. FURTHERMORE, THE LATTER SHOWED NO SIGNS OF HAVING REACHED ITS MAXIMUM LIMITS. IF ALL EFFORTS SHORT OF WAR FAILED TO KEEP WESTERN EUROPE OUT OF THE AMERICAN CAMP THE DISPARITY WOULD BE EVEN GREATER. CLEARLY INCREASED SOVIET

PRODUCTION ALONE WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH. TWO OTHER MOVES WERE NECESSARY. EASTERN EUROPE MUST BE QUICKLY INTEGRATED INTO THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS FITTED IN NICELY WITH SOVIET EXPANSION PLANS ALREADY FORMULATED. (ITS TIMING AND METHOD ARE OUTLINED ELSEWHERE IN THIS ARTICLE). BUT MORE IMPORTANT, GERMANY WITH ITS VAST PRODUCTION POTENTIAL HAD TO BE BROUGHT UNDER SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL.

BY FEBRUARY 1946, THE SOVIET UNION HAD WOVEN A WEB OF ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS AROUND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT SERVED BOTH TO MAKE POLITICAL ABSORPTION WHICH WAS SOON TO FOLLOW EASIER, AND TO ACHIEVE THE MINIMUM ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN CASE POLITICAL ANNEXATION SHOULD PROVE DIFFICULT. TRADE WITH THESE NEIGHBORS WAS NOT ONLY TO ECLIPSE ALL PREVIOUS RECORDS OF FORMER SOVIET COMMERCE WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL STATE BUT ITS TOTAL OF MORE THAN \$200 MILLION A YEAR WAS CONSIDERABLY GREATER THAN THE AVERAGE YEARLY TOTAL OF TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND ALL OF EUROPE BETWEEN 1934 AND 1937. THE SOVIET-HUNGARIAN AGREEMENT CALLED FOR AN EXCHANGE IN EXCESS OF 30 MILLION DOLLARS; THE SOVIET-RUMANIAN AGREEMENT INVOLVED MORE THAN 12 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE SAME PERIOD. THE POLISH-SOVIET EXCHANGE EXCEEDED 60 MILLION DOLLARS AND THE CZECH-SOVIET, 20 MILLION DOLLARS DURING A SIX-MONTH PERIOD. A BIT MORE MODERATE BUT STILL SIGNIFICANT WERE THE 10 MILLION DOLLAR BULGARIAN-SOVIET AND THE 8 MILLION DOLLAR FINNISH-SOVIET YEARLY DEALS.

THE TREMENDOUS MIGHT OF GERMAN WAR PRODUCTION HAD MADE ITSELF FELT DURING BOTH WORLD WARS I AND II. NATIONAL UNITY ACHIEVED UNDER BIS-MARCK'S SHREWD HAND IN 1870 HAD BROUGHT NOT ONLY STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO GERMANY BUT THE RICH PROVINCE OF ALSACE-LORRAINE. LORRAINE





BERLINERS observe the traffic between British and French zones

WAS THE SEAT OF EUROPE'S LARGEST IRON ORE RESERVES AND THEY WERE LOCATED ONLY 150 MILES SOUTH OF THE RUHR VALLEY'S EXCELLENT COKING COAL. THE ORE HAD BEEN NEARLY WORTHLESS PRIOR TO 1878 WHEN THE ENGLISH CHEMISTS GILCHRIST AND THOMAS PERFECTED A PROCESS WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE TO REMOVE THE UNDESIRABLE PHOSPHOROUS. UNDER THIS NEW PROCESS GERMAN STEEL OUTPUT SKYROCKETED. BETWEEN 1880 AND 1913 OUTPUT INCREASED FROM 690,000 TO 17,320,000 TONS. "THE RHINELAND-WESTPHALIAN" AREA, INCLUDING THE RUHR, BECAME THE MOST HIGHLY INDUSTRIALIZED AREA, AND GREATEST STEEL-MAKING DISTRICT OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE, AND SECONDARY STEEL-MAKING CENTERS DEVELOPED IN THE SAAR BASIN AND UPPER SILESIA, BOTH BEING WELL ENDOWED WITH COAL." THE LOSS OF LORRAINE WHILE CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DISLOCATION AFTER WORLD WAR I, DID NOT RELEGATE GERMANY TO A MINOR PRODUCTION ROLE. BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW

PLANTS, EXTENSIVE MECHANIZATION IN COAL AND IRON MINING, INTENSIVE EXPLOITATION OF LEAN IRON ORES SCATTERED ABOUT THE COUNTRY, LARGER IMPORTS OF SWEDISH AND SPANISH ORES AND THE ERECTION OF INTERNATIONAL COMBINES AND CARTELS MAKING LORRAINE AGAIN AVAILABLE, SHE WAS ABLE TO REGAIN HER FORMER POSITION OF THE WORLD'S NUMBER TWO PRODUCER OF IRON AND STEEL BY 1925. 1939 FOUND GERMANY LEADING ALL OTHER NATIONS OF THE WORLD EXCEPT THE UNITED STATES IN STEEL PRODUCTION. THESE FIGURES HAVE GREATLY INFLUENCED PRESENT SOVIET POLICY IN GERMANY.

BUT WHILE GERMANY HAD BEEN GROWING STRONGER BY LEAPS AND BOUNDS, BRITISH PRODUCTION HAD NOT KEPT PACE. STALIN COULD TAKE GREAT COMFORT FROM THE FACT THAT THE NUMBER 3 POWER HAD BEEN SLIPPING BADLY IN THE STEEL PRODUCTION RACE SINCE BEFORE THE TURN OF THE CENTURY. WHILE THE BRITISH OUT-



PUT OF STEEL INGOTS INCREASED FROM 220,000 TONS IN 1870 TO 4,900,000 TONS IN 1900 AND THEN TO 13,500,000 TONS IN 1939, IT HAD BEEN SURPASSED IN 1890 BY THE UNITED STATES, IN 1894 BY GERMANY AND BY RUSSIA IN 1934. BRITAIN'S SHARE IN THE WORLD'S TOTAL PRODUCTION OF STEEL DECLINED FROM 43% IN 1870 TO 18% IN 1900 AND TO ABOUT 10% IN 1939.

BUT STALIN COULD TAKE EVEN GREATER COMFORT FROM THE PROGRESS OF HIS OWN HEAVY INDUSTRIES. SUCH COMFORT WAS JUSTIFIABLE. AT A HEAVY COST IN PRIVATION AND BLOOD, A GIANT STEEL INDUSTRY HAD BEEN ERECTED IN NEW MANUFACTURING CENTERS IN THE URAL MOUNTAINS AND SIBERIA, WELL OUT OF REACH OF INVADING ARMIES. NO NATION OF THE WORLD HAD EVER ACHIEVED SUCH OUTSTANDING PROGRESS IN SO SHORT A TIME AS THE SOVIET UNION. IN 1913 RUSSIAN STEEL PRODUCTION STOOD AT 4 MILLION TONS. TWENTY-SIX YEARS LATER THE FIGURE HAD INCREASED ALMOST FIVE FOLD TO 19 MILLION TONS. SINCE 1931 THE SOVIET UNION HAS OCCUPIED THE NUMBER THREE SPOT AMONG THE WORLD'S IRON AND STEEL PRODUCERS.

OF EVEN GREATER SIGNIFICANCE WAS THE FACT THAT UNLIKE ALL OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, RUSSIA WAS COMPLETELY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN ALL THE BASIC MATERIALS OF STEEL-MAKING. BY 1937 DOMESTIC PLANTS WERE MANUFACTURING 98% OF ALL THE FINISHED IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS USED IN RUSSIA. THIS CONTRASTS GREATLY WITH BRITAIN WHO TODAY RELIES ON FOREIGN ORES FOR NEARLY 50% OF THE TOTAL SMELTED ON THE ISLAND.

ONE SIGNIFICANT FACT STOOD OUT FOR SOVIET PLANNERS TO GRASP IN 1945. AT THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II FOUR COUNTRIES HAD MANUFACTURED 3/4THS OF THE WORLD'S TOTAL SUPPLY OF STEEL: THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, RUSSIA AND GREAT BRITAIN. ONE OF THESE NATIONS, GREAT BRITAIN, WAS NOT KEEPING

PACE WITH THE OTHERS. WITH THREE OF THEM, THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND GERMANY LINED UP AGAINST HER, RUSSIA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO WAGE A SUCCESSFUL PROTRACTED WAR. INDUSTRIAL WEIGHT WOULD TELL AGAINST HER. BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL TIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES IT APPEARED DOUBTFUL THAT BRITAIN COULD BE WEENED AWAY FROM HER AMERICAN ALLY. GERMANY, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD NO SUCH RIGID AFFILIATIONS. SHE COULD AND INDEED MUST BE WON OVER TO RUSSIA TO BALANCE THE INDUSTRIAL SCALES. IN ANY CASE, GERMAN RUHR PRODUCTION MUST NOT BE THROWN INTO THE SCALES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THIS COMBINATION OF AIMS, A GERMANY FOR RUSSIA IF POSSIBLE, BUT IN ANY CASE, A GERMANY WHOSE PRODUCTION MUST NOT BE UTILIZED TO REVITALIZE WESTERN EUROPE PRESENTED DIPLOMATIC TASK. THEY WERE NOT NECESSARILY COMPATIBLE AIMS. IF COMPLETE CONTROL OR A LARGE SHARE OF RUHR PRODUCTION WERE DENIED HER, RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO INSIST ON A LOW LEVEL OF STEEL CAPACITY FOR GERMANY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF GERMANY WERE ABOUT TO FALL UNDER SOVIET DOMINATION, A HEALTHY THRIVING GERMAN STEEL INDUSTRY WOULD BE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS. IT IS NOT SURPRISING, THEREFORE, THAT THE SOVIET STAND ON THE LEVEL OF GERMAN INDUSTRY HAS BEEN CONTRADICTORY AT TIMES. THUS DURING 1945, LONG BEFORE THE SOVIETS COULD HOPE TO GET A CONCRETE PROGRAM FOR THE CONTROL OF GERMANY UNDER WAY, IT WAS NOT SURPRISING TO FIND THEM HOLDING OUT FOR A MAXIMUM GERMAN STEEL CAPACITY OF 4,500,000 TONS AS OPPOSED TO A CAPACITY OF 7,000,000 TONS DESIRED BY THE FRENCH AND ONE OF 9,000,000 TONS DESIRED BY THE BRITISH. PLANT REMOVALS TO RUSSIA FROM BOTH EAST AND WEST OCCUPATION ZONES WERE QUITE POPULAR WITH THEM AT THIS TIME AND BECAME MORE SO AS THE PASSING MONTHS FOUND SOVIET POLITICAL AMBITIONS IN GERMANY FRUSTRATED.



IF CONTROL OF THE RUHR COULD NOT BE SECURED THE RUHR'S CAPACITY COULD AT LEAST BE PACKED AND SHIPPED TO THEM. THE BRITISH POSITION, MORE LENIENT TOWARDS THE BREAKUP OF CARTELS, WAS ATTACKED REPEATEDLY BY SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS WHILE THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES WERE BUSY FORMING LARGE SOVIET-OWNED INDUSTRIAL COMBINES IN THEIR OWN ZONE IN RECOGNITION OF THE ELEMENTARY FACT THAT SUCH DEVICES SPEEDED PRODUCTION OUTPUT.

POURING OVER THEIR FIGURES AFTER THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY, SOVIET PLANNERS TOOK SERIOUS NOTE OF THE RELATIVE INDUSTRIAL POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POTENTIAL COALITION AGAINST HER. AS THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION TOOK CONCRETE FORM THESE INESCAPABLE FACTS EMERGED. USING ESTIMATED FIGURES OF 1950 PRODUCTION OF THE KEY WAR INDUSTRIAL ITEMS OF COAL, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, ELECTRIC POWER, CRUDE STEEL, ALUMINUM, MACHINE TOOLS, AND IRON, SOME VITAL FACTS COULD BE GLEANED. WITH GERMANY DIVIDED INTO ITS PRESENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ZONES AND GIVEN CURRENT GERMAN PRODUCTION THE NATO GROUP WOULD HAVE A PREPONDERANCE OF INDUSTRIAL POWER IN THE RATIO OF APPROXIMATELY 5 TO 1. IF ALL OF GERMANY SHOULD FALL UNDER SOVIET CONTROL AND CURRENT GERMAN PRODUCTION LEVELS WERE MAINTAINED THE RATIO WOULD FALL TO 3.5 TO 1. BETTER YET, IF WHEN SAFELY UNDER SOVIET CONTROL GERMANY'S PRODUCTION COULD BE INCREASED TO ABOUT 150% OF ITS PRE-WAR LEVEL (THE AVERAGE INCREASE OF THE NATO GROUP BY 1950) THE RATIO WOULD FALL AGAIN TO A FAR MORE DESIRABLE 2.8 TO 1. WITH SUCH A FIGURE A QUICK WAR AGAINST THE WEST COULD BE SUCCESSFUL. ANY HIGHER RATIO WOULD MEAN ALMOST CERTAIN FINAL DEFEAT. GERMAN PRODUCTION REMAINED THE KEY TO THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF SOVIET PLANS FOR WORLD DOMINATION, AND THE KREMLIN WAS THEN BECOMING INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THIS FACT.

### THE SHIFTING POLICIES OF RUSSIA IN GERMANY

THE STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD A LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR GERMANY IS NOT NEGATED BY THE FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN A CHANGING ONE. IT IS OF THE GREATEST HELP IN CONSIDERING RUSSIA'S GERMAN POLICY TO REMEMBER THAT THE GOAL OF A GERMANY ORIENTED TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN BUT ONE OF THE FAR-REACHING AIMS OF THE KREMLIN IN HER POST-WAR EXPANSION SCHEMES. AS SUCH IT HAS HAD TO BE FITTED INTO THE OVERALL PATTERN, A PATTERN WHICH HAS ITSELF BEEN ALTERED BY THE DISPOSITION OF THE OTHER MAJOR WORLD POWERS AS WELL AS THE DEGREE OF RESISTANCE OF THE TARGET COUNTRIES TOWARD IT.

IN PROSECUTING THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY, THE RUSSIANS EITHER BY ACCIDENT OR DESIGN EMPLOYED A STRATEGY THAT ENABLED THEM TO END THE WAR WITH THEIR MILITARY FORCES SO DEPLOYED AS TO MAKE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY WHICH WAS TO FOLLOW RELATIVELY SIMPLE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF A MORE ADVANTAGEOUS MILITARY DISPOSITION FOR A QUICK FULFILLMENT OF THE LONG-CHERISHED PAN-SLAV MOVEMENT OF THE TSARS THAN THAT ENJOYED BY THE SOVIETS AT THE WAR'S END. THE ELEMENT OF INTIMIDATION BACKED UP BY THE EVER-PRESENT SOVIET MILITARY FORCES CAME TO BE THE WEAPON OF PERSUASION THAT ONE BY ONE REDUCED THE EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS TO VASSAL STATES.

IT IS INTERESTING TO SPECULATE ON WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED TO GERMANY HAD SHE SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED THE CROSS CHANNEL INVASION OF THE WESTERN ALLIES IN 1944 ONLY TO SUCCEMB TO THE SOVIET ARMIES LATER ON. GERMANY WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY OCCUPIED BY THE RUSSIANS MUCH IN THE WAY HER ALLY BULGARIA WAS. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED IN A MANNER NOT DIS-



SIMILAR TO THOSE IN BULGARIA. THIS UNFORTUNATE COUNTRY, WE WILL REMEMBER, EARLY IN 1946 RECEIVED SOVIET "ASSISTANCE" IN FORMING A "FREE AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT." LIKE GERMANY, BULGARIA HAS HAD LITTLE REAL DEMOCRATIC TRADITION SO THE RUSSIAN MENTORS UTILIZED A BIT MORE FORCE THAN PERSUASION IN CONTRAST TO THEIR POLICY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHERE THE PROPORTIONS WERE REVERSED. IT SOON BECAME APPARENT IN BULGARIA AS IT HAD IN HUNGARY IN MAY OF 1947 AND RUMANIA IN MARCH OF 1945 THAT RUSSIA'S IDEA OF A "FREE AND DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY FRIENDLY TO THE SOVIET UNION" MEANT A COUNTRY CONTROLLED BY THE COMMUNIST MINORITY WHICH IN TURN RECEIVED ITS ORDERS FROM MOSCOW. THE MAIN OPPOSITION TO THIS PROGRAM FROM WITHIN BULGARIA STEMMED FROM THE STAND TAKEN BY THE LARGEST SINGLE POLITICAL PARTY, THE AGRARIAN, AND ITS LEADER NIKOLA PETKOV. PETKOV RESISTED THE TRANSPARENT MANEUVERS OF THE COMMUNISTS FORCING THE LATTER TO DROP THEIR QUASI-LEGAL MANEUVERING FOR DIRECT ACTION. THIS DIRECT ACTION TOOK THE FORM OF PETKOV'S EXECUTION ON SEPTEMBER 23, 1947 ON TRUMPED UP CHARGES OF TREASON. THE AGRARIAN PARTY WAS QUICKLY DISSOLVED AND ITS MEMBERS FORBIDDEN TO PARTICIPATE IN POLITICAL LIFE. THE COMMUNIST LEADER, GEORGI DIMITROV, NOW ISSUED A CONSTITUTION BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY WHICH PROVIDED IN DIMITROV'S OWN WORDS, FOR "COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF ALL REMNANTS OF THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM OF EXPLOITATION."

PETKOV'S TRIAL WAS FOLLOWED BY A SERIES OF OTHERS. AMONG THE MORE IMPORTANT VICTIMS WAS GENERAL KYRIL STANCHEV, THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE BULGARIAN ARMIES THAT FOUGHT THE GERMANS IN 1944 AND 1945. THE REMAINING NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES WERE STRANGLED BY THE BEGINNING OF 1949. IN FEBRUARY 1949 THE ZVENO AND RADICAL PARTIES WERE MERGED INTO THE

FATHERLAND FRONT. "ON FEBRUARY 2, THE FATHERLAND FRONT WAS DECLARED A POLITICAL PARTY AND THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT VIRTUALLY BECAME A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM." FEBRUARY 12 FOUND ALL NON-COMMUNIST DEPUTIES EXPELLED FROM THE SOBRANIE AND THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE FATHERLAND FRONT WHILE ALL THE PRINCIPAL BOURGEOIS LEADERS HAD BEEN PUT AWAY OR EXECUTED.

IN THE MEANTIME DIMITROV'S CONCEPT OF THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY HAD UNDERGONE A PROFOUND CHANGE. IN 1947 "A PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY WAS NOT TO BE A SOVIET REPUBLIC." THE STATE WAS TO BE DIRECTED BY THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE, NOT THE COMMUNIST PARTY. HOWEVER, BY DECEMBER 1948, HE DESCRIBED IT AS A STATE IN A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD TO SOCIALISM WHICH SERVES "THE FUNCTION OF PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP." HE REMINDED THE PEOPLE THAT IT HAD BEEN "CREATED THROUGH THE HISTORIC VICTORY OF THE RED ARMY AND COULD DEVELOP FURTHER ONLY IF IT RELIED ON THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION." THIS WAS NOT A DISGUISED FACT. THE RUSSIAN ROLE IN THE ENTIRE MATTER HAD QUICKLY BECOME APPARENT TO THE REST OF THE WORLD. DIMITROV'S NEXT STATEMENT CAME AS NO SURPRISE AS IT SUMMED UP SUCCINCTLY THE KEY TO SOVIET POLICY. HE NOTED THAT "ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES FORMED ONE SINGLE COMMUNIST FRONT UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET PARTY AND ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE ONE LEADER AND ONE TEACHER RECOGNIZED BY ALL-COMRADE STALIN."

ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1949, MARSHAL NIKOLAI BULGANIN ISSUED A WARNING TO THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES. ANYTHING THAT WEAKENED THE TIES OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE "DEMOCRATIC" COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION, OR DEVIATED FROM THE LENIN-STALIN PRINCIPLES WAS TREASON. THIS STATEMENT SERVED TO WIPE OUT THE LAST PRETENSE OF INDEPENDENCE ANY OF THE SATELLITES MAY HAVE HAD. ACTUALLY, IN BULGARIA STALINIST ELEMENTS AND BULGARIANS TRAINED IN RUS-





WEST GERMAN POLICE arrest demonstrator in West Berlin riot

SIA HAVE STEADILY TAKEN OVER ALL IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY POSTS SINCE 1948. "ALTHOUGH STILL DE JURE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, BULGARIA FOR ALL PURPOSES HAS BECOME DE FACTO A SOVIET REPUBLIC."

IT IS USELESS OF COURSE TO MERELY SPECULATE ON WHAT SOVIET POLICY IN GERMANY WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE SOVIET ARMY AS THE SOLE OCCUPIER UNLESS, OF COURSE, SUCH SPECULATION CAN AID US IN DETERMINING WHY THE RUSSIANS ACTED AS THEY DID IN GERMANY FROM 1945 ON. IT APPEARS THAT SUCH A FUNCTION CAN BE SERVED. IF WE ASSUME THE TECHNIQUES AS EMPLOYED IN BULGARIA TO BE THE MOST DIRECT AND DESIRABLE FROM THE SOVIET STANDPOINT, WE THEN HAVE A YARDSTICK BY WHICH TO MEASURE THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE GERMAN POLICY FELL SHORT OF THE IDEAL.

THE GREATEST SINGLE FACTOR MARKING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BULGARIAN AND GERMAN APPROACHES WAS THE EXISTENCE OF VITAL BRITISH, FRENCH AND UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN GERMANY. WHEREAS IN BULGARIA SUCH OPPOSITION AS EXISTED STEMMED SOLELY FROM DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS WITHIN THE COUNTRY, IN GERMANY THE OPPOSITION CAME LARGELY, ALTHOUGH NOT BY ANY MEANS EXCLUSIVELY, FROM WITHOUT. IT IS QUITE CLEAR SOVIET PLANS IN GERMANY CAME TO GRIEF UPON THE ROCKS OF STEADFAST WESTERN ZONES RESISTANCE. THIS RESISTANCE WAS AT FIRST WEAK AND HESITANT. LATER IT GREW STRONGER AND MORE SENSITIVE. AT ALL TIMES IT WAS MORE NEGATIVE THAN POSITIVE, DESIGNED TO CONTAIN THE SOVIETS RATHER THAN TO ADVANCE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE WEST IN EUROPE. AS SOVIET PRESSURE INCREASED, IT INCREASED TOO, UNTIL TODAY GERMANY STANDS DIVIDED AND EAST FACES WEST OVER ARMED BORDERS.

#### THE EARLY YEARS

IN EXAMINING THE EARLY SOVIET MOVES IN GERMANY, ONE FINDS IT HELPFUL TO RECREATE THE CONDITIONS EXISTING AS THE EUROPEAN WAR DREW TO A CLOSE. WITH THE CRUSHING DEFEAT OF THE GERMAN ARMIES, THE SOVIET UNION EMERGED AS A VICTORIOUS NATION OF GREAT MILITARY POWER. UNLIKE THE WEAK, INTERNALLY DISORGANIZED AND HIGHLY DISTRUSTED POWER OF THE PREWAR YEARS, THE RUSSIAN STATE TOWERED ABOVE ALL OTHER INDIVIDUAL POWERS BOTH IN EUROPE AND IN ASIA. THE TERRIBLE FEARS THAT HAD HAUNTED THE KREMLIN OF A GERMAN THRUST TO MOSCOW HAD BEEN REMOVED BY A BRILLIANT DEFENSIVE STAND. AS THE MECHANIZED HORDES OF THE GERMAN PANZER DIVISIONS HURLED THEMSELVES TO DESTRUCTION IT BECAME CLEAR TO ALL THE WORLD THAT THE SOVIET FEAR OF INVASION BY THE POWERS OF THE WEST LONG NOURISHED BY MOSCOW HAD BEEN DECISIVELY REMOVED. OF THIS THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION



IN ANYONE'S MIND. "FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE ITS INCEPTION THE SOVIET UNION FOUND ITS BORDERS UNQUALIFIEDLY SECURE FROM INVASION." THIS DRASTICALLY ALTERED SITUATION GAVE THE U.S.S.R. A FREE HAND IN THE CONDUCT OF ITS FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUCH AS IT HAD NEVER BEFORE ENJOYED. THE JAPANESE DAGGER WHICH HAD DRAWN RUSSIAN BLOOD IN 1905 LAY BLUNTED. ALL OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES WEAKENED BY WAR AND OCCUPATION LAY HELPLESS BEFORE THE RUSSIAN BEAR. FRANCE AND BRITAIN NEARLY EXHAUSTED BY THE LIFE AND DEATH STRUGGLE WITH HITLER OFFERED NONE OF THE LEADERSHIP EUROPE HAD RECEIVED FROM THEM DURING THE PAST SEVERAL HUNDRED YEARS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT WAS THE CHANGED ATTITUDE OF THE NON-SOVIET WORLD. TRUST AND GOODWILL REPLACED SUSPICION AND HATE. FRANCE, BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES ALL EVIDENCED AN UNMISTAKABLY GENUINE RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR THE ALLY WHO HAD FOUGHT SO VALIANTLY ON THEIR SIDE. THEY STOOD READY AND INDEED EAGER TO WORK AMICABLY WITH THE U.S.S.R. THE U.N., UPON WHICH ALL OF BRITAIN AND AMERICA'S HOPE FOR A FUTURE PEACEFUL WORLD RESTED, COULD WORK ONLY IF THE FIVE GREAT POWERS WHO FORMED THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF ITS SECURITY COUNCIL PULLED TOGETHER. THIS WAS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED BY ALL.

TWO COURSES LAY OPEN TO THE MEN IN THE KREMLIN. THEY COULD ENTER WHOLEHEARTEDLY INTO THE WORLD SECURITY SYSTEM AND BECOME A STRONG FORCE FOR WORLD PEACE OR THEY COULD SEIZE THE UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY TO CONCENTRATE ON THE EXTENSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE BOTH THROUGH THE SUBVERSIVE INFLUENCES OF COMMUNISM (MADE MORE ACCEPTABLE BY THE CHAOTIC CONDITIONS FOLLOWING THE WAR) AND THE SHEER STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET ARMIES. NO ONE TODAY ENTERTAINS ANY SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO WHICH COURSE THE SOVIETS CHOSE.

ONLY IN THIS SETTING CAN ONE MAKE

SENSE OUT OF THE EARLY SOVIET GERMAN POLICY WITH ITS APPARENT INNER CONFLICTS AND INCONSISTENCIES WHICH EMERGED FOLLOWING YALTA AND POTSDAM. FOR WHILE THE SOVIET DECISION TO SEEK THE EVENTUAL CONTROL OF ALL GERMANY HAD BEEN MADE AS PART OF THE OVERALL DECISION TO AGGRESSIVELY EXPAND, IT FACED THE POTENTIAL RESISTANCE OF ONE NATION WHICH LIKE THE U.S.S.R. EMERGED FROM THE WAR A RELATIVELY FAR STRONGER NATION THAN IT HAD BEEN AT THE START OF THE WAR. ON THE ONE HAND THE GREATLY IMPROVED SOVIET POWER POSITION PLUS THE WEAKENED EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS INVITED DIRECT AND FORCEFUL ACTION IN GERMANY. ON THE OTHER HAND, ANOTHER AND NO LESS COMPELLING CONSIDERATION COUNSELLED CAUTION. YALTA AND POTSDAM FOUND U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH AT ITS PEAK. AMERICAN DIVISIONS SUPERBLY EQUIPPED AND BATTLE TESTED WERE STATIONED IN GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND EVEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. TOTAL FRENCH, BRITISH AND AMERICAN NUMERICAL STRENGTH EXCEEDED THE RUSSIAN BY ABOUT ONE-THIRD. OF COURSE NOT ALL OF THE AMERICAN OR BRITISH STRENGTH WAS IN EUROPE, NEVERTHELESS SUFFICIENT FORCES WERE SO DEPLOYED AS TO MAKE A SOVIET COUP IN GERMANY IMPOSSIBLE EVEN IF A SUDDEN RASH DECISION WERE MADE TO ATTEMPT IT.

THE SOVIET DECISION TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SOLIDIFIED BY THE DATE OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE, I.E., FEBRUARY 1945. RECENT RESEARCH REVEALS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT WHILE PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WAS CONTENT MERELY GETTING A BROAD AGREEMENT ON GENERAL MATTERS STALIN WAS ALREADY SEEKING TO OBTAIN PRECISE CONCESSIONS TO FACILITATE HIS ELABORATE POST-WAR EXPANSION PLANS. THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT WITH GREAT AGILITY DODGED VIRTUALLY ALL FIRM COMMITMENTS EXCEPTING SOVIET CLAIMS IN THE FAR EAST. THESE HE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT EVEN BEFORE THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE IN 1943. HE BELIEVED THE SOVIETS HAD A LEGITIMATE



CLAIM TO MOST OF THE TERRITORY SINCE IT INVOLVED TERRITORY AND PRIVILEGES TAKEN BY THE JAPANESE FROM THE RUSSIANS IN THE WAR OF 1904. BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, ROOSEVELT OBVIOUSLY FELT THE 25 DIVISIONS THE SOVIETS PROMISED TO SEND AGAINST JAPAN WOULD BRING A SPEEDY END TO WHAT STILL PROMISED TO BE A COSTLY WAR AGAINST THE JAPANESE HOMELAND. BUT WHATEVER THE REASONING, STALIN HAD OBTAINED A FIRM PROMISE ON THE FAR EAST. UPON HIS INSISTENCE THE AGREEMENT WAS PUT IN WRITING. "THE HEADS OF THE THREE GREAT POWERS HAVE AGREED THAT THESE CLAIMS OF THE SOVIET UNION SHALL BE UNQUESTIONABLY FULFILLED AFTER JAPAN HAS BEEN DEFEATED."

ON THE QUESTION OF GERMANY, ROOSEVELT WAS LESS INCLINED TO BE PINNED DOWN ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS WERE NO LESS ANXIOUS TO GET CONCRETE GUARANTEES. RUSSIA APPEARS TO HAVE ADVANCED TWO IMPORTANT CLAIMS: 1) REPARATIONS WERE TO BE PAID BY GERMANY IN THE SUM OF 20 BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, 50% OF WHICH SHOULD GO TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND 2) POLAND'S WESTERN BOUNDARIES SHOULD BE EXTENDED AT GERMANY'S EXPENSE TO THE NEISSE RIVER. ON BOTH THESE QUESTIONS THE PRESIDENT DODGED FIRM COMMITMENTS SEEKING TO TREAT THEM LATER ON.

NEVERTHELESS DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT AGREE TO EITHER DEMAND, THE SOVIETS LATER CHOSE TO BEHAVE AS IF HE HAD. THIS LAST TACTIC WAS FACILITATED BY THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH WHICH MADE DIRECT REFUTATION IMPOSSIBLE. MOLOTOV ALSO ATTEMPTED TO HAVE WRITTEN IN THE YALTA COMMUNIQUE AN AMENDMENT TO THE SECTION ON LIBERATED AREAS. EVEN WHILE AGREEING TO AN EXPRESSION OF GENERAL TERMS REAFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS SEEKING WAYS TO CIRCUMVENT THEM. THE PROPOSED AMMENDMENT WAS TO READ: "AND IN THIS CONNEC-

TION SUPPORT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THESE COUNTRIES WHO TOOK AN ACTIVE PART IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE GERMAN INVADERS." BY THIS DEVICE THEY HOPED TO GIVE SOME MEASURE OF LEGITIMACY TO THE POLITICAL INTERFERENCE THEY HAD ALREADY PLANNED FOR EASTERN EUROPE. STETTINIUS' STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS AMMENDMENT SINCE IT SUGGESTED "TOO MUCH INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THESE COUNTRIES" MAY HAVE ALARMED THE SOVIETS WITH ITS IMPLICATION THAT WE SUSPECTED THEIR MOTIVES FOR THEY DROPPED THE AMENDMENT WITH NO FURTHER INSISTENCE.

ADDITIONAL GENERAL AGREEMENTS CONCERNING GERMANY INVOLVED THE DIVISION OF GERMANY INTO 3 SEPARATE ZONES WITH COORDINATION AND CONTROL TO BE EXERCISED THROUGH A CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION COMPOSED OF THE THREE POWERS WITH HEADQUARTERS IN BERLIN. FRANCE WAS RELUCTANTLY CUT INTO THE DEAL BY RUSSIA AFTER BOTH BRITAIN AND THE U.S. AGREED TO GIVE HER A ZONE MADE UP OF PARTS OF THEIRS. AGREEMENT WAS ALSO FORTHCOMING ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE DESTRUCTION OF NAZIISM AND MILITARISM, THE REMOVAL OR DESTRUCTION OF ALL WAR EQUIPMENT, THE DESTRUCTION OR CONTROL OF INDUSTRY HAVING WAR POTENTIAL, THE PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS, AND THE REMOVAL FROM PUBLIC OFFICE OF NAZIS AND MILITARISTIC INFLUENCES.

SINCE THESE LAST ITEMS WERE SUBJECT TO INDIVIDUAL INTERPRETATION LITTLE DIFFICULTY WAS HAD IN GETTING GENERAL AGREEMENT. IT IS CLEAR THE SOVIETS TREATED THEM AS WORTHLESS TRAPPINGS. YET SIGNIFICANTLY ENOUGH, BOTH THE U.S. AND BRITAIN COUNTED THEM AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULTS OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE. THE IDEALISTS WERE OVERJOYED AT THE DECISIONS MADE THERE. THE REALISTS WAITED FOR THE NEXT ROUND WHEN THEIR CONCRETE AIMS WOULD GET FURTHER AIRING.



## THE INITIAL PHASE OF SOVIET TACTICS

THUS, YALTA SAW LAUNCHED THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE SOVIET BLUE-PRINT FOR GERMANY. IT WAS TO FEATURE APPARENT AGREEMENT WITH THE WEST ON ALL MATTERS THAT WERE EITHER FAVORABLE TO SOVIET PLANS OR TOO GENERAL TO BE RESTRICTIVE. THE PLANS THEMSELVES WERE RELATIVELY SIMPLE. A "UNIFIED" GERMANY WOULD BE AGREED TO, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO THE RIGHT OF THE SOVIET EASTERN ZONE COMMANDER TO HAVE THE LAST WORD ON ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO AFFAIRS IN HIS OWN DOMAIN. IN THE MEANTIME THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN GERMANY, A LEGAL "DEMOCRATIC PARTY" WOULD WORK TO DOMINATE THE POLITICAL SCENE. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY IN HUGE QUANTITIES WERE TO RESTORE THE WAR-DAMAGED SOVIET ECONOMY WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PRODUCING NEAR ECONOMIC CHAOS WITHIN GERMANY ITSELF. IN THIS ATMOSPHERE COMMUNISM WOULD HAVE THE GREATEST OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP. THE UNITED STATES COULD BE EXPECTED TO REBEL AT THE CONTINUED DEFICIT FINANCING NEEDED TO KEEP HER ZONE GOING AND WITHDRAW FROM THE GERMAN SCENE IN THE FACE OF TAXPAYER INDIGNATION. MEANWHILE THE CONTINUED REDUCTIONS IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD THROW THE POWER CONSCIOUS GERMANS MORE AND MORE INTO THE SOVIET LAP, FOR THE SOVIET ARMIES WERE TO BE HELD AT A HIGH LEVEL. A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN GERMANY, BOUND TO OCCUR UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD PLACE GERMANY SECURELY IN SOVIET HANDS. IN THE MEANTIME THE TIMETABLE FOR EASTERN EUROPE WOULD BE CAREFULLY MAINTAINED. WITH COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISHED ON GERMANY'S EASTERN BORDERS, THE LATTER WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO HOLD OUT.

AT THE SAME TIME, WESTERN PRESTIGE IN THE EASTERN ZONE WAS TO BE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM. FOUR POWER OCCUPATION OF BERLIN HAD TO BE AGREED TO IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO

ALLAY THE WESTERN ZONE OCCUPIERS' FEARS. NEVERTHELESS IT WAS NOT BY ACCIDENT THAT THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION'S PROCLAMATIONS CONCERNING THE OCCUPATION OF BERLIN CONTAINED NO GUARANTEE OF ACCESS TO BERLIN OR SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR TRUCK, RAIL, OR AIR RIGHTS OF WAY. THE SOVIETS WERE MERELY LOOKING AHEAD TO THE DAY WHEN THEIR CONTROL OF THE PORTALS OF BERLIN MIGHT BE A POWERFUL WEAPON IN THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY.

THE RUSSIANS LOST NO TIME IN IMPLEMENTING THIS WELL CONSIDERED POLICY. AT THE SECOND MEETING OF THE ALLIED COMMANDERS IN BERLIN ON JULY 7, 1945, THEIR PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC UNDERMINING BEGAN. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET ZONE WAS BY FAR THE LARGEST FOOD PRODUCING AREA OF GERMANY, THEY INSISTED THAT EACH SECTOR OF BERLIN BE FED BY ITS OCCUPIER. THIS MEANT THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE TO FEED THEIR OWN ARMIES AND THE PEOPLES OF THEIR OWN WESTERN ZONES BUT A LARGE SHARE OF THE LARGEST CITY OF THE SOVIET ZONE ITSELF. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIET ARMY WAS TO CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF FURTHER REDUCING THE TOTAL GERMAN FOOD SUPPLY BY LIVING OFF THE LAND IN THE RUSSIAN ZONE. ZHUKOV ALSO INSISTED THAT RUHR COAL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ALL BERLIN. THIS NEAT ARRANGEMENT WOULD PERMIT LESS HOMES IN THE WESTERN ZONES TO BE HEATED, LESS FACTORIES TO OPERATE THERE, AND MORE UNEMPLOYMENT TO DEVELOP. AT THE SAME TIME IT FREED SILESIAN COAL PRODUCTION FOR POLAND WHICH WAS BEING CAREFULLY INTEGRATED INTO THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SPHERE. THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE WHICH HAD REAFFIRMED ALL THE GENERALITIES OF YALTA, IN ADDITION "CLEARLY CONTEMPLATED THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF A SINGLE ECONOMIC LIFE FOR THE WHOLE OF GERMANY WHICH WOULD ENABLE IT TO BE SELF-SUPPORTING." SUCH A PROGRAM, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE FRUSTRATED THE SOVIET PLANS FOR



ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THEREFORE THAT GENERAL CLAY SHOULD REPORT, "THIS WAS THE FIELD IN WHICH WE FIRST BEGAN TO ENCOUNTER THE SOVIET VETO AND IT WAS OUR FAILURE TO OBTAIN A COMMON UTILIZATION OF GERMAN PRODUCTS WHICH LED TO THE BREAKUP OF QUADRIPARTITE GOVERNMENT."

WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE, THE COMMUNIST DRIVE FOR CONTROL OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BEGAN. THE END OF 1945 FOUND RUMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, AND ALBANIA SAFELY IN THE HANDS OF COMMUNIST DICTATORS. IN POLAND, HUNGARY, AND BULGARIA THE PLANS WERE WELL AFOOT. ONLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA GAVE EVIDENCE OF A STUBBORN DETERMINATION TO HOLD ON TO ITS FREEDOM. BUT IT WAS TO BE EXPECTED THAT THIS, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC OF THE VICTIMS, WOULD STRUGGLE THE LONGEST.

IN THE MEANTIME THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED TO PAY LIP SERVICE TO ALL OF CLAY'S PROPOSALS FOR CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. THEY HAD LITTLE FEAR THAT SUCH AGENCIES WOULD EVER COME INTO EXISTENCE IN VIEW OF THE ADAMANT FRENCH STAND IN OPPOSITION TO THEM. THEY GAINED MUCH IN PROPAGANDA VALUE AND LOST LITTLE IN ACTUAL FACT WHEN THEY LENT THEIR SUPPORT TO THE AMERICAN COMMANDER IN HIS EFFORTS TO PUT GERMANY ON A PAYING BASIS BY ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC CONTROL THROUGH SUCH AGENCIES. SUCH A PROGRAM WOULD HAVE BEEN INIMICABLE TO THEIR OWN BEST INTERESTS TO SAY THE LEAST. YET IT TOOK THE CYNICAL FRENCH TO SEE THROUGH THEIR PRETENSE. THEY POINTED OUT TO GENERAL CLAY THAT "EARLY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES WAS NOT SINCERE." THE LATTER REALIZED THIS HIMSELF SOMEWHAT LATER WHEN, FOLLOWING REPEATED SOVIET PRONOUNCEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSAL FOR CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, SOKOLOVSKY

FLATLY TURNED DOWN A SUGGESTION BY BOTH CLAY AND ROBERTSON THAT THE BERLIN CITY ADMINISTRATION SUPERVISE THE OPERATION OF BERLIN UNIVERSITY WHICH WAS IN THE SOVIET SECTOR OF THE CITY. HE FURTHER VETOED AN ADDITIONAL PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES IN GERMANY WHICH WOULD HAVE PROVIDED OBSERVATION POSTS FOR OTHER NATIONS IN EASTERN GERMANY. CLEARLY THE RUSSIANS WOULD IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS SUPPORT NO PROPOSAL THAT IN ANY WAY INTERFERRED WITH THE COMPLETE EXERCISE OF SEVEREIGNTY WITHIN THEIR ZONE. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES EVEN IF CREATED WOULD HAVE BEEN RENDERED INEFFECTUAL BY SOVIET VETOES.

ON THE FIRST DAY OF OCCUPATION, THE WORK OF ORGANIZING A POWERFUL COMMUNIST POLITICAL ORGANIZATION TO FULFILL THE NEED FOR A REVOLUTIONARY FORCE BEGAN. FOUR POLITICAL PARTIES WERE IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED AND PERMITTED TO ORGANIZE IN THE RUSSIAN ZONE. THEY WERE THE COMMUNISTS, THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION, AND THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. ALMOST AT ONCE THEY WERE PRESSURED INTO ANTI-FASCIST BLOCS AND COMPELLED TO COOPERATE WITH EACH OTHER. OF COURSE THESE BLOCS WERE MERELY INSTRUMENTS TO ENABLE THE COMMUNISTS TO CONTROL THE OTHER PARTIES. THIS SOON BECAME APPARENT TO ALL. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY WITH ITS GREAT ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH RESISTED THE COMMUNISTS' EFFORTS BUT FINALLY HAD TO SUBMIT UNDER COMPULSION TO A MERGER WITH THE COMMUNISTS. THE SED OR SOCIALISTS UNITY PARTY EMERGED AND SOON BECAME THE DOMINANT PARTY IN THE ANTI-FASCIST FRONT. ACTUALLY, ITS DEVELOPMENT USHERED IN SINGLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN EASTERN GERMANY.

IN THE WESTERN ZONES THE COMMUNIST PARTIES DID NOT FARE SO WELL. THE KPD (COMMUNIST PARTY) OF THE AMERI-





CITY HALL is swarmed by mob during a communist demonstration in 1948

CAN ZONE NEVER ACHIEVED A VOTING STRENGTH OF MUCH MORE THAN 5%. GERMAN HATRED OF SOVIET METHODS PRECLUDED A GREATER SHOWING OF STRENGTH. DEPRIVED OF THE SINGLE LIST OF CANDIDATES SYSTEM IN VOGUE IN MANY AREAS OF THE EASTERN ZONE, THE WESTERN COMMUNISTS NEVER ACHIEVED REAL POWER.

IN LINE WITH THEIR DESIRE FOR A SLOW GERMAN WESTERN ZONE RECOVERY (TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUSIVE TO THE SPAWNING OF COMMUNISM) THE SOVIETS HELD OUT FOR A LOW LEVEL OF STEEL PRODUCTION. DR. CALVIN HOOVER

OF DUKE UNIVERSITY, ONE OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC EXPERTS, HAD CONCLUDED AFTER CAREFUL STUDY THAT A STEEL CAPACITY OF 7,800,000 TONS WAS ESSENTIAL TO A MINIMUM SUSTAINING GERMAN ECONOMY. THE BRITISH HELD OUT FOR 9,000,000 TONS. THE SOVIETS, QUITE AWARE OF THE EFFECTS OF THEIR PROPOSAL INSISTED THE LIMIT SHOULD BE 4,500,000 TONS. COMPROMISE WAS FINALLY REACHED BY DECEMBER OF 1945 AFTER MANY BITTER EXCHANGES. THE FIGURE WAS 7,500,000 TONS OF CAPACITY ALTHOUGH ANNUAL PRODUCTION WAS RESTRICTED TO



5,800,000 TONS UNLESS INCREASED BY THE ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL.

MEANWHILE THE SOVIET ZONE WITH EVER-INCREASING MOMENTUM WITHDREW FROM THE REST OF GERMANY. GENERAL EISENHOWER HAD GRANTED THE OTHER POWERS FREE ACCESS TO THE AMERICAN ZONE AT THE OPENING MEETING OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL. THE SOVIETS HAD FAILED TO RECIPROCATE. IN THE CONTROL COUNCIL MEETING OF DECEMBER 17, 1945, CALY AND ROBERTSON BOTH FORMALLY PROPOSED THAT ALL BOUNDARIES BE OPEN TO THE PASSAGE OF ALL GERMANS. THE SOVIETS AGREED "IN PRINCIPLE" TO THE PROPOSAL BUT SAID "PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION AT THE PRESENT MOMENT IS IMPOSSIBLE."

AS A MATTER OF FACT THEY WERE NOT ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE REST OF GERMANY WITNESS THEIR BRAND OF DEMOCRACY. IN ADDITION TO THE ONE-PARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM THEY WERE INTRODUCING MANY OF THE OTHER UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THE POLITICAL POLICE, THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS, AND THE PRISONS BLOSSOMED AGAIN UNDER THE SOVIET TUTELAGE. THE WEAPONS AND TECHNIQUES OF POLITICAL SUPPRESSION WERE RE-APPEARING IN GREAT FORCE. "THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS STEADILY INCREASED DURING THE FIRST TWO YEARS AFTER THE WAR UNTIL THEY MADE UP A MAJOR SHARE OF THE PRISONERS IN THE CAMPS."

BY EARLY 1946 THE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MACHINE BEGAN TO GRIND OUT ITS LIES IN A CALCULATED PLAN TO SHAKE GERMAN CONFIDENCE IN THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND AMERICANS. THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE WESTERN ZONES CHARGED THEM WITH HARBORING NAZIS AND FASCISTS. EFFECTIVE QUADRIPARTITE CONTROL OF INFORMATION SERVICES WAS REJECTED BY THE RUSSIANS WHO HAD NO QUALMS ABOUT SQUELCHING ANTI-SOVIET PROPAGANDA IN THEIR OWN ZONE BUT DID NOT WISH TO SEE THE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA OF THE WESTERN

ZONES CEASE.

BY MAY OF 1946 THE SOVIETS HAD MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WITH THEIR OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS CHAPTER. THEY HAD REACHED "AGREEMENT" WITH THE WEST ON ALL MAJOR ISSUES FROM FREE ACCESS TO ALL ZONES TO THE NEED FOR A POOLING OF RESOURCES. YET ALL THE BASIC AGREEMENTS HAD FAILED OF IMPLEMENTATION BECAUSE OF SOVIET TECHNICAL OBJECTIONS OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER. THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN WERE POURING FOOD INTO THEIR ZONES WHILE THE SOVIET'S GOVERNMENT WAS NOT ONLY LIVING OFF ITS ZONE BUT IN ADDITION "WAS WITHDRAWING HUGE QUANTITIES OF RAW MATERIALS AND FINISHED PRODUCTS." THE WESTERN OCCUPIERS WERE LIMITED TO A FIXED LOW LEVEL OF INDUSTRY WHICH WAS CONTRIBUTING TO UNREST AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THEIR ZONES. THE WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES WERE AT WORK WITH THEIR SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA. MEANWHILE THE SOVIET ZONE ITSELF WAS ISOLATED AND FAST BECOMING A POLICE STATE SUBJECT TO CONTROL FROM MOSCOW. IT REMAINED ONLY FOR THE DISILLUSIONED AMERICANS TO PULL OUT AND LEAVE MOST OF GERMANY TO THE VULTURES.

CURIOSLY ENOUGH, THE AMERICAN REACTION WAS QUITE THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD EXPECTED. IN MAY OF 1946 CLAY STOPPED FURTHER REPARATIONS UNTIL THE SOVIETS GAVE AN ACCOUNTING OF THE PLANT AND PRODUCTIVE OUTPUT OF EASTERN GERMANY REMOVED BY THEM AND UNTIL A WORKABLE POOLING OF RESOURCES SYSTEM WAS INTRODUCED. IN THE JUNE 15 COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AT PARIS SECRETARY BYRNES MADE PLAIN OUR INTENT TO REMAIN IN GERMANY FOR A LONG TIME BY PROPOSING A 25-YEAR TREATY COVERING CONTINUED GERMAN DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARIZATION. FURTHERMORE HE URGED EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC UNITY TO PERMIT THE UTILIZATION OF EXPORT PROCEEDS TO PAY FOR ESSENTIAL



IMPORTS, A DEVICE CALCULATED TO GET THE BURDEN OF GERMAN SUBSIDIZATION OFF THE BACKS OF AMERICAN TAXPAYERS.

BUT MORE IMPORTANT BYRNES HAD HIT UPON THE TRUE SOVIET MOTIVES FOR THEIR TACTICS. GENERAL CLAY WRITES, "BYRNES WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES NOT ONLY DID NOT INTEND TO REACH AN AGREEMENT BUT WERE DELIBERATELY DELAYING DISCUSSION IN THE BELIEF THAT THE RESULTING CONDITIONS IN GERMANY WOULD BE FAVORABLE TO THEIR EXPANSION PROGRAM."

ONCE CONVINCED OF THIS FACT, THE UNITED STATES MADE ITS FIRST POSITIVE COUNTER-MOVE. KNOWING THAT THE CONTINUATION OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF FOUR SEPARATE ZONES COULD ONLY LEAD TO COMPLETE ECONOMIC COLLAPSE AND ECONOMIC DETERIORATION (THE LONG-BOUGHT OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIETS) IT EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO THE OTHER ZONES TO JOIN WITH IT IN ECONOMIC UNITY. WHEN THIS INVITATION WAS REPEATED IN THE ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL IT WAS IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED BY THE BRITISH AND THE SOVIETS RECEIVED THEIR FIRST DECISIVE SETBACK.

BUT THE SOVIETS DID NOT IMMEDIATELY CALL A HALT TO THEIR PHASE I PROGRAM. INSTEAD THEY INCREASED THE COERCIVE ASPECTS. EARLY IN 1946 THREE OF BERLIN'S MUNICIPAL JUDGES WHO ARE REPORTED TO HAVE DEFIED COMMUNIST PARTY ORDERS TO RENDER JUDGEMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LATTER'S VIEWS, DISAPPEARED. TWO OF THEM HAD BEEN RESIDENTS OF THE AMERICAN SECTOR. LARGE MOVEMENTS OF SKILLED WORKERS FROM BERLIN TO RUSSIA BEGAN TO TAKE PLACE IN MOST CASES AGAINST THE WILL OF THE VICTIMS.

SIMULTANEOUSLY, A NEW PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WAS LAUNCHED IN THE SOVIET PRESS WITH ARTICLES BY SUCH PROMINENT GERMAN COMMUNISTS AS GROTEWOHL, COMPARING THE WONDERFUL CONDITIONS IN THE EASTERN ZONE WITH THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE WESTERN ZONES. THE

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND AND THE TAEGLICHE RUNDSCHAU USED INCREASINGLY VITRIOLIC LANGUAGE ACCUSING THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH PRESS OF SLANDER AND LIES.

BUT THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACTION TAKEN AS IT HAD BEEN IN FULL RECOGNITION OF SOVIET AIMS HAD EFFECTIVELY BLOCKED THE PROGRAM. AS 1946 WORE ON AND PLANS FOR THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN ZONES MERGER GREW FROM PAPER PLANS TO FACT, THE RUSSIANS GREW INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THE INADEQUACIES OF THEIR INITIAL PROGRAM. ANY DOUBTS THEY MAY HAVE ENTERTAINED AS TO ITS ULTIMATE FAILURE WERE RUDELY SWEEPED AWAY WITH THE BERLIN ELECTIONS OF OCTOBER 1946.


PRIOR TO THE ENTRANCE OF THE AMERICAN OCCUPYING FORCES IN BERLIN, IN THE SPRING OF 1945, THE RUSSIANS HAD INSTALLED CITY OFFICIALS, OBVIOUSLY SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR OWN VIEWS. IT WAS NOT UNTIL OCTOBER OF 1946, HOWEVER, THAT THE FRENCH, BRITISH, AND AMERICANS COULD GET THE SOVIETS TO HOLD LEGITIMATE ELECTIONS FOR NEW OFFICIALS. THESE ELECTIONS CARRIED OUT UNDER THE DIRECTION OF QUADRI-PARTITE INSPECTION TEAMS RESULTED IN A STUNNING DEFEAT OF THE SOVIET-SPONSORED SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY EVEN THOUGH THE LATTER HAD BEEN AIDED IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY BY THE SOVIET MILITARY ADMINISTRATION. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS RECEIVED 48.7%, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS 22% WHILE THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY RECEIVED ONLY 19.8% OF THE VOTES. WITH THIS DEMONSTRATION OF THE ESTEEM IN WHICH THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR FOLLOWERS WERE HELD RIGHT IN THEIR OWN ZONE, THE RUSSIANS WROTE FINIS TO THEIR INITIAL TACTICS. A NEW PLAN HAD TO BE DRAWN UP.

#### THE SECOND PHASE OF SOVIET TACTICS

THE FIRST PHASE OF SOVIET TACTICS IN GERMANY WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON THE CREATION OF CHAOTIC CONDITIONS IN



THE WESTERN ZONES COUPLED WITH ACTIVE COMMUNIST PARTY ACTION HAD LASTED FROM THE GERMAN DEFEAT TO THE END OF 1946. THE SECOND PHASE WHICH WAS TO EXTEND THROUGH THE ENTIRE OF 1947 TO THE BEGINNING OF THE BERLIN BLOCKADE WAS MARKED BY INCREASING FRICTION AND MORE INSISTENT SOVIET DEMANDS. IN ADDITION TO THE FAILURE OF THEIR ORIGINAL TACTICS, THE RUSSIANS HAD NOTED ONE OTHER SIGNIFICANT FACT. FROM THE END OF THE GERMAN WAR IN 1945 TO WELL INTO 1946 THE COMBINED MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH, BRITISH, AND UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES HAD EXCEEDED THE RUSSIAN BY ABOUT A THIRD. GENERAL CALY, WHEN AN OBSERVER AT POTSDAM, HAD NOTED THE EFFECT A REVIEW OF AMERICAN FORCES HELD IN PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S HONOR HAD MADE ON THE RUSSIANS WITNESSING THE EVENT. HE WRITES IN HIS BOOK, DECISION IN GERMANY, "AN INSPIRING OCCASION DURING THE PRESIDENT'S STAY IN POTSDAM WAS HIS REVIEW OF THE 2D ARMORED DIVISION, WHICH WAS THEN THE PRINCIPAL UNIT IN OUR BERLIN GARRISON. ALL THE TANKS OF THE DIVISION CLEANED AND OILED TO IMMACULATE BUT WARLIKE APPEARANCE, WERE ALIGNED SIDE BY SIDE, GUNS TO THE FRONT ALONG THE AUTOBAHN BETWEEN POTSDAM AND BERLIN, AND THE BATTLE-SEASONED TROOPS STOOD AT ATTENTION BEFORE THEM AS THE PRESIDENT DROVE SLOWLY DOWN THE LINE. IT WAS AN IMPRESSIVE DEMONSTRATION OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER WHICH, I MIGHT SAY, DID NOT GO UNNOTICED BY THE RUSSIANS. I MUST ADMIT THAT SEVERAL YEARS LATER, WITH TWO BATTALIONS OF INFANTRY IN BERLIN I WONDERED WHETHER THE BLOCKADE WOULD HAVE OCCURRED IF THE 2ND ARMORED DIVISION OR ITS EQUIVALENT HAD REMAINED. OBVIOUSLY THERE IS NO ANSWER TO THIS TYPE OF CONJECTURE WHICH THE SOLDIER CAN NEVER AVOID. CERTAINLY MILITARY STRENGTH CAN AND DOES LEAD TO AGGRESSIVE ACTION WHEN THE STRENGTH BECOMES RELATIVELY TOO GREAT. IT SEEMS EQUALLY CERTAIN TO THE SOLDIER



FRITZ REUTER, Lord Mayor of Berlin

THAT THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND MAINTENANCE OF PEACE, AND THAT WAR IS MOST APT TO OCCUR AT A TIME WHEN COUNTRIES HAVE NEGLECTED THEIR NATIONAL DEFENSE OR HAVE PERMITTED IT TO FALL BELOW THE DEMANDS OF REALITY."

MORE IMPORTANT THAN ONE DIVISION IN BERLIN, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE BEEN THE NATURE OF TOTAL U.S. STRENGTH BOTH IN GERMANY AND AT HOME. FOR IT SEEMS QUITE CLEAR THAT A PREPARED AMERICA WOULD HAVE FOUGHT FOR GERMANY REGARDLESS OF ITS STRENGTH THERE AT THE TIME OF AN ATTACK. IN THE EVENT OF A GENERAL WAR ONE DIVISION WOULD HAVE BEEN HOPELESSLY OUTCLASS-ED BY THE 26 SOME-ODD DIVISIONS OF THE SOVIET OCCUPYING FORCES. THE REAL DANGER LAY IN A MATERIAL REDUC-



TION IN TOTAL U.S. FIGHTING STRENGTH EVERYWHERE AND SUCH A REDUCTION WAS RAPIDLY TAKING PLACE.

THIS ONE-THIRD ADVANTAGE IN MILITARY STRENGTH ENJOYED BY THE THREE WESTERN POWERS HAD DISSAPPEARED BY THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PHASE OF SOVIET TACTICS IN THE SPRING OF 1947. THAT THE NEW POWER LINEUP WAS IN LARGE MEASURE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATURE OF THE NEW TACTICS CANNOT BE GAINSAID. IT WAS NO MERE COINCIDENCE THAT THE THIRD PHASE, THE PERIOD OF THE BERLIN BLOCKADE REPRESENTING AS IT DID THE MOST AGGRESSIVE POLICY YET PURSUED BY THE SOVIETS, OCCURRED AT A TIME WHEN THE MILITARY STRENGTH RATIO WAS MOST PREDOMINANTLY IN MOSCOW'S FAVOR.

PHASE TWO APPEARS TO HAVE CALLED FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF THE PLAN CALLING FOR THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF GERMANY THROUGH DEFAULT BY AMERICA AND BRITAIN AND A SOVIET INSPIRED GERMAN SWING TOWARDS COMMUNISM. INSTEAD IT WAS TO FEATURE THE CREATION OF A CENTRALISED GERMAN GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD BE LURED OR INTIMIDATED INTO THE RUSSIAN CAMP. IT WAS TO FOLLOW MORE CLOSELY THE MANEUVERS WORKING SO WELL IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND YET, OF NECESSITY, IT HAD TO BE SUBTLE ENOUGH TO DUPE THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND AMERICANS. IT INVOLVED THE NECESSITY OF TAKING A FIRM STAND AGAINST "ALL ATTEMPTS BY THE WESTERN ALLIES TO ESTABLISH A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD HAVE DENIED THE GERMAN COMMUNISTS THE OPPORTUNITY OF GAINING CONTROL OF ALL GERMANY THROUGH A CENTRALIZED MACHINE DIRECTED FROM MOSCOW."

AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THEY INTENDED TO WORK MAY BE SEEN IN THE DIFFICULTY ENCOUNTERED IN THE OPERATION OF THE NEWLY ELECTED BERLIN CITY ADMINISTRATION. IN FEBRUARY 1947 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, THE VICTORS IN THE

OCTOBER ELECTIONS, FORCED THE RESIGNATION OF DR. OTTO OSTROWSKI, ONE OF THEIR MEMBERS WHO HAD BEEN MADE MAYOR UPON THEIR VICTORY. HE WAS ACCUSED BY THE PARTY OF BEING "TOO AMENABLE TO SOVIET SUGGESTION." ERNST REUTER, CHOSEN TO REPLACE HIM, HAD BEEN A COMMUNIST AT ONE TIME BUT HAD RETURNED TO THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN 1922 AFTER HAVING REALIZED THE TRUE AIMS OF THE COMMUNISTS. THE RUSSIANS NOW STEPPED IN TO PREVENT HIS TAKING OFFICE ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM. IT BECAME QUITE CLEAR THAT FREE ELECTIONS MEANT FREE ONLY TO THE DEGREE THAT NO ONE COULD BE ELECTED TO OFFICE WHO IN ANY WAY OPPOSED THE POLICIES OF THE SOVIET MILITARY ADMINISTRATION. SO FUNDAMENTAL TO THE SOVIET PLANS WAS THIS CONCEPT THAT RATHER THAN AGREE TO REUTER'S TAKING OFFICE THEY SPLIT THE CITY GOVERNMENT IN TWO.

FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THEIR INTENT TO WORK FOR A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT VULNERABLE TO THEIR TACTICS APPEARED AT THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF MARCH, 1947. IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF BITTER SOVIET RECRIMINATION IT BECAME CLEAR THAT RUSSIA WANTED A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OPERATING UNDER A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION DRAWN UP BY A SONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF "ANTI-FASCIST" ORGANIZATIONS. AS GENERAL CALY POINTS OUT, "OBVIOUSLY THIS WOULD GUARANTEE REPRESENTATION FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS MANY FRONT ORGANIZATIONS AND WOULD PROVIDE A GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE LENDING ITSELF TO SINGLE-PARTY DOMINATION.

GENERAL MARSHALL REITERATED THIS VIEW WHEN HE MADE HIS RADIO ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE UPON HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW IN APRIL OF 1947. HE SAID, "AGREEMENT WAS MADE IMPOSSIBLE AT MOSCOW BECAUSE, IN OUR VIEW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT INSISTED UPON PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD HAVE ESTA-



BLISHED IN GERMANY A CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT ADAPTED TO THE SEIZURE OF ABSOLUTE CONTROL."

MEANWHILE THE SOVIETS CONTINUED THEIR WORK OF TIGHTENING UP THE CONTROL IN THEIR OWN ZONE. IN MAY THEY DEMANDED THE RIGHT TO INCREASE THEIR OCCUPATION TROOPS TO 200,000, A FIGURE ROUGHLY EQUAL TO THE FRENCH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN COMBINED TOTALS. INCREASING NUMBERS OF STORIES CONCERNING FORCED LABOR BEGAN REACHING THE AMERICAN ZONES.

THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE EASTERN ZONE ALSO HAD UNDERGONE CHANGES. GERMAN AGRICULTURE WAS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROLS EVEN MORE EXACTING THAN THOSE OF THE NAZIS, INVOLVING EVERYTHING FROM PRODUCTION TO PRICES. WHILE COLLECTIVIZATION OF PRIVATE LAND HOLDINGS WAS DELAYED, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF A FEAR OF A DROP IN VITALLY NEEDED PRODUCTION, CONFISCATED HOLDINGS WERE SUBJECTED TO A MACHINERY POOLING SYSTEM. THE POOLS, KNOWN AS MASCHINEN-AUSLEIH-STATIONEN NUMBERING IN EXCESS OF 4,000 IN 1947, AFFORDED THE SOVIET ADMINISTRATION A SIMPLE BUT EFFECTIVE MEANS OF CONTROLLING THE FARMER SINCE A WITHHOLDING OF MACHINERY COULD DELAY A PLANTING OR RUIN A HARVEST.

IN OTHER ECONOMIC SPHERES FREE ENTERPRISE WAS RAPIDLY DISAPPEARING EXCEPT FOR THE NEW RETAIL OUTLETS. IN ITS PLACE A COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE EMERGED. THIS PROVIDED FOR THE CONTROL OF THE ENTIRE SETUP BY A FEW COMMUNISTS. INDUSTRIES CAME UNDER THE CONTROL EITHER OF THE SOVIET MILITARY OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES (LATER UNDER STATE CONTROL) OR SOVIET CORPORATIONS. THE LATTER SYSTEM INVOLVING BOTH OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT BY THE SOVIETS HAD ITS DUBIOUS LEGAL BASIS IN THE REPARATIONS AGREEMENT. MOST MINING WAS CONTROLLED IN THIS MANNER. A GERMAN CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION (LATER SUCCEEDED BY THE

GERMAN ECONOMIC COUNCIL) EXERCISED COMPLETE CENTRAL CONTROL EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THE SOVIET CORPORATIONS. OVER 25% OF ALL PRODUCTION WENT INTO REPARATIONS TO THE RUSSIANS AND SOVIET OCCUPATION COSTS. WHILE INCES- SANTLY ATTACKING THE BRITISH FOR NOT DESTROYING THE CARTELS OF THE RUHR, THE RUSSIANS WERE CLEARLY BUILDING UP LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF ECONOMIC POWER THROUGH SEIZURES AND INCORPORATION UNDER SOVIET OWNERSHIP. FURTHERMORE THE SOVIET MILITARY ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT PERMIT QUADRI- PARTITE TEAMS TO INSPECT THE PLANTS OF THE EASTERN ZONE. IN AUGUST 1947 THE WESTERN POWERS WERE AMAZED TO DISCOVER THEODOLITES (FOR ROCKET RE- CORDING) BEING MANUFACTURED FOR THE SOVIET MILITARY ADMINISTRATION RIGHT IN THE AMERICAN SECTOR OF BERLIN. THIS, OF COURSE, WAS IN DIRECT VIO- LATION OF ALL EXISTING AGREEMENTS PROHIBITING SUCH PRODUCTION. THE NATURE OF THE GOODS BEING PRODUCED IN THE FORBIDDEN ZONE COULD ONLY BE GUESSED AT. ONE WRITER WHO PROFESSES TO HAVE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME BE- HIND THE IRON CURTAIN IN GERMANY RE- PORTS THESE WORDS BY A GERMAN SCIENTIST WHOM HE MET IN DRESDEN CONCERN- ING THE SOVIET OPERATION OF THE CARL ZEISS OPTICAL PLANT IN JENA. "THE RUSSIANS HAVE REMEDIED ONE OF THE WEAKEST SPOTS IN THEIR WAR POTENTIAL. THEY HAVE JUMPED TWENTY YEARS AHEAD IN THE FIELD OF OPTICS." THEIR PRO- GRESS IN AIRCRAFT AND GUIDED MISSILE MANUFACTURING COULD ONLY BE GUESSED AT.

WITH SOVIET TACTICS AND AIMS ONCE AGAIN QUITE CLEAR TO THE WESTERN POWERS, THE SOVIETS ONCE AGAIN FELT A FEELING OF FRUSTRATION AS THEIR EVERY MOVE TOWARD GERMAN UNITY ON THEIR OWN TERMS WAS BLOCKED. NO DOUBTS REMAINED IN ANYONE'S MIND AS TO THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET ACTION IN EASTERN EUROPE. HUNGARY FELL UNDER COMMUNIST SWAY IN MAY. BULGARIA WAS TO FALL VICTIM IN





SOVIET NAVAL POLICE parade frequently during communist demonstrations

SEPTEMBER WHILE POLAND SUCCUMBED IN OCTOBER.

IN THIS ATMOSPHERE SECRETARY MARSHALL IN JUNE OF 1947 MADE HIS FIRST OFFER OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO EUROPEAN NATIONS WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM. THIS AID COULD NOT MATERIALIZE OVER NIGHT. BEFORE ITS FULL IMPACT COULD BE FELT, THE RUSSIANS, AS THEY HAD WHEN THEIR PREVIOUS TACTICS FAILED, STEPPED UP THEIR EFFORTS AT INTIMIDATION. NEWSPAPERS AND MAGA-

ZINES FROM THE UNITED STATES WERE CONFISCATED IN THE SOVIET ZONE. KIDNAPPINGS OF GERMANS LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES SECTOR OF BERLIN BY SOVIET ZONE POLICE INCREASED. SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SOVIET ZONE COMMANDER AND HIS WESTERN COUNTERPART BECAME STRAINED. THE CONTROLLED PRESS LAUNCHED A MORE VICIOUS ATTACK ON THE WESTERN POSITION AND CHARGED IT WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE TO AGREE ON A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. A PURGE OF POLITICAL LEADERS THEY COULD NOT CONTROL IN THE "INDEPENDENT" CDU AND LDP PARTIES RESULTED IN THE RE-



MOVAL OF SUCH PROMINANT EAST GERMANS  
AS JAKOB KAISER AND ERNST LEMMER.

BUT THESE DESPERATE AND IRRESPONSIBLE ACTS COULD NOT CONCEAL THE FACT THAT CONDITIONS IN THE COMBINED BRITISH AND AMERICAN ZONES WERE MATERIALLY IMPROVED AND THAT BARRING A FREE AND TRULY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT FOR ALL GERMANY THE WESTERN ALLIES WOULD PREFER TO CONTINUE WITH TWO SEPARATE GERMANIES. FURTHERMORE THEY HAD SHOWN THEMSELVES DETERMINED IN THEIR REFUSAL TO BE INTIMIDATED.

THE "THIN SCREEN OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN TROOPS IN GERMANY" AS WELL AS THE RAPIDLY DEVELOPING MARSHALL PLAN WERE TWO OBSTACLES THAT COULD NOT BE REMOVED WITHOUT WAR. AND THE RUSSIANS WERE CLEARLY NOT YET READY FOR WAR.

BY AUGUST OF 1947 THE ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL HAD BEGUN TO BREAK DOWN. AT ONE MEETING, THAT OF NOVEMBER 21, IT BECAME CLEAR THE SOVIETS HAD ARRIVED QUITE PREPARED TO COMPLETELY SCUTTLE ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL RULE. IN A PREPARED STATEMENT SOKOLOVSKY CHARGED THE 3 WESTERN POWERS WITH ALL MANNER OF DELIBERATE CRIMES.

THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT BUT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD PREPARED A DELIBERATE BREAK. WHEN THE NOVEMBER 1947 MEETING IN LONDON OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS FAILED TO ACHIEVE ANY FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT THERE REMAINED NOTHING FOR THE THREE WESTERN POWERS TO DO BUT GO AHEAD WITH REALISTIC ECONOMIC PLANNING BASED ON CO-OPERATION WITH EACH OTHER. IN MARCH 1948 THE FINAL CONTROL COUNCIL BREAK OCCURRED WHEN THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES WALKED OUT. THIS ARBITRARY ACT WAS THE SIGNAL FOR THE END OF PHASE TWO SOVIET TACTICS IN GERMANY. PHASE THREE WHICH WAS ABOUT TO BEGIN MARKED A NEW EXTREME IN THE SOVIET POLICY OF INTIMIDATION.

### THE THIRD PHASE OF SOVIET TACTICS

MARCH OF 1948 FOUND THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND AMERICANS FAIRLY WELL AGREED ON WHAT FUTURE ACTION HAD TO BE TAKEN IN THEIR ZONES TO INTEGRATE THEM INTO THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM. JUST AS EAST GERMANY HAD BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC PLAN FOR EASTERN EUROPE, SO NOW THE WEST HAD TO UNITE THE VAST AND VITALLY NEEDED STEEL CAPACITY OF WESTERN GERMANY WITH THE DETAILED PLANS OF THE WEST. THE SOVIET STAND AT THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN LONDON JUST DESCRIBED HAD CONVINCED THE FRENCH OF THE DESIRABILITY OF EFFECTING A TRIZONAL FUSION. BIDAULT HAD ALSO AGREED TO THREE-POWER DISCUSSIONS INTENDED TO LEAD TO THE FORMATION OF A WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT. ON JANUARY 20, 1948 IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT A CONFERENCE COVERING THESE MATTERS WOULD BE HELD IN LONDON ON FEBRUARY 23RD. THIS CONFERENCE LASTED UNTIL MARCH 5TH WHEN IT ADJOURNED AFTER REACHING GENERAL AGREEMENT IN BROAD FIELDS. THE THREE MILITARY GOVERNORS WERE AUTHORIZED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF WEST GERMANY.

IT WAS WHILE THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE UNDER WAY THAT THE RUSSIANS WALKED OUT OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL (MARCH 20, 1948), AND EMBARKED UPON THEIR NEW PLAN OF ACTION. FROM THIS POINT UNTIL MAY 12, 1949 WHEN THE BLOCKADE WAS LIFTED, THE SOVIETS FOLLOWED A POLICY OF COERCION AND PRESSURE AIMED SOLELY AT PREVENTING THE GROWTH OF A VIABLE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT. IT HAD BECOME APPARENT TO THE MEN IN THE KREMLIN THAT THE MOST STUNNING BLOW THEIR PROGRAM FOR NOT ONLY GERMANY BUT THE REST OF EUROPE COULD RECEIVE WOULD BE THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH A GOVERNMENT ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY REGULATE THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIFE OF A HERETOFORE DIVIDED AND WEAK WEST GERMANY. SUCH A PROGRAM

WOULD NOT ONLY BRING MUCH IMPROVED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE, REMOVING MUCH OF THE FUTILITY AND DISSATISFACTION WHICH COMMUNISM THRIVED UPON, BUT A HEALTHY GERMANY WOULD BRING ABOUT A MUCH NEEDED TRANSFUSION INTO THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF ALL WESTERN EUROPE.

THE DEVICE HIT UPON TO STOP ALL THIS WAS THE BLOCKADE OF BERLIN. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT THE QUESTION OF CURRENCY REFORM WHICH THE RUSSIANS LATER BROUGHT UP WAS ANY MORE THE CAUSE THAN THE "TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES" THEY FIRST REPORTED AS RESPONSIBLE. WITHOUT GOING INTO AN ELABORATE CONSIDERATION OF THE CURRENCY PROBLEM WHICH IN ITSELF WAS MERELY ONE PART OF THE PROBLEM OF THE LACK OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THE BLOCKADE ACTUALLY BEGAN ON MARCH 31, 1948, TWO AND ONE-HALF MONTHS BEFORE CURRENCY REFORM IN THE WESTERN ZONES BECAME EFFECTIVE. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE CURRENCY REFORM (EFFECTIVE JUNE 20) COULD HAVE HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE EAST GERMAN ECONOMY AS TRADE BETWEEN THE ZONES HAD CEASED AND ONLY EMPTY FREIGHT CARS WERE LEAVING BERLIN. THE ONE-WAY FLOW OF FOOD AND SUPPLIES REACHING BERLIN ON JUNE 20 COULD HAVE IN NO WAY AFFECTED THE TRANSFER OF FUNDS BETWEEN THE WESTERN ZONES AND BERLIN AS THE SOVIETS CHARGED.

THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE OPEN TO THE SOVIETS (BESIDES THE ONE THEY ADOPTED OF ATTEMPTING TO BREAK UP THE PLANS FOR A WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT BY COERSION) WAS TO AGREE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GENUINELY FREE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS DECIDEDLY UNSATISFACTORY FROM THE RUSSIAN VIEWPOINT. AS GENERAL CLAY POINTS OUT, "THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT COULD NOT RISK THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FREE GERMANY UNDER QUADRIPARTITE SUPERVISION WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE MESSAGE OF FREEDOM AND ECONOMIC SECURITY TO REACH THE BORDERS OF ITS SATELLITE

COUNTRIES. MOLOTOV WAS NOT INTERESTED IN ANY SETTLEMENT OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM UNLESS IT INSURED COMMUNIST CONTROL OF GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND THE CONTINUED SUPREMACY OF THE SOVIET COMMANDER IN EASTERN GERMANY."

THE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO USE MASS STARVATION AS A POLITICAL LEVER TO COERCE THE WEST INTO ABANDONING ITS PLANS FOR WEST GERMAN UNITY WAS AN ENLIGHTENING INSIGHT INTO THE METHODS THEY WERE PREPARED TO USE TO WIN CONTROL OF GERMANY. THAT THEIR ACTION COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A WAR THEY MUST CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN AWARE. ONE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THE SHIFT IN THE MILITARY POWER PICTURE BY 1948 (AS SHOWN BY THE ACCOMPANYING CHART) LED THEM TO BELIEVE WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF BERLIN AT THAT TIME.

ON JULY 3, IN A MEETING OF THE 4 MILITARY GOVERNORS CALLED TO DISCUSS THE LIFTING OF THE BLOCKADE, SOKOLOVSKY PLAINLY INDICATED HIS TERMS. HE STATED BLANDLY, "THAT THE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL WE HAD ABANDONED OUR PLANS FOR WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT." LATER IN THE MONTH THE THREE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN POWERS IN MOSCOW PRESENTED THEIR FORMAL PROTESTS AGAINST THE BLOCKADE. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH STALIN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT HE TOO WAS OBJECTING PRIMARILY TO THE "POLITICAL AMALGAMATION OF THE WESTERN ZONES."

THE AIRLIFT WHICH BECAME THE ONLY SUPPLY LINE BETWEEN THE WEST AND SOME 2,500,000 PEOPLE IN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN WAS AN OUTSTANDING DEMONSTRATION OF WESTERN TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY. FROM A TRICKLE OF SUPPLIES IN JUNE 1948 IT GREW TO A DELUGE OF 8,000 TONS A DAY BY THE SPRING OF 1949, OR AS MUCH AS THE WESTERN POWERS HAD BEEN ABLE TO GET INTO BERLIN BY RAIL AND WATER BEFORE THE BLOCKADE.



THE PRESTIGE GAINED BY THE WEST IN THIS OPERATION HAS NEVER BEEN MEASURED. IT CERTAINLY MUST HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE. NEVERTHELESS IT WAS NOT THE SUCCESS OF THE AIRLIFT ITSELF BUT RATHER THAT OF THE COUNTER-BLOCKADE WHICH FINALLY LED TO THE RESUMPTION OF NORMAL TRAVEL ON MAY 12, 1949. THE WESTERN COUNTER-BLOCKADE IMPOSED SOON AFTER THE RUSSIAN MOVE, DEPRIVED THE STEEL MILLS OF EAST GERMANY OF VALUABLE COKING COAL. THE PICTURE OF A GROWING STEEL PRODUCTION IN THE RUHR (323,000 TONS PER MONTH IN MAY, 1948; 752,000 TONS PER MONTH IN JUNE 1949) AND A DECLINING PRODUCTION IN EAST GERMANY PROBABLY DID MORE TO CAUSE THE RUSSIANS TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS THAN ANYTHING ELSE.

THE END OF THE BLOCKADE BROUGHT THE END OF THE THIRD PHASE OF SOVIET TACTICS IN GERMANY. LIKE PREVIOUS SOVIET STRATEGY, IT HAD FAILED IN ITS OBJECTIVES. JUST TWELVE DAYS LATER, ON MAY 24, 1949 THE NEW CONSTITUTION FOR THE WESTERN ZONE GOVERNMENT CAME INTO EFFECT.

#### THE FOURTH PHASE OF SOVIET TACTICS

ONE PART OF THE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE LIFTING OF THE BLOCKADE HAD BEEN THE DECISION TO CALL A MEETING OF THE BIG FOUR AT PARIS TO CONSIDER THE LARGER ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM. AS HAD BEEN THE CASE BEFORE, THE RUSSIANS TALKED ABOUT GERMAN UNITY, THE SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS, BUT ONLY ON THEIR TERMS. THESE TERMS STILL INCLUDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET CONTROLLED CENTRAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

JUST BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION BECAME EFFECTIVE IN THE WESTERN ZONE THE SOVIETS MADE ONE LAST EFFORT TO BLOCK IT. A LARGE GROUP OF PROMINENT NON-COMMUNISTS WERE SENT FROM THE EASTERN ZONE TO DISSUADE THE WEST

GERMAN LEADERS FROM DRAFTING A CONSTITUTION. THE LATTER, HOWEVER, WERE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM THE OCCUPYING POWERS TO COMPLETE THEIR WORK SO THE MISSION WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. IN ADDITION AN ALL-PARTY APPEAL WAS DISPATCHED TO THE PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL AT BONN TO ARRANGE FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A UNIFIED GERMANY. BOTH THESE DEVICES WERE OBVIOUSLY LAST MINUTE DESPERATION MOVES TO STEM THE TIDE OF THE GROWTH OF THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

AFTER THE FAILURE OF THESE MANEUVERS, THE SOVIETS BECAME RESIGNED TO THE IDEA OF A WEST GERMAN STATE. THEY QUICKLY SET ABOUT TO CREATE A SEPARATE STATE IN THEIR OWN ZONE. THE METHODS THEY EMPLOYED WERE ILLUMINATING FOR THEY CLEARLY INDICATED WHAT THE FATE OF A SOVIET "FREE GOVERNMENT" FOR GERMANY WAS LIKELY TO BE.

CALLING ITSELF THE ONLY LEGAL GOVERNMENT FOR ALL GERMANY THE "EAST GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC" CLOSELY PARALLELED THE SOVIET MODEL. ONLY "TRULY DEMOCRATIC" POLITICAL GROUPS WERE PERMITTED TO NAME CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE DURING THE FIRST ELECTIONS HELD ON MAY 15, 1949. "TRULY DEMOCRATIC" GROUPS, AS COULD BE EXPECTED, TURNED OUT TO BE ONLY THOSE ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS. A SINGLE LIST OF CANDIDATES WAS OFFERED AND THE PEOPLE VOTED ON ONE LOADED QUESTION: "DO YOU DESIRE GERMAN UNIFICATION, AND DO YOU APPROVE OF THIS LIST OF CANDIDATES?" A SEPARATE VOTE ON EITHER PART OF THE QUESTION WAS NOT PERMITTED.

SOVIET TACTICS NOW SHIFTED TO A POLICY INVOLVING THE CLOSER INTEGRATION OF EAST GERMANY INTO THE SATELLITE ECONOMIC BLOC, THE REMOVAL OF THE REMAINING NON-COMMUNISTS FROM EAST GERMAN POLITICAL LIFE AND AN APPEAL DIRECTLY TO THE NEW WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT UTILIZING ECONOMIC AS

WELL AS NATIONALISTIC ARGUMENTS IN AN EFFORT TO WIN IT AWAY FROM THE WEST AND IF POSSIBLE OVER TO THE SOVIET BLOC. THE ENTIRE PROGRAM WAS BASED ON THE BELIEF THAT THE U.S. WAS ABOUT TO TAKE THE LONG PREDICTED ECONOMIC PLUNGE. AS ONE AMERICAN OBSERVER WROTE DURING 1949, "THE RUSSIANS, WHO HAVE BEEN PREDICTING AN ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THIS COUNTRY, ARE COUNTING HEAVILY ON IT; THE ENTIRE POLICY OF THE COMINFORM HAS BEEN BASED ON THIS ANTICIPATION FROM ITS OUTSET." SUCH AN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IF IT DID MATERIALIZE (THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE IN THE SUMMER OF 1949 THAT A U.S. RECESSION WAS ABOUT TO OCCUR) WAS BOUND TO RESULT IN THE CURTAILMENT OF E.R.P. THE KREMLIN REASONED. WITH E.R.P. CURTAILED, THE WEST GERMAN ECONOMY WAS ALMOST CERTAIN TO COLLAPSE.

THE PRE-WAR TRADE OF GERMANY HAD BEEN HEAVILY ORIENTED TOWARD THE EAST. THE WAR ITSELF DID NOTHING TO FREE GERMANY OF A DEPENDENCE ON THESE EASTERN MARKETS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT INCREASED IT. WITH A CONSIDERABLY LARGER POPULATION THAN BEFORE AND WITH A CRITICAL SHARE OF HER AGRICULTURAL LANDS STRIPPED FROM HER, GERMANY HAD A GREATER NEED THAN EVER OF EASTERN EUROPE'S LOW-PRICED GRAINS. FURTHERMORE INCREASED INDUSTRIAL EXPORTATION APPEARED THE ONLY WAY TO ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND EXPORTS TO THE WEST COULD BE INCREASED ONLY IN DIRECT COMPETITION WITH THE OTHER INDUSTRIAL NATIONS WHO WERE FIGHTING FOR MARKETS. BRITAIN HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED HER MISGIVINGS ABOUT A REBIRTH OF GERMAN COMPETITION.

ON THE OTHER HAND, EASTERN EUROPE, SUFFERING FROM AN ACUTE SHORTAGE OF INDUSTRIAL ITEMS, COULD EASILY ABSORB THE OUTFLOW AND IN RETURN PROVIDE THE NEEDED FOOD PRODUCTS. THIS FACT WAS WELL KNOWN THROUGHOUT GERMANY. THUS A SOVIET APPROACH BASED ON SOUND ECONOMIC FACTS COULD BE EX-

PECTED TO HAVE A GREAT APPEAL. GERMAN INDUSTRIALISTS COULD AS IN THE PAST FORGET DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTS FOR MARKETS AND GERMAN WORKERS LIKEWISE COULD GIVE UP FREEDOMS (AS THEY HAD IN 1933) FOR JOBS AND FOOD.

THE SOVIET GUNS CONSEQUENTLY WERE TURNED ON THE THEME OF ECONOMIC AFFINITY AND NATIONALISM. AT THE BIG FOUR PARIS CONFERENCE VISHINSKY QUITE FRANKLY ADMITTED HE HAD COME PRIMARILY TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST GERMAN TRADE RELATIONS. THE GERMAN ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF THE SOVIET ZONE PROMISED PRIVATELY OWNED PLANTS HELP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS CONTRACTS WITH WEST GERMAN MANUFACTURERS. THE LATTER WERE IN TURN CALLED UPON TO BY-PASS THE WESTERN POWERS AND JOIN WITH THE SOVIET ZONE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALL-GERMAN ECONOMIC AGENCY.

JOHN J. MCCLOY MEANWHILE FELT COMPELLED TO MAKE CLEAR WESTERN OBJECTIVES IN GERMANY. AS COULD BE EXPECTED, THEY WERE AGAIN EFFORTS TO COUNTER SOVIET POLICY. HE DESCRIBED THEM AS A DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE WEST TO INTEGRATE GERMANY INTO THE EUROPEAN FAMILY OF NATIONS AND TO ACHIEVE ITS CLOSE ASSOCIATION, POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY WITH THE WESTERN GROUP. BUT AS THE LONDON ECONOMIST OBSERVED, "IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE WHICH IS BEGINNING TO BEAR SUCH RESEMBLANCE TO THE GERMANY, SAY OF 1928, WILL BE ABLE, WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR DOLLAR AID TO END AND WESTERN GERMANY'S RUMP ECONOMY MAY BE EXPOSED TO SEVERE ECONOMIC STRAIN, TO SOLVE ITS INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND AT THE SAME TIME EMERGE AS A PARTNER IN WESTERN EUROPE, A BULWARK AGAINST COMMUNISM, AND A MAGNET TO THE SOVIET ZONE."

THE APPEAL TO GERMAN NATIONALISM WAS ALSO A CLEVER MOVE. HITLER HAD EFFECTIVELY USED THIS DEVICE TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR HIS PROGRAM. WHILE IT



WAS QUITE CLEAR THE TRULY DEMOCRATIC PARTIES OF WEST GERMANY WOULD NOT BE LURED BY THE CALL, THERE WERE OTHER ELEMENTS TO WHICH SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD HAVE GREAT APPEAL. ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO ATTRACT THOSE GROUPS WHICH HAVE TRADITIONALLY ADVOCATED CLOSE RUSSIAN-GERMAN COLLABORATION. AMONG THESE WERE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE RIGHT, THE COMMUNISTS, FORMER MILITARY MEN, SOME NOBILITY, AND OF COURSE, THE INDUSTRIALISTS. IN MAY OF 1949, THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY BEGAN A PROGRAM BASED ON THIS NATIONALISTIC APPEAL. SLOGANS WERE ISSUED PLACING NATIONAL UNITY ABOVE PARTIES. A NEW "NATIONAL FRONT" MOVEMENT WAS LAUNCHED IN WHICH NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS WERE TO WORK TOGETHER FOR A UNIFIED GERMANY. WALTER ULBRIGHT, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY (USUALLY CONSIDERED MOSCOW'S MAN IN E. GERMANY) SET THE PATTERN WITH A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF HOW FAR THEY INTENDED TO GO. "ANYONE," HE SAID, "WHO RAISES THE QUESTION, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AS TO WHETHER A FIGHTER FOR GERMAN UNITY WAS ONCE A MEMBER OF HITLER'S PARTY IS A SABOTEUR OF THE NATIONAL FRONT." CONCURRENTLY THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE WESTERN ZONES SET ABOUT TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES AS THE SPOKESMEN OF GERMAN UNITY.

THE SECOND PART OF THE NEW PHASE OF SOVIET TACTICS IN GERMANY, THAT OF FURTHER INTEGRATING EAST GERMANY WITH THE SOVIET BLOC AND THE ELIMINATION OF NON-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS, WENT ON APACE. THE CHIEF WEAPONS OF THE LATTER CAMPAIGN WERE THE SOVIET'S OWN MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (MVD) AND LATER, IN JANUARY OF 1950, THE EAST GERMAN MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY. THE MVD ESTABLISHED A NUMBER OF COMMAND POSTS, PRISONS AND SECRET MEETING PLACES THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE ZONE AND THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THEIR GERMAN AGENTS, COMMUNISTS, FORMER NAZIS AND OTHERS SUBJECT TO

PRESSURE OR BRIBE, KEPT A CLOSE CHECK ON THE ENTIRE POPULATION. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE FALLEN VICTIM TO THIS SYSTEM MAY NEVER BE KNOWN. ONE AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE WRITES, "ESTIMATES OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VICTIMS RANGE FROM A LOW OF 185,000 BY AN ORGANIZATION KNOWN AS THE FIGHTING GROUP AGAINST INHUMANITY TO A HIGH OF 300,000 BY THE LEAGUE OF VICTIMS OF THE SOVIET ZONE CONCENTRATION CAMPS. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SPD) STATES THAT 180,000 TO 230,000 WERE INTERNED. OBSERVERS GENERALLY AGREE THAT 30,000 TO 40,000 HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE U.S.S.R. AND THAT ONLY A HANDFUL OF THESE HAVE RETURNED." THE EAST GERMAN MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY WAS BORN IN FEBRUARY OF 1950 TO HELP COUNTER "INCREASED SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES." THIS ORGANIZATION HAS CONTINUED TO WORK ALONGSIDE OF THE MVD AND ITS OPERATIONS ARE CLOSELY SUPERVISED BY THE LATTER. ITS AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO THE ORDINARY POLICE, THE MAILS, THE PRESS, AND THE RAILWAYS. IT HANDLES THE RIGOROUS SYSTEM OF CENSORSHIP NOW IN EFFECT IN ALL OF EASTERN GERMANY.

DESPITE THESE EXTREME MEASURES OPPOSITION IN THE SOVIET ZONE WAS BY NO MEANS CRUSHED DURING 1949. STRONG ANTI-RUSSIAN SENTIMENT FORCED THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE LONG-PROMISED COMMUNAL ELECTIONS. THE ELECTIONS OF WORKER'S REPRESENTATIVES TO LABOR-MANAGEMENT COUNCILS WERE DISCONTINUED AFTER A SERIES OF COMMUNIST DEFEATS (EVEN IN THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES). IN THE FALL OF 1949 A PLEBISCITE HELD TO DETERMINE THE PEOPLES' VIEWS ON A PROPOSAL TO ELECT AN OFFICIALLY SPONSORED LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR AN ALL-GERMAN PEOPLES COUNCIL RESULTED IN ONE-THIRD OF THE VOTERS REJECTING THE IDEA.

THIS OPPOSITION AMONG THE PEOPLE OF THE EAST GERMAN ZONE WAS BUT ONE REASON FOR THE FAILURE OF THE NEWEST SOVIET TACTIC IN GERMANY. THE ADEN-

AUER GOVERNMENT, AWARE OF THEIR OWN FATE IN A GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED BY THE COMMUNISTS, PERSISTENTLY REJECTED ALL OVERTURES FROM THE ZONE BEHIND THE CURTAIN. BUT MORE IMPORTANT, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY DID NOT COLLAPSE AS HAD BEEN PREDICTED AND THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM'S EFFECTS WERE FELT IN A HIGHER LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT, GREATER PRODUCTION AND INCREASED FOOD RATIONS NOT ONLY IN GERMANY BUT THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE OF WESTERN EUROPE. ONCE AGAIN THE FREE WORLD HAD SUCCESSFULLY MET THE CHALLENGE OF THE CONTROLLED STATE.

#### PRESENT SOVIET TACTICS

THE FOURTH PHASE OF SOVIET TACTICS IN GERMANY HAD BEGUN WITH THE ENDING OF THE BERLIN BLOCKADE. AS WE HAVE SEEN, CERTAIN FORCES BOTH WITHIN AND BEYOND THE EASTERN ZONE HAD CONTRIBUTED TO ITS FAILURE. THE YEAR 1950 WAS TO BEGIN WITH YET ANOTHER SHIFT IN TACTICS. AS THE ECONOMIC AND NATIONALISTIC ARGUMENTS FELL SHORT OF THE DESIRED RESULTS, THE KREMLIN LOOKED ABOUT FOR NEW MEANS TO ACHIEVE THE ELUSIVE OBJECTIVES. THE NATIONALISTIC APPEAL WAS BY NO MEANS TO BE DROPPED, ON THE CONTRARY NEW EMPHASIS WAS TO BE PLACED ON IT. BUT CERTAIN MOVES BY THE WESTERN POWERS WERE NECESSITATING A FASTER MOVING POLICY. NOT ONLY WERE THE WESTERN POWERS IMPLEMENTING THEIR PLANS OF JOINT DEFENSE (ALBEIT SLOWLY) BUT A GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM WAS BEYOND THE REALM OF THE IMPROBABLE. A WESTERN GERMANY ALIGNED WITH THE WEST MILITARILY WOULD BE A SEVERE SETBACK FOR FUTURE SOVIET EXPANSION PLANS.

IN THE LATE FALL OF 1949 THE RUSSIANS HAD BEGUN THE CREATION OF A MILITARY FORCE COMPOSED OF EAST GERMANS. THIS ARMY, FOR SUCH WERE ITS CHARACTERISTICS, WAS TO BE EQUIPPED FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR WITH ALL THE WEAPONS OF A HIGHLY MOBILE, FAST MOVING STRIKING FORCE. IT WAS TO BE COMMANDED BY PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS OF

THE OLD WEHRMACHT AND LIKE THE GERMAN ARMY OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, ITS MEMBERS WERE TO BE TRAINED TO ASSUME COMMISSIONED OR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER ROLES MAKING A RAPID EXPANSION LATER A RELATIVELY SIMPLE MATTER. OBVIOUSLY THE PRESENCE OF SUCH A FORCE COULD NOT BE LONG CONCEALED FROM THE WEST EVEN WITH THE TIGHTEST SECURITY IN EFFECT. TO HAVE TO ACCOUNT FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT ON THE OTHER HAND MIGHT BE EMBARRASSING PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT AT POTSDAM, THE BIG THREE HAD AGREED TO THE "COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY." FOR ANYONE BUT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THIS MIGHT HAVE POSED A SERIOUS DILEMMA. THEY MERELY RESORTED TO THE "BIG LIE."

ON APRIL 13, 1950, A TRUCKLOAD OF SOLDIERS FROM THE BEREITSCHAFTEN OR ALERT UNITS AS THESE FORCES ARE CALLED, TOOK A WRONG TURN AND BLUNDERED INTO THE WESTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN. THEY WERE QUICKLY SURROUNDED AND DISARMED BY MILITARY POLICE AND ARRESTED ON CHARGES OF CARRYING ARMS IN VIOLATION OF OCCUPATION STATUTES. ON THE BASIS OF TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THESE MEN A MUCH CLEARER IDEA OF THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE BEREITSCHAFTEN WAS DETERMINED. IT WAS CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THESE UNITS BORE NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE VOLKSPOLIZER, THE 250,000-MAN PEOPLES' POLICE FORCE WHICH HANDLED THE ROUTINE POLICE PROTECTION OF THE SOVIET ZONE. PRIOR TO THIS TIME THE EAST GERMANS HAD MADE AN EFFORT TO JOIN THE TWO IN PEOPLES' MINDS TO OBSCURE THE TRUE NATURE OF THE MILITARY UNITS. THE INFORMERS RELATED HOW AS NEW RECRUITS THEY HAD BEEN TOLD THE ORGANIZATION WAS BEING CREATED "TO PROTECT THE EAST GERMAN REPUBLIC FROM THE SINISTER MECHINATIONS OF THE WESTERN IMPERIALISTS." THEIR WEAPONS AND TRAINING WERE THOSE OF MODERN MILITARY UNITS. RIFLES AND CAR-

(CONTINUED ON PAGE 37)





XF-91

## NEW DEVELOPMENTS



XC-123A



XF7U-1 Cutlass



THE LOCKHEED NEPTUNE AIR SEARCH AND RESCUE AIRPLANE

(WITH A-2 AIRBORNE LIFEBOAT)





XF4D-1



USS Pomodon



Aluminum - hulled USS PT 810 during a high speed run



(CONTINUED FROM PAGE 32)

BINES, MACHINE PISTOLS, HEAVY AND LIGHT, MACHINE GUNS, GERMAN WORLD WAR II MEDIUM TANKS, HEAVY STALIN TANKS, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, GERMAN 88, 105 AND 155 MILIMETER GUNS AND POSSIBLY SOME AIRCRAFT WERE THE EQUIPMENT WITH WHICH THEY TRAINED. THEIR STRENGTH WAS ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 50,000 AS OF APRIL 1950 BUT PROJECTED PLANS CALLED FOR A FORCE FIVE TIMES THIS SIZE BY 1953. THE ARMY WAS REVEALED TO BE HEADED BY GENERAL WILHELM ZAISSER (MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY) WHO HAD COMMANDED A BRIGADE IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. THE ACTIVE FIELD COMMANDER WAS HEINZ HOFFMANN, A MAN WITH A NOTORIOUS RECORD IN COMINFORM ACTIVITIES.

ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE GATHERED FROM THESE CAPTIVES, FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U.S. A FEW WEEKS LATER DISPATCHED THREE SHARP NOTES ACCUSING THE RUSSIANS OF CREATING A 50,000-MAN GERMAN ARMY. IN THE BEST MANNER OF THE BIG LIE THE SOVIETS DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A FORCE. AS LATE AS JANUARY 1951 THEY STATED IN AN OFFICIAL NOTE TO THE WEST THAT, "REFERENCES TO THE ALLEGED REARMAMENT TAKING PLACE IN EASTERN GERMANY ARE INVENTED FROM BEGINNING TO END."

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CREATION OF SUCH A FORCE LAY IN THE APPARENT WILLINGNESS OF THE SOVIETS TO EMPLOY FORCE IN THEIR TACTICS IF SUCH MEASURES WERE NECESSARY FOR THE SUCCESS OF THEIR PLANS. YET IT APPEARED DIFFICULT FOR MOST WESTERN EUROPEANS AND GERMANS TO BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WOULD EVER RUN THE RISK OF A GENERAL WAR BY MILITARY COERCION IN GERMANY. KOREA WAS TO CHANGE A GOOD MANY MINDS.

THE WAR IN KOREA CREATED A NEW SITUATION WHICH WAS RAPIDLY EXPLOITED BY THE RUSSIANS. THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT NOW VIEWED WITH ALARM THE INVOLVEMENT IN ASIA OF U.S. FIGHTING

STRENGTH. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS SAW IN THE KOREAN OUTBREAK (AND MORE PARTICULARLY THE CHINESE INTERVENTION) A SOVIET PLOT TO OBTAIN A FREE HAND IN EUROPE. DURING THE COMMUNIST-INSPIRED MAY 28 RALLY IN BERLIN OF THE F.D.J (EAST GERMAN YOUTH ORGANIZATION CLOSELY PARALLELING HITLER'S YOUTH MOVEMENT) THE ADANEUER GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN A STRONG STAND BEHIND THE U.S. IN ITS INTENTION TO USE FORCE IF NECESSARY IN BLOCKING ALL EFFORTS TO SEIZE BERLIN. NOW, HOWEVER, THEY APPEARED LESS INCLINED TO SIDE STRONGLY WITH THE WEST WHILE THE LATTER WAS APPARENTLY NEGLECTING EUROPE'S DEFENSES IN FAVOR OF KOREA'S. THE OPPORTUNITY SEEMED RIPE FOR THE RUSSIANS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO FORGET A WESTERN ORIENTATION WHICH COULD NOT PROMISE THE DEFENSES NEEDED.

BUT THE KOREAN WAR HAD ANOTHER EFFECT PROBABLY QUITE UNEXPECTED AT THE KREMLIN. EARLY COMMUNIST VICTORIES AWOKE THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES TO A DANGER THEY HAD THOUGHT TO BE LESS PRESSING. WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY PROBABLY NOTHING LESS THAN AN ACTUAL WAR COULD HAVE INDUCED, THE WEST SPEEDILY SET ABOUT TO IMPLEMENT PLANS THAT HAD BEEN HANGING FIRE FOR MANY MONTHS. THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT PLANNING GAINED MOMENTUM. A VAST NEW PROGRAM OF REARMAMENT WAS UNDERTAKEN IN ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE WEST AND PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES. BUT OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN TO THE RUSSIANS, PLANS WERE AFOOT TO INCLUDE GERMAN UNITS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENSE ARMY.

THE SOVIETS NOW INTENSIFIED THEIR NEW TACTICS OF THREAT AND GULE. IN OCTOBER THE EIGHT FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES MET AT PRAGUE TO DISCUSS GERMAN UNIFICATION. AMONG THE PROPOSALS AGREED ON THERE WAS ONE CALLING FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN

GERMAN GOVERNMENTS TO ACHIEVE GERMAN UNITY ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY BETWEEN THE TWO. EQUALITY WOULD HAVE MEANT DISREGARDING THE FACTS OF POPULATION FOR THE WEST HAD 47,000,000 PEOPLE WHILE THE EAST HAD ONLY 18,000,000. THE REAL CONCERN OF THE CONFEREES, HOWEVER, WAS WITH WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT AND THEY INCLUDED A PROPOSAL TO ASK FOR A NEW FOUR-POWER DECLARATION AGAINST GERMAN REARMAMENT. THIS CONCERN FOR A REARMED WEST GERMANY HAS PERVADED ALL SOVIET ACTS AND THINKING SINCE IT FIRST BECAME A POSSIBILITY IN THE EARLY FALL OF 1950. IT EXPLAINS THE SERIES OF MOVES MADE BY THEM FROM OCTOBER TO THE PRESENT.

ON OCTOBER 19, 1950 THE RUSSIANS SENT A NOTE TO THE THREE WESTERN POWERS IN WHICH THEY STATED, "THE U.S.S.R. WILL NOT RECONCILE ITSELF" TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WEST GERMAN ARMY. THIS REPRESENTED THE THREAT. THE PRAGUE DECLARATIONS WHICH FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY AFTER REPRESENTED THE GUILT. THESE DECLARATIONS WERE FOLLOWED BY THE GROTEWOHL PROPOSAL, A LETTER SENT ON DECEMBER 1, 1950 BY THE EAST GERMAN PREMIER TO ADENAUER, WHICH PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALL-GERMAN CONSTITUENT COUNCIL AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARD UNIFYING GERMANY. MEANWHILE ON NOV. 30 THE EAST GERMAN CABINET HAD ANNOUNCED THAT A "NATIONAL EMERGENCY" HAD ARISEN AS A RESULT OF "THE REMILITARIZATION OF WESTERN GERMANY AND ITS INCORPORATION IN WAR PREPARATIONS." THIS INTERMINGLING OF THREAT AND GUILT HAD CONTINUED DOWN TO THE PRESENT. THE SED NEUES DEUTSCHLAND ANNOUNCED, "REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE (GROTEWOHL) PROPOSAL WILL AMOUNT TO THE DELIBERATE ADOPTION OF A POLICY OF WAR WITH ITS INEVITABLE DESTRUCTION OF THE REMAINDER OF GERMAN CITIES, FACTORIES, AND POPULATION BY ATOM BOMBS." TÄGLICHE RUNDSCHAU, THE ORGAN OF THE SOVIET ARMY IN GERMANY, WARNED THAT GERMANY MIGHT BECOME "THE EUROPEAN KOREA."

FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF CHANCELLOR ADENAUER TO ACCEPT THE GROTEWOHL BAIT THE SOVIETS INTENSIFIED THEIR CAMPAIGN TO EXPLOIT WEST GERMANY'S FEAR OF WAR. SIMULTANEOUSLY THEY INITIATED A NEW SERIES OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN MOSCOW ON THE ONE HAND AND WASHINGTON, LONDON AND PARIS ON THE OTHER. ON NOVEMBER 3, 1950 THEY SENT A NOTE PROPOSING A MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE BIG FOUR POWERS TO CONSIDER GERMAN DEMILITARIZATION. ON DECEMBER 22, THE BIG THREE REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD AGREE TO A CONFERENCE ONLY ON THE GROUND THAT THE BROADER ISSUES OF "PRESENT WORLD TENSIONS" BE EXPLORED. IN THEIR REPLY TO THIS NOTE SENT ON NEW YEAR'S DAY 1951, MOSCOW ANNOUNCED ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE DRAWING UP OF AN AGENDA FOR THE SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS WHICH WOULD FOLLOW. BEFORE THESE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS GOT UNDER WAY, HOWEVER, STALIN MADE A SPEED IN WHICH HE ACCUSED THE WEST OF PREPARING FOR WAR. WHILE NOT YET INEVITABLE, SUCH A WAR MIGHT WELL BECOME SO, HE INTIMATED. AGAIN THE THREAT.

THE SOVIET TACTICS WERE NOT WITHOUT RESULTS IN WESTERN GERMANY. THE PROMISE OF GERMAN UNITY HAD A GREAT APPEAL FOR ALL GERMANS REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS. THE DIFFICULTY OF ENGINEERING AN ALL-GERMAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WITHOUT RUNNING THE DANGER OF COMMUNIST DOMINATION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN FORGOTTEN BY A GOOD MANY GERMANS.

SIMILARLY THE RUSSIAN THREATS HAVE HAD A PROFOUND EFFECT. MANY NON-COMMUNIST GERMANS WORRIED ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE RUSSIANS DECIDED TO MOVE WESTWARD BEFORE THE ATLANTIC PACT NATIONS HAD AMMASSSED SUFFICIENT FORCES TO CHECK THEM. EVEN IF SUCH FORCES WERE ORGANIZED THEY WERE DISMAYED AT THE PROSPECTS OF A MAJOR



WAR BEING FOUGHT MAINLY ON GERMAN SOIL.

BUT THE GERMANS WERE NOT ALONE IN THESE FEARS. BOTH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH, QUITE AWARE THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT WELL GET DESPERATE OVER THE MATTER OF GERMAN REARMAMENT, COUNCILED CAUTIOUS ACTION. THEY NOTED THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN USING THE SPECTOR OF AN ARMED GERMANY TO CONVINCE THEIR OWN PEOPLE OF THE VALIDITY OF THEIR CHARGE THAT THE WEST IS PREPARING TO MOUNT AN ATTACK AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. SUCH PROPAGANDA IS QUITE EFFECTIVE AMONG PEOPLE WHO VIVIDLY RECALL THE GERMAN INVASION OF A FEW YEARS AGO. BECAUSE OF THE EFFECTS THESE TACTICS HAVE HAD BOTH ON THE WESTERN ALLIES AND THE GERMANS THEMSELVES, PLANS FOR THE IMMEDIATE INTEGRATION OF GERMAN FORCES INTO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY GROUP HAVE BEEN DELAYED. WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE IMPLEMENTED IN THE FUTURE WILL DEPEND ON SEVERAL THINGS SUCH AS THE OUTCOME OF THE PROPOSED FOREIGN MINISTER'S CONFERENCE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAR EASTERN WAR OR SOVIET MILITARY PLANS. THESE FACTS MUST BE FACED. IF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD FAIL TO RESULT IN A GENERAL SETTLEMENT OF BASIC ISSUES, AND THIS IS THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME, THE WEST WILL BE COMPELLED TO GO AHEAD WITH THEIR PLANS FOR WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT. WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE MIGHT WELL BE INADEQUATE WITHOUT GERMAN UNITS. A GERMAN FORCE OF AT LEAST 150,000 MEN APPEARS NECESSARY. BUT SUCH A FORCE CANNOT BE ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED AND INTEGRATED IN LESS THAN 12 MONTHS. DURING THESE 12 CRITICAL MONTHS THE RUSSIANS WILL BE COMPELLED TO ADOPT NEW TACTICS. UPON THESE NEW TACTICS MIGHT WELL REST THE QUESTION OF PEACE OR WAR IN EUROPE.

#### CONCLUSION

IN THIS ARTICLE WE HAVE STRESSED

THE BASIC AIM OF SOVIET POLICY IN GERMANY. WE HAVE SEEN HOW THE RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE ENTIRE OF GERMANY HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY THE FIRM AND POSITIVE MEASURES OF DETERMINED MEN. OUR REPORT MUST END AT THIS TIME BUT MOST CERTAINLY THE EFFORTS OF THE RUSSIANS WILL CONTINUE. THE FUTURE IS NOT ALL BLACK. CERTAINLY AS THE ARMIES OF THE WEST GROW STRONGER, THE RUSSIANS WILL FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO SWAY MEN'S REASONING WITH FEAR. YET ONLY FEAR OR MILITARY FORCE ITSELF CAN CAUSE GERMANY TO BE LOST TO THE WEST NOW. A FIRM STAND APPEARS AS NECESSARY TODAY AS IN 1945.



# CZARIST AND SOVIET IMPERIALISM

## PART II

RUSSIAN EXPANSION, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN NOTED, HAS USUALLY TAKEN PLACE UPON CONTIGUOUS TERRITORY. EVEN IN THE CASE OF ALASKA, THIS PATTERN WAS ONLY MODIFIED BY THE NECESSITY OF CROSSING THE BERING STRAIT. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THIS ANCIENT METHOD OF MOVING IN ON OTHER PEOPLES WILL ALWAYS BE THE METHOD EMPLOYED BY THE SOVIET RUSSIANS, SINCE THEY MAY NOW POSSESS TECHNIQUES OF PUSHING THEIR AGGRESSION INTO NON-CONTIGUOUS TERRITORY. THE CASE OF KOREA DEMONSTRATES SUCH A TECHNIQUE WHERE SATELLITE PEOPLES ARE USED FOR A STRICTLY RUSSIAN OBJECTIVE.

SEVERAL AREAS IN THE WORLD OFFER THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS SUITABLE FOR RUSSIAN INTRIGUE AND AGGRESSION WITH THE PROMISE OF TURNING THE LOCAL SITUATIONS TO RUSSIAN ADVANTAGE. THESE AREAS ARE, FOR THE MOST PART, ADJACENT TO THE TERRITORY NOW CONTROLLED BY THE SOVIETS, AND CONSTITUTE DANGER POINTS WHERE REVOLT OR DIRECT AGGRESSION MAY AT ANY TIME TAKE PLACE.

THE MOST CONSPICUOUS OF THESE AREAS ARE IN FINLAND AND THE BALTIC, THE BALKANS AND TURKEY, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE FAR EAST. THESE ARE THE AREAS THAT MAY TOMORROW BE IN HEADLINE NEWS. THEY DESERVE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION.

HISTORICALLY, THE BALTIC REGION HAS BEEN EITHER A BUFFER OR A BATTLEFIELD BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE LEADING EUROPEAN NATIONS. RUSSIAN ACTIVITY AS A NATION IN THE BALTIC WAS INITIATED BY THE CLASSIC ACHIEVEMENT OF PETER THE GREAT IN HACKING THROUGH THE SWEDISH BARRIER WHICH SAFEGUARDED EUROPE FROM RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON BALTIC SHORES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. LATER IN THE SAME CENTURY, GERMAN-BORN CATHERINE THE GREAT COMPLETED THE TASK INITIATED

BY PETER AND BROUGHT A LARGE PART OF POLAND UNDER RUSSIAN CONTROL. FINLAND WAS FORCIBLY SEIZED FROM SWEDEN IN 1809 BEFORE MOST OF EUROPE, INCLUDING RUSSIA, COMBINED TO DEFEAT NAPOLEON. THESE CONTIGUOUS EXTENSIONS OF IMPERIAL RUSSIA'S DOMAIN REMAINED VIRTUALLY INTACT UNTIL THE PEACE CONFERENCES AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR. THEN, POLAND, FINLAND, AND LITHUANIA WERE RE-ESTABLISHED AS INDEPENDENT NATIONS, AND THE NATIONS OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA WERE CREATED.

THE PATTERN OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION INTO THE BALTIC, WHETHER THAT OF IMPERIAL OR BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA, HAS BEEN PROPORTIONAL TO RUSSIA'S RELATIVE STRENGTH AMONG THE MAJOR EUROPEAN POWERS. RUSSIAN INTEREST IN BALTIC AFFAIRS HAS MANIFESTED ITSELF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECLINE OF POLAND AND SWEDEN AS MAJOR POWERS, WITH THE UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS OF NAPOLEONIC FRANCE TO ESTABLISH CONTINENTAL HEGEMONY, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY IN RECENT TIMES WITH THE EMERGENCE AND DECLINE OF PRUSSIA-DOMINATED GERMANY AS THE STRONGEST SINGLE NATION IN WESTERN EUROPE. BY REASON OF ITS HISTORY, THE BALTIC REGION APPEARS TO BE DESTINED TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE AS A BUFFER ZONE IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE WEST.

SATELLITE POLAND, INDEPENDENT FINLAND, AND THE "FEDERATED" BALTIC NATIONS (LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTONIA) CONSTITUTE THE CONTEMPORARY GEOGRAPHIC ENTITIES TOWARDS WHICH RUSSIA HAS EXHIBITED TRADITIONAL BEHAVIOR IN PRESERVING AND AUGMENTING ITS BALTIC HOLDINGS. ALTHOUGH THE EXPORTATION OF THE PROFESSED ULTIMATE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVE OF THE WORLD-WIDE "CLASSLESS SOCIETY" HAS PROVED MORE USEFUL TO THE PROGRAM OF THE SOVIETS THAN THE "RUSSIFICATION" POLICY OF THE



ROMANOV CZARS, RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM IN THE BALTIC FOR ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC, OR MILITARY ADVANTAGE HAS EXHIBITED GENERAL PATTERNS THROUGHOUT A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME. THEY ARE PATTERNS WHICH, IN SPITE OF THEIR SOMEWHAT SUPERFICIAL NATURE, ARE BASED UPON HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY. LET US EXAMINE THESE PATTERNS OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN SOME DETAIL WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO POLAND AND FINLAND.

## POLAND

PECULIAR GEOGRAPHIC CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE ALWAYS CONDITIONED POLAND'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORING NATIONS. A SEGMENT OF THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN PLAIN STRETCHING FROM FLANDERS TO THE URALS, POLAND HAS HAD NO NATURAL BOUNDARIES TO THE EAST OR WEST OF ITS NATIONAL NUCLEUS IN THE VISTULA BASIN. POLAND'S RELATIONS WITH MUSCOVITE RUSSIA, IN FACT THE EVER-EXISTENT "POLISH QUESTION" IN EUROPEAN POLITICS, WAS PRIMARILY A PROBLEM OF DETERMINING POLAND'S BOUNDARIES WITHOUT TRANSGRESSING RUSSIAN ASPIRATIONS OR THOSE OF OTHER NEARBY NATIONS. FROM A STRICTLY RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW, POLAND HAS ALWAYS BEEN A STRATEGIC ASSET INCREASING DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH UNDER RUSSIAN DOMINATION, A SERIOUS LIABILITY IF WITHIN THE SPHERE OF ANY NATION OTHER THAN RUSSIA.

ALTHOUGH POLAND DEFIES PRECISE GEOGRAPHIC DEFINITION, IT MUST BE RECALLED THAT POLAND WAS ONCE A MAJOR POWER IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. IT WAS POLAND WHICH, FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME, SUCCESSFULLY CAMPAIGNED AGAINST SWEDEN IN THE NORTH AND TURKEY IN THE SOUTH, AS WELL AS AGAINST RUSSIA IN THE EAST AND PRUSSIA IN THE WEST, TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. POLISH ARMIES, RUSSIANS CAN NEVER FORGET, EVEN OCCUPIED MOSCOW IN 1611. BY THE TIME OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, HOWEVER, POLAND WAS INTERNALLY DIVIDED, RULED BY INCOMPETENT IF NOT

ALIEN MONARCHS, AND WAS UNABLE TO MATCH THE GROWING MIGHT OF ITS NEIGHBORS. CATHERINE THE GREAT OF RUSSIA, FIRST IN COLLUSION WITH FREDERICK OF PRUSSIA AND MARIA THERESA OF AUSTRIA, WHITTLED AWAY ON POLISH TERRITORY IN 1772, THEN WITH PRUSSIA MADE ANOTHER POLISH GRAB IN 1793. WITH THE THIRD PARTITION IN 1795, POLAND COMPLETELY DISAPPEARED FROM THE POLITICAL MAP OF EUROPE FOR OVER A CENTURY. OUTSIDE OF A BRIEF PERIOD UNDER NAPOLEON, THE GRAND DUCHY OF POLAND (CONSISTING OF THE VISTULA BASIN BUT EXCLUDING THE GERMAN-HELD BALTIC COAST AND AUSTRIAN HOLDINGS) REMAINED PART OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE UNTIL 1914.

DURING THE INTENSE STRUGGLE ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR, BOTH RUSSIA AND GERMANY PROMISED THE POLES THEIR INDEPENDENCE IN RETURN FOR WARTIME ASSISTANCE. UNQUESTIONABLY, CZARIST RUSSIA HOPED TO WREST ALL POLISH LANDS FROM GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, BUT IT REMAINS SPECULATIVE WHETHER OR NOT POLISH AUTONOMY WOULD HAVE RESULTED FROM A RUSSIAN VICTORY. WITH THE GERMAN DEFEAT OF IMPERIAL RUSSIA FOLLOWED BY THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION IN 1917, THE INFANT SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS FORCED TO RENOUNCE ALL CLAIMS TO POLAND UNDER THE RUSSO-GERMAN PEACE TERMS SIGNED AT BREST-LITOVSK. AFTER GERMANY SURRENDERED TO THE WESTERN ALLIES IN 1918, THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE RESURRECTED POLAND AS A SOVEREIGN NATION WITH THE VIEW FIRMLY IN MIND THAT BOLSHEVISM, INSTEAD OF BEING A MERE MUSCOVITE NIGHTMARE, THREATENED ALL OF CENTRAL EUROPE.

THE ERECTION OF POLAND AS A BUFFER BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GERMANY TEMPORARILY ANSWERED SOME PROBLEMS FOR THE PEACEMAKERS BUT CREATED MANY MORE. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS SEPARATED GERMANY FROM ITS EAST PRUSSIAN LANDS BY CREATING A CORRIDOR TO PROVIDE POLAND ACCESS TO THE BALTIC, AND MADE DANZIG AN INTERNATIONAL CITY. THE BOUNDARY

BETWEEN RUSSIA AND POLAND, SIGNIFICANTLY, WAS DETERMINED BY THE ACTUAL FORCE OF ARMS RATHER THAN BY WOODROW WILSON'S DESIRE FOR A PLEBISCITE DECISION. AS GERMAN TROOPS RETREATED AT THE END OF 1918, POLAND ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN GERMAN HOLDINGS IN THE INTERIOR OF RUSSIA. INSTEAD THE RED ARMY ADVANCED INTO POLISH DISTRICTS, PROCEEDING AS FAR AS WILNO AND GRODNO. A GROUP OF POLISH BOLSHEVIKS ADVANCED ALONG WITH THE RED ARMY, PROCLAIMING THEMSELVES THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF ALL POLAND. BY JULY 1920, POLISH DEFENSES WERE CRACKING BEFORE THE COMMUNIST ADVANCE AT THE VERY GATES OF WARSAW. GERMAN DOCKWORKERS IN DANZIG REFUSED TO UNLOAD MUNITIONS. POLISH PROSPECTS WERE INDEED DARK. AN APPEAL TO THE WESTERN ALLIES BY POLAND BROUGHT AID FROM FRANCE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF GENERAL MAXIM WEYGAND, THE PROTEGE OF MARSHAL FOCH. WITH FRENCH AID, MARSHAL PILSUDSKY THEN LED THE POLISH ARMIES WHICH TURNED THE BOLSHEVIK TIDE. THE RUSSIAN ARMIES WERE SENT STREAMING EASTWARD CARRYING THEIR POLISH-BOLSHEVIK PUPPET GOVERNMENT WITH THEM. AFTER DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION, THE TREATY OF RIGA (OCTOBER 1920) ESTABLISHED A BOUNDARY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND POLAND. IT PROVIDED POLAND WITH A LAND-GRAB OF ITS OWN IN WHICH RESIDED 4,000,000 PERSONS, OF WHICH ONE-THIRD WERE POLES, AND ONE-QUARTER EACH WERE WHITE RUSSIANS AND UKRAINIANS. POLAND PLAYED ITS UNCOMFORTABLE ROLE AS A BUFFER BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA DURING THE NEXT TWO DECADES OF PEACE.

THE NEUTRALITY PACT SIGNED BETWEEN THE THIRD REICH AND SOVIET RUSSIA ON AUGUST 23, 1939, KNOCKED OUT THE REMAINING PROPS THAT SUPPORTED POLAND'S INDEPENDENCE. SINCE THE PAPER PROMISES OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE TO SUPPLY MILITARY AID TO POLAND IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES WERE GEOGRAPHICALLY IMPOSSIBLE OF FULFILLMENT, THE OPPORTUNITY FOR POLAND TO PLAY GERMANY OFF AGAINST RUSSIA WAS NOW TOTALLY LOST.

IN RETURN FOR PREMIER STALIN'S PROMISE TO REMAIN NEUTRAL IN ANY WAR IN THE WEST, HITLER PROMISED RUSSIA A GENEROUS SLICE OF POLAND, AS WELL AS OTHER BALTIC AREAS LOST BY RUSSIA IN 1919. WHEN THE WEHRMACHT PLUNGED DEEPLY INTO POLAND WITH STARTLING RAPIDITY IN SEPTEMBER 1939, THE RED ARMY OCCUPIED THE EASTERN HALF OF POLAND ON SEPTEMBER 17TH AND BROUGHT 14,000,000 PEOPLE AND 75,000 SQUARE MILES OF TERRITORY WITHIN THE SOVIET EMPIRE.

THE U.S.S.R. INITIATED A CONCERTED DRIVE TO RESTORE ALL OF THE HOLDINGS OF THE ROMANOV CZARS IN THE BALTIC WHEN IT MARCHED INTO POLAND IN 1939. IN EXPLAINING RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE FOURTH PARTITION OF POLAND, FOREIGN MINISTER MOLOTOV INFORMED THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN A CLASSICAL ROMANOV VEIN: "THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DEEMS IT IS A SACRED DUTY TO EXTEND A HELPING HAND TO OUR BROTHER UKRAINIANS AND BROTHER WHITE RUSSIANS WHO LIVE IN POLAND." THE TRIUMPH OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE OVER HISTORICAL TRADITION--A CARDINAL TENET IN COMMUNIST APPEALS TO ALL NATIONALITY GROUPS IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS--WAS THUS THOROUGHLY REPUDIATED BY THE U.S.S.R. IN THE NAME OF TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM.

BEFORE HITLER'S WEHRMACHT INVADDED RUSSIA IN JUNE 1941, SOVIET RUSSIA IMPOSED A STERN POLICY OF INDOCTRINATION IN THE RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED PORTION OF POLAND. THE KREMLIN INTRODUCED COMMUNIST SOCIAL REFORMS AND INCULCATED POLITICAL DOGMA WITHIN RUSSIAN-HELD POLAND BEFORE GERMAN ARMIES WENT EASTWARD AND RUSSIAN ARMIES WESTWARD ON BATTLEFIELDS IN POLAND. MEANWHILE, A PROVISIONAL POLISH GOVERNMENT RESIDING IN LONDON SUCCEEDED IN FORMING POLISH-MANNED AIR AND LAND UNITS TO ASSIST THE ALLIES. SIGNIFICANTLY, HOWEVER, A LARGE POLISH ARMY WAS FORMED AND TRAINED WITHIN RUSSIA TO ASSIST IN THE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GERMANY.



IT WAS AT TEHRAN AND YALTA THAT THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECIDED THE POST-WAR FATE OF POLAND, FOR STALIN'S PLANS FOR FUTURE POLAND WERE THERE, IN ESSENCE CONFIRMED. ON JULY 25, 1944, THE SOVIET COMMISSAR- IAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANNOUNCED OVER RADIO MOSCOW THAT THE U.S.S.R. RECOG- NIZED THE POLISH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION LIVING IN MOSCOW, RATHER THAN THE PROVISIONAL POLISH GOVERNMENT IN LONDON, AS THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY FOR "THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLISH STATE." ENJOYING THE SUPPORT OF THE KREMLIN, THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED THE RIBBENTROP-MOLOTOV LINE AS POLAND'S EASTERN BOUNDARY, THUS RUSSIANIZING THE SOVIET SLICE OF POLAND SEIZED IN 1939. AS RUSSIAN ARMIES MOVED BACK INTO POLAND, THE POLISH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVED FROM MOSCOW TO LUBLIN, POLAND. ON DECEMBER 31, 1944, THE LUBLIN COMMITTEE DECLARED ITSELF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND. AT THE YALTA CONFERENCE, WHICH FOLLOWED, THE PROGRAM OF THE LUBLIN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE RUS- SIAN BOUNDARY, WAS APPROVED BY ALL MAJOR CONFEREES. ALSO, IT WAS RECOM- MENDED, POLAND RECEIVE "SUBSTANTIAL ACCESSIONS OF TERRITORY IN THE NORTH AND WEST." ALTHOUGH SOVIET RUSSIA HAD DIPLOMATIC SANCTION FOR ACQUIRING 69,771 SQUARE MILES OF POLAND (46.3 PERCENT OF ITS 1939 AREA) AND A POP- ULATION OF AROUND 11,000,000, POLAND IN TURN GAINED FROM GERMANY TWO-THIRDS OF EAST PRUSSIA, SILESIA AND POMER- ANIA, NORMALLY INHABITED BY 8,500,000 GERMANS AND AROUND 1,000,000 POLES.

WITH THE WILLINGNESS OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN LON- DON TO JOIN THE LUBLIN COMMITTEE, THE WISHES OF MOSCOW PREVAILED OVER THOSE OF THE WEST REGARDING POLAND'S POST- WAR FATE. SOVIET INFLUENCE, EXERTED THROUGH THE PROPAGANDA MILL AND THE POLICE MACHINERY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, RAPIDLY GAINED EFFECTIVE CON- TROL OF POLAND IN THE EARLY YEARS OF

PEACE. IN THE OBVIOUSLY RIGGED AND POLICED ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 1947, COMMUNIST-DOMINATED PARTIES CAPTURED 394 OF 444 SEATS IN THE POLISH PARLIA- MENT. A NEW CONSTITUTION WAS IMMEDI- ATELY ADOPTED HANDING WIDE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH WERE BY THEN ALSO UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL. THE SOVIET PATTERN OF A POLICE STATE WAS SOON INSTITUTED IN POLAND WITH ALL THE TRIMMINGS. THE KREMLIN'S CONTROL WAS SO INFLUENTIAL BY NOVEMBER 1949, THAT SOVIET MARSHAL KONSTANTIN ROKOSSOVSKY WAS NAMED POLISH MINISTER OF DEFENSE WHILE SOVIET ARMY UNITS IN POLAND WERE MOVED INTO EASTERN GERMANY. MARSHAL ROKOSSOVSKY, AN OFFICER IN THE CZARIST ARMY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR, IMMEDI- ATELY CALLED UPON THE POLISH ARMED FORCES TO STRENGTHEN THEIR BONDS WITH THE "POWERFUL" RUSSIAN ARMY AND TO INCREASE "POLITICAL WORK" AND MILITARY TRAINING. A MEMBER OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE MADE THE ASTUTE COMMEN- TARY THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF MARSHAL ROKOSSOVSKY AS POLISH MINISTER OF DEFENSE WAS THE "BEST ANSWER TO RUS- SIAN CHARGES OF IMPERIALISM BY THE WESTERN NATIONS."

THUS, WE HAVE SEEN THAT SOVIET RUSSIA SUCCESSFULLY REVIVED THE CZAR- IST PATTERN OF IMPERIALISM BY PARTI- CIPATING IN THE FOURTH PARTITION OF POLAND IN 1939. FAILING TO ESTABLISH A BOLSHEVIK POLISH STATE IN 1920, THE MEN OF THE KREMLIN STUDIED THEIR MIS- TAKES WITH DISPASSIONATE THOROUGHNESS. THEY DID NOT FAIL AFTER WORLD WAR II AND SUCCEEDED IN ABSORBING ALL OF PRESENT-DAY POLAND INTO THE SOVIET ORBIT. THE PATTERN OF SOVIET IMPERI- ALISM IN POLAND, REPEATED IN CZECHO- SLOVAKIA A YEAR LATER, HAS BEEN RE- GARDED BY MANY AUTHORITIES TO BE OF TREMENDOUS IMPORT. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WHO WITNESSED THE INCOR- PORATION OF POLAND INTO THE COMMUNIST WORLD, ARTHUR BLISS LANE, FIRMLY BE- LIEVES THAT THE EXAMPLE OF POLAND DEMONSTRATES THE MANNER WHICH SOVIET

RUSSIA SEEKS TO WIN DOMINATION OF THE WORLD: "THERE WILL BE NO TURNING BACK ON THE PART OF STALIN. ON THE CONTRARY, HE WILL PROCEED ON HIS POLICY, WHICH WAS ALSO THAT OF HITLER, OF SEIZING CONTROL, STATE BY STATE, UNTIL HE OBTAINS WORLD DOMINATION—THE ANNOUNCED AIM OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL HELD IN SWITZERLAND IN 1915—OR UNTIL HE MEETS THE EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE OF A STRONGER POWER—THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA." STALIN'S METHOD OF IMPERIALISM, MR. LANE TESTIFIES, CAN ONLY BE PREVENTED BY METHODS SHORT OF WAR BY A "POLICY OF FIRMNESS" BY THE WESTERN WORLD.

### FINLAND

BY VIRTUE OF FINLAND'S CONTINUING DESIRE TO EXIST, IT OCCUPIES ONE OF THE HOTTEST SPOTS IN THE BALTIC FANNED BY THE PROPAGANDA OF THE KREMLIN. ONE OF THE MOST RECENT OF IMPERIAL RUSSIA'S BALTIC ACQUISITIONS BEFORE BECOMING INDEPENDENT, FINLAND HAS SUCCESSFULLY MAINTAINED ITS SOVEREIGNTY IN SPITE OF ITS UNFORTUNATE GEOGRAPHIC POSITION AND ITS LIMITED STRENGTH. A SMALL NATION BETWEEN GIANTS, FINLAND HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DETACH ITSELF FROM THE IMPERIALISTIC DESIGNS OF EITHER RUSSIA OR GERMANY. FINLAND'S COMMANDING VIEW OF THE SEA APPROACHES TO LENINGRAD, AS WELL AS THE AIR APPROACHES TO THE INTERIOR OF RUSSIA, PROMPTED SOVIET RUSSIA TO EXERT OVERT MILITARY FORCES AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN 1939-40. ANY APPRAISAL OF FUTURE SOVIET MOVES TOWARDS FINLAND REQUIRES AN EXAMINATION OF THE PATTERN OF PAST EXPERIENCE.

WHEN CZARIST RUSSIA BEGAN TO EXPAND DURING THE 18TH CENTURY AT THE EXPENSE OF SWEDEN, THE FINNISH PEOPLE FOR THE FIRST TIME CAME UNDER RUSSIAN RULE. IT WAS "ALEXANDER THE LIBERATOR" WHO SEIZED FINLAND IN 1809, AND, BECAUSE OF FINLAND'S UNRUSSIAN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, GRANTED IT A SEMI-SOVEREIGN STATUS AS A

GRAND DUCHY. DURING THE LATE 19TH CENTURY, FINLAND'S DESIRE FOR COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CZAR FORCED MANY FINNS TO SUPPORT THE CAUSE OF REVOLUTION WITHIN RUSSIA. WITH THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I, HOWEVER, FINNISH NATIONALISTS SECURED THE SUPPORT OF GERMANY IN THE CAUSE FOR INDEPENDENCE, A SOURCE OF STRENGTH WHICH REMAINED CONSTANT FOLLOWING THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA, AND AFTER THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY BY THE ALLIES IN 1918. UNDER BARON MANNERHEIM WHO HAD GERMAN SUPPORT, FINLAND'S SUCCESSFUL STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE RESULTED IN A VICTORY FOR ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS.

THE BOLSHEVIK LORDS OF RUSSIA, AS THE CASE-STUDY OF POLAND DEMONSTRATED, WERE EXPELLED FROM THE ENTIRE BALTIC REGION AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR. THE YOUNG LEAGUE OF NATIONS SUPPORTED THE RIGHT OF POLAND AND FINLAND, AS WELL AS LITHUANIA, LATVIA, AND ESTONIA, TO BE INDEPENDENT WITH A VIEW TO CREATING A NEUTRAL ZONE BETWEEN DEFEATED GERMANY AND OUTCAST RUSSIA. THE NEW SOVIET REGIME IN RUSSIA, LIKE THAT OF MUSCOVITE RUSSIA, ATTEMPTED TO HOLD ITS DOMAIN IN THE BALTIC BUT WAS REPULSED AND RESTRICTED TO COASTAL HOLDINGS ALMOST DUPLICATING THE SMALL "WINDOW TO EUROPE" ESTABLISHED BY PETER THE GREAT TWO CENTURIES BEFORE. EXPANDING OUTWARD UNTIL RUSSIA MET POWER STRONGER THAN ITSELF AND INTERNALLY WROUGHT BY CIVIL WAR WITHIN RUSSIA ITSELF, SOVIET IMPERIALISM WAS FORCED TO BOW TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES. AFTER THE END OF THE BALTIC WARS OF 1919-20, THEREFORE, SOVIET RUSSIA BLESSED THE RIGHT OF BALTIC PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS. AS LENIN EXPLAINED SOVIET RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF FINLAND AND THE OTHER BALTIC NATIONS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLICS WAS PROVIDED WITH A CLAUSE STATING THAT THE FEDERATED REPUBLICS WERE FREE TO LEAVE THE UNION AT WILL. THUS, THE



HOPE WAS EXPRESSED BY THE KREMLIN THAT PERHAPS THE BALTIC NATIONS (EXCEPTING POLAND) MIGHT INCORPORATE THEMSELVES IN THE SOVIET UNION BY FORCE OF CONVICTION OF COMMUNISM RATHER THAN BY FORCE OF RUSSIAN ARMS. SUCH A HOPE WAS TO BE FRUSTRATED.

MARXIST PRINCIPLES, AS A FEW YEARS PROVED, WERE LESS POTENT IN BALTIC POLITICS THAN HAD BEEN SUPPOSED, PARTICULARLY IN FINLAND. SIGNIFICANT TO FINNISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, NO SOCIALISTS WERE PERMITTED IN THE FINNISH ARMY BEFORE 1939, AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS OUTLAWED. FINLAND, ALONG WITH OTHER SMALL BALTIC NATIONS BETWEEN WORLD WARS, WAS ABLE TO AUGMENT ITS MILITARY DEFENSES BY SCRUPULOUS DIPLOMATIC CONDUCT WITH THE SOVIET UNION: (1) ECONOMIC INTERCOURSE WITH RUSSIA WAS MAINTAINED, BUT ENTANGLING ANTI-SOVIET ALLIANCES WERE AVOIDED; (2) ENVOYS WERE MAINTAINED IN MOSCOW, BUT AT THE SAME TIME COMMUNIST AGENTS WERE REPRESSED WHILE SOVIET DIPLOMATS WERE FULLY RECEIVED IN HELSINKI; AND (3) THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS RECEIVED ZEALOUS SUPPORT. THE LONG-TERM HOPE OF LITTLE FINLAND, LIKE THAT OF EVEN MORE VULNERABLE POLAND, LAY PRECARIOUSLY BALANCED UPON THE CONTINUATION OF GERMAN-SOVIET ANIMOSITY WITHOUT OPEN HOSTILITIES. IT WAS INEVITABLE WITH THE RISING MIGHT OF NAZI GERMANY, THEREFORE, THAT FINLAND AND THE OTHER BALTIC NATIONS WERE CONSIDERED VITAL LINKS IN THE CHAIN OF RUSSIAN DEFENSES AGAINST THE THIRD REICH. THE IDEALISTIC REPUDIATION OF CZARIST CLAIMS IN THE BALTIC WAS, IN TURN, ALSO DOOMED TO BE REPUDIATED IN TYPICAL IMPERIALISTIC FASHION BY THE SOVIET UNION.

THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR PROMPTED SOVIET RUSSIA TO MEND ITS BOUNDARY FENCES AND TO INITIATE A PROGRAM OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AIMED PREDOMINANTLY AT RESTORING THE PRE-1914 FRONTIERS OF IMPERIAL RUSSIA. POLAND, AS WE HAVE SEEN, WAS

PARTITIONED BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA IN 1939 AS A LOGICAL SEQUENCE TO THE NAZI-SOVIET NEUTRALITY PACT. FINNISH ARTILLERY WITHIN RANGE OF LENINGRAD AND AIR-BASES PERHAPS OF USEFULNESS TO A GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA, ALSO POSED A VEXING POLITICAL PROBLEM TO SOVIET LEADERS. ANDREI ZHDANOV LABELLED FINLAND QUITE SIMPLE AS "A JUMPING-OFF PLACE FOR FASCISM," FOR THE VISIT OF THE CHIEF OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF, GENERAL FRANZ HALDER TO HELSINKI IN JUNE 1939, OFFERED THE KREMLIN THE OPPORTUNITY OF JUSTIFYING A PREVENTIVE WAR AGAINST FINLAND IN THE NAME OF SOVIET DEFENSE.

AS SOON AS POLAND HAD BEEN PARTITIONED, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY FORCED THE ISOLATED NATIONS OF ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA TO CEDE NAVAL AND AIR-BASES TO RUSSIA, AND TO ALLOW RED ARMY TROOPS TO GARRISON WITHIN THEIR BORDERS. ON OCTOBER 5, 1939, RUSSIA INVITED FINLAND TO CEDE FIVE ISLANDS IN THE GULF OF FINLAND AND 2,761 SQUARE KILOMETERS OF THE KARELIAN ISTHMUS, TO DEMILITARIZE THE FINNISH-SOVIET BORDER, TO LEASE THE PORT OF HANKO TO RUSSIA, AND TO MUTUALLY PLEDGE NOT TO ENTER ANY ALLIANCE HOSTILE TO THE OTHER PARTY. IN RETURN THE U.S.S.R. OFFERED FINLAND 5,529 SQUARE KILOMETERS IN THE NORTH, AND PERMISSION FOR THE ALAND ISLAND TO REMAIN FORTIFIED. PREFERRING THE RISK OF IMMEDIATE RUIN TO THE CERTAINTY OF BEING LEFT COMPLETELY DEFENSELESS, FINLAND REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET TERMS AND MOBILIZED ITS MILITARY FORCES. IN SPITE OF HEROISM ADMIRABLE BY THE WORLD AGAINST SUPERIOR SOVIET FORCES, FINLAND WAS FORCED TO SUBMIT TO RUSSIAN TERMS BY THE SPRING OF 1940. SOVIET RUSSIA THUS ACQUIRED MORE FINNISH TERRITORY THAN IT ORIGINALLY OFFERED TO SETTLE FOR, BUT FINLAND HAD PRESERVED ITS NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA, WHICH HAD BEEN "BALTIC PROVINCES" OF IMPERIAL RUSSIA IN THE

18TH CENTURY, HAD LITTLE CHOICE EXCEPT TO BECOME FEDERATED REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R. IN AUGUST 1940.

FINLAND SUBSEQUENTLY JOINED GERMANY IN HER ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION. PEACE TERMS WERE ARRANGED WITH RUSSIA AND BRITAIN IN SEPTEMBER 1944. THE FINNISH-RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS OF 1948 WERE REIN- STATED, WITH THE NOTABLE ADDITIONAL CEDING OF THE PETSAMO (PECHENGO) STRIP TO THE SOVIET STATE. THUS, FINLAND WAS CUT OFF FROM THE ARCTIC OCEAN AND NORWAY BECAME A NEIGHBOR OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THE NORTHERN TUNDRA.

POSTWAR RELATIONS BETWEEN FINLAND AND SOVIET RUSSIA HAVE BEEN ESSENTI- ALLY CONDITIONED BY HISTORICAL CIR- CUMSTANCES OUTLINED ABOVE. RESIDING UNDER THE SHADOW OF SOVIET MIGHT, FINLAND HAS CONTINUED TO EXHIBIT BOTH A BUSINESSLIKE WILLINGNESS TO TRADE AND BARTER FULLY WITH RUSSIA (ALREADY HAVING PAID EIGHTY PERCENT OF ITS WAR-INDEMNITY TO MOSCOW) AS WELL AS A HEROIC DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN ITS SOVEREIGNTY AT ANY COST. AS ONE PROMINENT FINNISH LEADER RE- CENTLY REMARKED, "WE FINNS ARE ALIVE TODAY; WE EXPECT TO BE ALIVE TOMOR- ROW." RECENT UNSUCCESSFUL COMMUNIST- INSPIRED STRIKES IN FINLAND HAVE SERVED TO WEAKEN SOVIET INFLUENCE IN FINNISH POLITICS FURTHER. THUS, FINLAND, A VITAL MISSING LINK IN THE ARCTIC TO BLACK SEA SOVIET DEFENSE IN THE WEST, INDEED APPEARS TO BE A FRUSTRATING PROBLEM FACING SOVIET PLANNERS.

BY JULY 1950, SOVIET PROPAGANDA HAD SPOKEN REPEATEDLY OF THE "AG- GRESSIVE" INTENTIONS OF FINLAND AS WELL AS ASKING THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE TO BELIEVE THAT SOUTH KOREA INVADDED NORTH KOREA. THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT, THEREFORE, THAT THE KREMLIN ENTERTAINS A VIEW OF PLACING FINLAND, PERHAPS BY FORCE, DEEPER INTO THE RUSSIAN ORBIT SO THAT THE U.S.S.R. CAN TURN ITS BACK UPON STRENGTHENING

EUROPE AND THE WEST TO CONCENTRATE UPON FORGING A COMMUNIST EMPIRE IN THE FAR EAST. ANY MOVE WHICH SOVIET RUSSIA MAY MAKE AT A FUTURE DATE TO- WARDS FINLAND, THEREFORE, WILL AP- PARENTLY CONFORM TO THE 1939 PATTERN, FOR FINLAND, UNLIKE PRESENT-DAY PO- LAND OR CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HAS RESISTED THE PROGRESSIVE STEPS LEADING TO COMPLETE ABSORPTION INTO THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

#### TURKEY AND THE BALKANS

WHEN THE GRAND DUKES OF MUSCOVY HAD SUCCEEDED FINALLY IN THROWING OFF THE TARTAR YOKE THEY FOUND THAT THE RUSSIAN TERRITORY WAS BLOCKED ON THE SOUTH BY THE HOLDINGS OF THE IN- FIDEL TURK. BESIDES AN EXTENSIVE PORTION OF THE NORTHERN COAST OF AF- RICA, THIS OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT AROUND 1700 WAS TO INCLUDE THE REGIONS BETWEEN THE PERSIAN- FRONTIER AND THE MEDITERANEAN SEA, THE LANDS BORDERING ON THE BLACK SEA, HUNGARY, AND THE ENTIRE BALKAN PEN- INSULA. FROM RUSSIA'S POINT OF VIEW, THE CONTIGUITY OF THESE TWO EMPIRES POSED A SERIES OF PROBLEMS SOME OF WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETELY RE- SOLVED TO THE PRESENT DAY.

FOR WELL OVER TWO CENTURIES THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AS RELATED TO TURKEY WAS DICTATED BY THREE MAJOR FACTORS. IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONSTANTINOPLE, WHICH HAD FALLEN TO THE TURKS IN 1453, WAS THE COMMANDING POINT TO THE STRAITS (THE BOSPORUS, THE SEA OF MARMARA, AND THE DARDANELLES), WHICH RUSSIA CAME TO REGARD AS "THE KEYS TO OUR HOUSE." ONCE ESTABLISHED ON ITS NORTHERN SHORES, RUSSIA DESIRED THE FREEDOM OF CIRCULATION ON AND OUT OF THE BLACK SEA. MOREOVER, AS LONG AS THE GATEWAY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN WAS CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN POWER, RUSSIAN RULERS CONSIDERED THEIR NATION EXPOSED CONSTANTLY TO THE DANGERS OF AN INVASION FROM THE SOUTH. IN THE SECOND PLACE, CONSTANTINOPLE SERVED AS A SOURCE OF RUSSIAN CULTURE AND



RELIGION. THE IDEA OF SUPPLANTING THE CRESCENT WITH THE CROSS AT THE SEAT OF THE FORMER BYZANTINE EMPIRE FIRED THE IMAGINATION OF A PEOPLE TO WHOM A WAR WITH THE TURKS ASSUMED THE NATURE AND PROPORTIONS OF A RELIGIOUS CRUSADE. LASTLY, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS AFFINITIES INSPIRED THE RUSSIANS WITH IDEALISTIC MOTIVES OF LIBERATING THEIR "LITTLE SLAV BROTHERS" IN THE BALKANS FROM THE RULE OF THE SULTAN.

WITH THE VIEW TO SECURING A FREE PASSAGE FOR A BLACK SEA FLEET AND CLOSING THE STRAITS TO FOREIGN WAR VESSELS, RUSSIA ENGAGED IN NO LESS THAN A DOZEN WARS WITH THE OTTOMAN TURKS IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1650 AND THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I. THROUGH THE YEARS ENGLAND PROVED TO BE A CHIEF OPPONENT OF RUSSIA'S AMBITIONS WITH REFERENCE TO TURKEY AND THE BALKANS. STATED BRIEFLY, GREAT BRITAIN CONSIDERED RUSSIAN CONTROL OF CONSTANTINOPLE AS A PRELIMINARY TO A POSSIBLE RUSSIAN ADVANCE UPON INDIA. HENCE, TO A LARGE DEGREE THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE DEPENDED UPON THE PRESERVATION OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE. AS WILL APPEAR, HOWEVER, AT DIFFERENT TIMES OTHER STATES, SUCH AS FRANCE, AUSTRIA, AND PRUSSIA (LATER GERMANY), HELPED TO CHECK RUSSIA'S PLANS.

RUSSIA'S FIRST CONTACT WITH TURKEY IN THE BALKANS CAME IN 1667 WITH THE ACQUISITION FROM POLAND OF SMOLENSK AND KIEV IN THE EASTERN UKRAINE. IN A WAR WITH TURKEY, 1676-1682, RUSSIA CAPTURED A PORTION OF THE TURKISH UKRAINE. THIS WAS FOLLOWED IN 1699 BY THE SEIZURE OF AZOV. THIS CITY, RECAPTURED BY THE TURKS A FEW YEARS LATER, WAS TAKEN AGAIN BY THE RUSSIANS IN 1739.

CATHERINE THE GREAT, RULER OF RUSSIA FROM 1762-1796, WAS QUITE AS SUCCESSFUL IN "OPENING A WINDOW" TO THE SOUTH AS PETER THE GREAT HAD BEEN TO THE NORTH A HALF CENTURY EARLIER. BY THE TREATY OF KUCHUK-

KAINARDJI, 1774, FOLLOWING A SIX-YEAR WAR, RUSSIA ACQUIRED TERRITORY SURROUNDING AZOV; SECURED THE RIGHT TO SEND COMMERCIAL VESSELS THROUGH THE STRAITS; AND GOT THE PRIVILEGE OF ACTING AS PROTECTOR OF CERTAIN ORTHODOX CHURCHES IN CONSTANTINOPLE. AT THE SAME TIME TURKEY ALSO RENOUNCED HER CONTROL OVER PETTY STATES ON THE NORTH SHORE OF THE BLACK SEA, AND PROMISED A MORE LENIENT RULE OVER THE CHRISTIANS IN MOLDAVIA, WALLACHIA, AND GREECE. SOON THEREAFTER RUSSIA ANNEXED THE FORMER TARTAR PROVINCES IN THE CRIMEA. FOLLOWING ANOTHER SHORT CONFLICT WITH TURKEY, THE RUSSIANS BY THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST IN 1812 OBTAINED BESSARABIA AND SECURED EXTENSIVE RIGHTS IN THE DANUBIAN PROVINCES.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE GREEK REVOLUTION, 1821-1829, THE RUSSIANS DECLARED WAR ON TURKEY; AND WITH THE AID OF THE SERBIANS FOUGHT THEIR WAY ALMOST TO CONSTANTINOPLE. DUE, HOWEVER, TO THE FEAR OF INTERVENTION BY ENGLAND AND FRANCE (ALSO AT WAR WITH THE TURKS BECAUSE OF THEIR CRUELTY TO GREEK CHRISTIANS) THEY STOPPED SHORT OF THAT GOAL. IN THE RESULTING TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE, GREECE BECAME INDEPENDENT OF TURKEY; SERBIA, MOLDAVIA, AND WALLACHIA IN THE BALKANS ACHIEVE AUTONOMY; AND RUSSIA EXTENDED HER TERRITORY IN THE AREA OF THE LOWER DANUBE.

DURING THE FOLLOWING DECADE RUSSIA SUPPORTED TURKEY IN AN ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS A REVOLT OF THE EGYPTIAN PASHA—BUT AT A RATHER HIGH PRICE. BY VIRTUE OF THE TREATY OF UNKIAR SKELESSI (1833), EACH POWER AGREED TO COME TO THE AID OF THE OTHER IN CASE OF AN ATTACK. IN A SECRET PROVISION, HOWEVER, TURKEY WAS RELIEVED OF THE OBLIGATION ON HER PART, PROVIDED RUSSIA WAS ALLOWED TO MAINTAIN WARSHIPS IN THE STRAITS. THE CONVENTION OF LONDON, SIGNED WITH TURKEY EIGHT YEARS LATER BY ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, PRUSSIA, AND AUSTRIA, HOWEVER, AGAIN CLOSED THE BOSPORUS

AND DARDANELLES TO ALL FOREIGN WARSHIPS IN TIMES OF PEACE.

RUSSIA NEVERTHELESS HAD EMERGED FROM THE WAR FOR GREEK INDEPENDENCE WITH INCREASED PRESTIGE. PLAYING UP THE ROLE OF "BIG BROTHER" TO THE BALKAN SLAVS, RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS BEGAN OPENLY REFERRING TO TURKEY AS THE "SICK MAN OF EUROPE," WHOSE DEATH WAS IMMINENT AND WHOSE ESTATE SHOULD BE DIVIDED AMONG THE GREAT POWERS. WHEN THE OTHER STATES FAILED TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THIS SUGGESTION THE CZAR, AROUND MID-CENTURY, TOOK CERTAIN MATTERS IN HIS OWN HANDS. RUSSIA DEMANDED A PROTECTORATE OVER THE GREEK ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS. REFUSED BY THE SULTAN, RUSSIA OCCUPIED MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA, ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND SARDINIA CAME TO THE AID OF TURKEY IN WHAT WAS KNOWN AS THE CRIMEAN WAR. WITH THE CAPTURE OF SEVASTOPOL BY THE ALLIES RUSSIA SUED FOR PEACE. THE WAR ENDED WITH THE TREATY OF PARIS, 1856, WHICH PROVIDED AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THE BLACK SEA SHOULD BE DEMILITARIZED AND NEUTRALIZED; THAT TURKEY GRANT MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA A CERTAIN MEASURE OF SELF CONTROL; THAT RUSSIA GIVE UP HER CLAIM AS PROTECTOR OF THE CHRISTIANS IN TURKEY; AND THAT RUSSIA SURRENDER TERRITORY AT THE MOUTH OF THE DANUBE AND A SMALL PART OF BESSARABIA. A FEW YEARS LATER RUSSIA TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR TO DENOUNCE THE BLACK SEA PROVISIONS OF THIS TREATY; WHILE, AS A MATTER OF RECORD, THE SULTAN CONTINUED TO OPPRESS CHRISTIANS IN THE TURKISH EMPIRE.

DURING THE LAST HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY A WAVE OF INTENSE NATIONALISM SWEEPED OVER THE BALKANS WHICH, WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF RUSSIA, CRYSTALLIZED IN 1877 INTO A BULGARIAN INSURRECTION. THIS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE PENINSULA. EXCESSIVE CRUELITIES ON THE PART OF THE TURKS IN ATTEMPTING TO SUPPRESS THE REVOLT AROUSED ALL OF EUROPE; BUT ONLY RUSSIA WENT TO WAR.

ADRIANOPLE FELL, AND CONSTANTINOPLE SEEMED NEXT IN LINE WHEN TURKEY SUED FOR PEACE. THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO, 1878, WHICH FOLLOWED, SPECIFIED THAT SERBIA, MONTENEGRO, AND RUMANIA (WALLACHIA AND MOLDAVIA) SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT; AND THAT BULGARIA BE ENLARGED SO AS TO INCLUDE MACEDONIA AND RUMELIA. THIS LEFT TO TURKEY IN EUROPE ONLY ALBANIA TOGETHER WITH CONSTANTINOPLE AND VICINITY.

THERE WAS WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO, EVEN AMONG THE BALKAN PEOPLES. SINCE THEY WANTED PARTS OF MACEDONIA FOR THEMSELVES THE GREEKS AND SERVIANS PARTICULARLY OPPOSED THE CREATION OF GREATER BULGARIA. AUSTRIA DESIRED AN OUTLET TO THE AEGEAN SEA, WHICH WAS DENIED HER BY THIS SETTLEMENT. BESIDES, SHE HAD AN AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE CREATION OF A LARGE STATE IN THE BALKANS. ENGLAND, AS USUAL, WAS OPPOSED TO ANY DETERIORATION OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE WHICH WOULD ENHANCE RUSSIA'S POSITION.

AS A RESULT OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE SETTLEMENT WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD FORCED UPON THE TURKS THE GREAT POWERS MET AT THE GERMAN CAPITAL IN THE SAME YEAR AND SUPPLANTED THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO WITH THE TREATY OF BERLIN. SEVERAL MAJOR MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE. FIRST, GREATER BULGARIA WAS SPLIT THREE WAYS. BULGARIA PROPER WAS MADE AN AUTONOMOUS PRINCIPALITY UNDER THE GENERAL CONTROL OF THE SULTAN. EASTERN RUMELIA ACHIEVED ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY UNDER A CHRISTIAN GOVERNOR, WHILE MACEDONIA WAS LEFT DEFINITELY AS A PART OF TURKEY. THE SULTAN CEDED THESSALY, AND A PART OF EPIRUS TO GREECE. RUSSIA WAS ALLOWED TO RETAIN BATUM, ARDAHAN, AND KARS IN THE CAUCASUS, AND TO ACCEPT FROM RUMANIA A STRIP OF BESSARABIA IN EXCHANGE FOR DOBRUDJA WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN BY TURKEY. ENGLAND WAS PERMITTED TO OCCUPY THE ISLAND OF CYPRUS. FINALLY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY WAS GIVEN THE RIGHT TO OCCU-



PY AND ADMINISTER BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, WHICH LEGALLY REMAINED AS A PART OF TURKEY.

IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN THE "BALANCE OF POWER" RELATING TO RUSSIA AND TURKEY BEGAN TO SHIFT. NEAR THE TURN OF THE CENTURY RUSSIA, IN FACT, DIRECTED HER ATTENTION MORE TO THE FAR EAST, BUT NOT FOR LONG, SINCE DEFEAT BY JAPAN COMPELLED A POSTPONEMENT OF ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA. THUS DRIVEN FROM THE PACIFIC AND BLOCKED BY ENGLAND ON THE ROAD TO THE PERSIAN GULF, RUSSIA EARLY IN THE 20TH CENTURY RETURNED TO THE DREAM OF ACQUIRING CONSTANTINOPLE. BUT NOW, RUSSIA HAD TO FACE GERMANY INSTEAD OF ENGLAND, SINCE GERMAN INTERESTS IN ASIA MINOR CAUSED THAT NATION TO CHAMPION THE SULTAN'S DOMAIN. AND BESIDES GERMANY, THERE WAS AUSTRIA, WHICH HAD SUCCEEDED TURKEY AS THE REAL OPPRESSOR OF THE BALKAN SLAVS. THUS AFTER MANY YEARS ENGLAND AND RUSSIA FOUND THEMSELVES TOGETHER OVER TURKISH PROBLEMS.

THE OUTRIGHT SEIZURE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN 1908 PRODUCED ONE OF THE MORE SERIOUS CRISES WHICH THREATENED THE PEACE OF EUROPE IN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I. THIS ACTION ON THE PART OF THE DUAL MONARCHY GAVE PROMISE OF BLOCKING COMPLETELY SERBIA'S PREVIOUS PLAN FOR A UNION OF THE YUGOSLAVS. THE LITTLE SERB STATE THEN SET ABOUT TO ACCOMPLISH HER AIMS BY A PROGRAM OF PROPAGANDA WITH THE VIEW OF DETACHING HER KINSMEN IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO THE HAPSBURGS. RUSSIA NATURALLY TOOK THE SIDE OF THE SERBIANS, YET AGREED TO THE SEIZURE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BY AUSTRIA PROVIDED THE LATTER WOULD ACQUIESCE IN RUSSIA'S DEMAND FOR THE OPENING OF THE STRAITS TO RUSSIAN WARSHIPS. THIS PROPOSED "BARGAIN" WAS VETOED BY ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND GERMANY. SO THOUGH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

KEPT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. RUSSIA'S HOPES WITH REFERENCE TO THE STRAITS ONCE MORE WERE THWARTED.

DETAILS NEED NOT BE RECOUNTED HERE; BUT, AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN EUROPE IN 1914 WERE CONNECTED IN LARGE MEASURE WITH RUSSIA'S SUPPORT OF SERBIA IN THE IMPASSE WHICH HAD ARISEN WITH AUSTRIA AS A RESULT OF THE MURDER OF THE ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND, HEIR TO THE HAPSBURGH THRONE, IN THE STREETS OF SARAJEVO. IN DECLARING WAR AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND GERMANY, RUSSIA CITED IDEALISTIC REASONS, SUCH AS THE PROTECTION OF "THE HONOR, DIGNITY, AND INTEGRITY" OF HER EMPIRE. IT WAS CLEARLY EVIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT IN GOING TO WAR WITH TURKEY, RUSSIA AIMED AT THE ACQUISITION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE STRAITS. IN CASE OF VICTORY, SECRET TREATIES, CONCLUDED WITH SOME OF HER ALLIES WHILE THE FIGHTING STILL WAS IN PROGRESS, WOULD HAVE CONSUMMATED THESE LONG-FELT AMBITIONS. YET ALL CHANCES WERE LOST BY VIRTUE OF THE DEFECTION OF RUSSIAN ARMS, THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, AND THE CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS. INSTEAD OF GAINING ANYTHING IN THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK, THE BOLSHEVIKS LOST MUCH OF CZARIST-HELD TERRITORY IN THE SOUTHERN AREA.

AS A PART OF THE OVER-ALL PEACE SETTLEMENTS FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF WORLD WAR I, SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, TOGETHER WITH BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND A PART OF THE DISTRICT OF BANAT, WERE UNITED TO FORM THE PRESENT STATE OF YUGOSLAVIA. RUMANIA RECEIVED TRANSYLVANIA AND THE REMAINDER OF BANAT. THE TREATY OF SEVRES, 1920, REALLY PARTITIONED TURKEY IN EUROPE, WITH GREECE AS THE "HEIR OF THE SICK MAN." THREE YEARS LATER, HOWEVER, THIS SETTLEMENT WAS SUPPLANTED BY THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE WHICH PROVIDED THAT TURKEY SHOULD RETAIN CONSTANTINOPLE, GALLIPOLIS,

AND EASTERN THRACE IN EUROPE; AND ADELIA, ANATOLIA, AND CILICIA IN ASIA.

THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE INCLUDED ALSO A SPECIAL STRAITS CONVENTION. TURKEY AND SOVIET RUSSIA, LIKE THE CZARS OF OLD, HAD BEEN INSISTING THAT THE BOSPORUS AND DARDANELLES BE CLOSED TO ALL WARSHIPS EXCEPT THEIR OWN. GREAT BRITAIN AND OTHER POWERS ON THE OTHER HAND, DESIRED A FREE PASSAGE FOR ALL SHIPS OF ALL COUNTRIES. A COMPROMISE WAS EFFECTED. THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION ALLOWED ALL FLEETS OF ALL STATES TO PASS THROUGH THE STRAITS, PROVIDED THAT THE TONNAGE IN NO INDIVIDUAL CASE SHOULD EXCEED THAT OF THE LARGEST FLEET MAINTAINED IN THE BLACK SEA. FURTHER, WITH TURKEY BEING OBLIGED TO DESTROY ALL ITS FORTIFICATIONS IN THE BOSPORUS AND DARDANELLES, THE STRAITS WERE TO BE DEMILITARIZED COMPLETELY. THE CONVENTION, LASTLY, SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING THE FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS IN CASE OF ATTACK.

SOVIET RUSSIA SIGNED BUT DID NOT RATIFY THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE. THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE STRAITS NATURALLY WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE INDIVIDUAL TONNAGE CLAUSE WAS OF NO PROTECTION, FOR A COMBINED FLEET OF TWO OR MORE POWERS COULD BE MANY TIMES AS STRONG AS THAT OF THE RUSSIANS. TRULY, THE "KEYS TO THE HOUSE" WERE LOST, WITH THE DOOR LEFT WIDE OPEN.

WITHIN A FEW YEARS AFTER THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION PROMPTED A REVISION OF THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CONTROL OF THE STRAITS. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN THE MONTREUX CONVENTION WHICH WAS CONCLUDED IN 1936. THEREBY TURKEY HAD THE RIGHT TO FORTIFY THE BOSPORUS AND DARDANELLES. IN TIMES OF PEACE, HOWEVER, THEY MUST REMAIN OPEN TO ALL MERCHANT VESSELS,

WARSHIPS OF THE BLACK SEA POWERS, AND A LIMITED TONNAGE OF FOREIGN WAR VESSELS. DURING A PERIOD OF WAR TURKEY MIGHT CLOSE THE STRAITS, PROVIDED SUCH ACTION WAS REGULATED BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. ACCORDED SPECIAL TREATMENT, FLEETS OF BLACK SEA POWERS, HOWEVER, WERE PERMITTED TO PASS THE STRAITS UNDER CERTAIN LIMITING CONDITIONS. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION WAS MADE SUBJECT TO REVISION EVERY FIVE YEARS. AT THE END OF THE FIRST PERIOD THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS PROPOSED TO BE SATISFIED WITH ITS PROVISIONS. YET IN 1940, IN A SECRET PROTOCOL OF THE PROPOSED FOUR POWER PACT WITH GERMANY, ITALY, AND JAPAN, RUSSIA AGREED TO WORK FOR ANOTHER CONVENTION WHEREBY THE NAVIES OF THE BLACK SEA POWERS, AS WELL AS OF GERMANY AND ITALY, WOULD BE GRANTED THE RIGHT OF UNRESTRICTED PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS AT ANY TIME. THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED, MOREOVER, THAT RUSSIA SECURE THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN BY LONG-TERM LEASE A BASE FOR HER LIGHT NAVAL AND LAND FORCES ON THE BOSPORUS AND DARDANELLES.

AT POTSDAM IN 1945 THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND RUSSIA CONCLUDED THAT THE MONTREUX CONVENTION SHOULD BE REVISED. TO THAT END THEY TRANSFERRED THE MATTER TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EACH OF THE THREE POWERS AND TURKEY. SUBSEQUENTLY THEY EACH AGREED THAT THE STRAITS SHOULD BE OPEN TO MERCHANT VESSELS OF ALL COUNTRIES AND TO WARSHIPS OF THE BLACK SEA POWERS, BUT TO FOREIGN WAR VESSELS ONLY ON CERTAIN SPECIAL TERMS. THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND TURKEY, HOWEVER, OPPOSED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT THE BLACK SEA POWERS SHOULD HAVE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY OVER THE STRAITS AS WELL AS JOINT MEANS FOR THEIR DEFENSE. THERE THE MATTER WAS RESTED. THE SOVIET UNION COULD HAVE ATTAINED A GOAL DENIED THE CZARS PRIOR TO 1915: NAMELY, FREE PASSAGE OF THE



RUSSIAN FLEET THROUGH THE STRAITS, WHICH WOULD HAVE REMAINED CLOSED TO THE WARSHIPS OF NON-BLACK SEA POWERS; BUT TO THE SOVIETS THESE CONCESSIONS WERE NOT ENOUGH. COMMUNIST RUSSIA DEMANDED CONTROL BY BLACK SEA POWERS ALONE.

AS IS WELL KNOWN, OF COURSE, SINCE THE CLOSE OF WORLD WAR II THE SOVIETS HAVE WIELDED TREMENDOUS INFLUENCE IN THE BALKAN AREA. THERE, AS IN SECTIONS OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, WHERE RUSSIAN ARMIES WERE IN OCCUPATION OR CLOSE AT HAND WHEN HOSTILITIES CEASED, THE SOVIET UNION INSISTED ON THE INCLUSION OF COMMUNISTS IN GOVERNMENT. THEN, DESPITE ADEQUATE EVIDENCE THAT THESE REPRESENTED ONLY A MINORITY OF THE NATIVE POPULATIONS, IT SUPPORTED THEM IN DIRECTING FARCICAL ELECTIONS AND INSTALLING COMMUNIST REGIMES, MODELLED AFTER ITS OWN AND USUALLY HEADED BY PERSONS TRAINED FOR THE JOB IN RUSSIA. STEP BY STEP THE GOVERNMENTS OF YUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA, ALBANIA, AND ROMANIA WERE CONVERTED INTO VIRTUAL COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIPS AND SATELLITES OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE ONLY DEFECTION HAS OCCURRED IN THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA.

THE "IRON CURTAIN" EXTENDS FROM THE BALTIC SEA THROUGH RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED AREAS OF GERMANY AND AUSTRIA TO THE ADRIATIC. BEHIND IT, OR TO THE EAST, ALL STATES EXCEPT GREECE AND TURKEY ARE DOMINATED BY RUSSIA THROUGH PUPPET GOVERNMENTS. THE SOVIETS CONSTANTLY HAVE USED THE VETO POWER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO PREVENT ACTION IN ANY WAY INIMICAL TO THE INTERESTS OF RUSSIA AND HER SATELLITES, SUCH, FOR INSTANCE, AS PROPOSALS TO PROTECT GREECE AGAINST COMMUNIST INCURSIONS FROM ALBANIA, BULGARIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA. THIS PARTICULAR THREAT TO WORLD PEACE WAS OFFSET SOMEWHAT BY THE ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUPPORTING THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AGAINST COMMUNIST RISINGS FROM WITHIN,

AND GUERRILLA ATTACKS FROM THE OUTSIDE. FURTHER, THROUGH THE MARSHALL PLAN, AND OVER RUSSIAN PROTESTS, THE UNITED STATES ARRANGED TO SUPPLY BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY—ALONG WITH THE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE AND CHINA—WITH FINANCIAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO SPEED UP THEIR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND STRENGTHEN THEM AGAINST A POSSIBLE COMMUNIST ADVANCE. BUT THE RUSSIAN THREAT CONTINUES.

### RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN THE DIRECTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA BEGAN WITH THE SEIZURE OF ASTRAKHAN BY IVAN THE TERRIBLE. INITIALLY THE MOVEMENT TOWARD THE INDIA-AFGHANISTAN IRAN FRONTIER WAS SLOW AND INTERMITTENT, BUT EVENTUALLY IT ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF A RELENTLESS DRIVE.

HERE, AS ELSEWHERE, THE PATTERN OF AGGRESSION ASSERTED ITSELF EARLY IN THE PERIOD. RUSSIAN RULERS SEIZED CONTIGUOUS TERRITORIES, CONSOLIDATED THEIR GAINS, AND PREPARED TO MOVE AGAIN. PEOPLES LIVING NEXT TO RUSSIAN CONTROLLED TERRITORY COULD EXPECT ONE THING—AGGRESSION. ONLY STRENGTH FOR DEFENSE OR POWERFUL NEIGHBORS OR FRIENDS COULD CHECK THE CREEPING ASSAULT.

BY THE MIDDLE OF THE 19TH CENTURY RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN CENTRAL ASIA WAS MOVING RAPIDLY. IN 1865 TASHKENT WAS CAPTURED, IN 1866 BOKHARA WAS INVADDED. SAMARKAND WAS TAKEN IN 1868, AND KHIVA WAS FINALLY CONQUERED IN 1873. IN 1876 KIKAND WAS OCCUPIED, AND TURKESTAN WAS ORGANIZED AS A GOVERNOR-GENERALSHIP. THE FORTRESS OF GEOK-TEPPE WAS CAPTURED IN JANUARY 1880. AND IN 1884 THE RULERS OF MERV ACCEPTED RUSSIAN SUZERAINTY.

GREAT BRITAIN WAS THE NATION MOST CONCERNED WITH RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN CENTRAL ASIA, FOR EVERY STAGE OF ITS ADVANCE BROUGHT THE RUSSIANS CLOSER TO INDIA AND TO THE LIFE LINE TO IN-

DIA, VITAL TO THE INTERESTS OF BRITISH MERCHANTS. BRITISH POLICY WAS, THEREFORE, TO CHECK THE RUSSIANS, SOMETIMES BY A SHOW OF ARMS, SOMETIMES BY DIPLOMACY. AS EARLY AS 1856, FOR INSTANCE, GREAT BRITAIN INTERVENED WHEN PERSIAN ARMIES INVADED HERAT, AND FORCED PERSIA TO RECOGNIZE AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE, INTENDING THEREBY TO CREATE A BUFFER STATE BETWEEN INDIA AND THE COLOSSUS TO THE NORTH. AGAIN IN 1895, A JOINT RUSSO-BRITISH COMMISSION WAS APPOINTED TO SETTLE THE SPHERES OF RUSSIAN AND BRITISH INFLUENCE IN THE PAMIR MOUNTAINS ON THE RUSSO-INDIAN BORDER. AND IN 1907, THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION, IN WHICH BRITISH AND RUSSIAN DIFFERENCES THROUGHOUT EURASIA WERE ADJUSTED, COMPELLED RUSSIA TO RECOGNIZE AFGHANISTAN AS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY IN THE BRITISH SPHERE OF INFLUENCE. IN SHORT, CZARIST RUSSIAN FORCES PENETRATED CENTRAL ASIA TO THE BORDERS OF INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN, AND STOPPED THERE ONLY TO AVOID OPEN CONFLICT WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

SHORTLY AFTER THE BOLSHEVIKS ASSUMED POWER, A PERIOD OF QUIESCENCE AGAIN MANIFESTED ITSELF, FOR SOVIET POWER HAD TO BE CONSOLIDATED AT HOME. NON-AGGRESSION PACTS BECAME THE ORDER OF THE DAY, AND ONE OF THESE WAS TAILORED TO SUIT AFGHANISTAN. BUT LIKE THE TREATIES OF THE CZARS, THESE PACTS MASKED THE TRUE INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIETS, FOR THE HEAVY FACE OF THE AGGRESSOR WAS BEHIND THE MASK.

SOVIET AIMS TOWARD AFGHANISTAN WERE MADE CLEAR AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST HELD IN BAKU, SEPTEMBER 1920. IN THAT CONGRESS, A BLUEPRINT OF AGGRESSION WAS DRAWN UP. FIRST IRAN MUST FALL, THEN AFGHANISTAN. THEY WERE CONSIDERED BY THE SOVIETS AS THE GATEWAYS TO INDIA. THEY MUST BE CONQUERED, SO THAT INDIA WOULD FALL TO THE EROSION OF DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET STATE.

LIKE THE CASE AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, THAT OF IRAN, OR PERSIA, WAS OF LONG STANDING. SOVIET PRESSURE PURSUED THE OLD PATTERNS OF CZARIST EXPANSION, BUT ADDED TO THEM THE TACTICS OF A FIFTH COLUMN OF COMMUNISTS. TO THE OLD METHOD OF MOVING IN ON CONTIGUOUS TERRITORY AND BEARING DOWN WITH ALL WEIGHT, SOVIET POWER NOW ADDED THE CRUSADE OF WORLD REVOLUTION.

VINCENT SHEEAN IN HIS THE NEW PERSIA HAS DESCRIBED THE OLD CZARIST POLICY, BUT THE DESCRIPTION WHICH FOLLOWS COULD WELL HAVE BEEN WRITTEN OF SOVIET AIMS. "RUSSIA UNDER THE CZARS DID NOT TROUBLE TO CONCEAL ITS PURPOSES; THE PURPOSE WITH REGARD TO PERSIA WAS TO CONFISCATE, TO CONQUER, TO SEIZE, WHEREVER AND WHENEVER IT WAS POSSIBLE, WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO OFFER ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR ANY ACTION TAKEN."

CZARIST RUSSIA AND PERSIA FIRST CLASHED IN THE 16TH CENTURY WHEN THE PERSIAN SHAH, ABBAS THE GREAT, BARRED THE SOUTHWARD EXPANSION OF THE RULERS OF MOSCOW. IN THE YEARS WHICH FOLLOWED THIS EARLY CONFLICT, PERSIA GREW WEAKER FROM INVASIONS WHILE RUSSIA GREW STRONGER. THUS BY 1723 PETER THE GREAT WAS ABLE TO CONQUER THE CAUCASUS AS WELL AS THE TERRITORY WEST AND SOUTH OF THE CASPIAN SEA INCLUDING THE CITY OF RESHT.

PERSIA WAS ABLE TO REGAIN THE CASPIAN PROVINCES, BAKU AND DERBENT, BY 1735, BUT WAS COMPELLED BY CATHERINE THE GREAT TO TURN THEM BACK TO RUSSIA. ONLY CATHERINE'S DEATH IN 1797 PREVENTED PERSIA FROM LOSING ADDITIONAL TERRITORY AT THAT TIME.

WITH THE PATTERN ESTABLISHED, EXCEPT FOR TEMPORARY PERIODS OF RELAXATION, RUSSIAN PRESSURE IN CENTRAL ASIA AND AGAINST PERSIA OR IRAN CONTINUED. AFTER 1839 IT BECAME BOTH MORE INTENSE AND MORE SUSTAINED UN-



TIL ALL OF THE TERRITORY DOWN TO THE RIVER OXUS HAD BEEN OCCUPIED.

THEREAFTER RUSSIAN ECONOMIC PENETRATION CONTINUED EVEN THOUGH OPEN CONQUEST STOPPED. AS IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN, GREAT BRITAIN HAD SERVED AS THE MAJOR DETERRENT AGAINST RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM IN THIS AREA, BUT WHEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA CAME TO TERMS IN 1907 DIVIDING PERSIA INTO SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, RUSSIAN PRESSURE WAS INTENSIFIED. THE CZARIST STATE NOW HAD A FREE HAND TO DOMINATE THE NORTHERN PORTION OF PERSIA, AND BY CONTROLLING TEHRAN IT BECAME POSSIBLE TO EXTEND AN INFLUENCE OVER ALL OF IRAN.

THIS WAS THE SITUATION AT THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I, WHEN RUSSIAN EXPANSION WAS TEMPORARILY HALTED. THE WAR WAS FOLLOWED, HOWEVER, BY THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA, WHICH BROUGHT NEW STRENGTH AND PURPOSE TO THE AMBITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN STATE. BY 1920, RUSSIA SET HERSELF UP AS THE CHAMPION OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST EXPLOITATION, BOTH LOCAL AND FOREIGN. "THERE CAN BE NO PERMANENT PEACE," SAID RADEK AT THE BAKU MEETING "BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF LABOR AND THE COUNTRIES OF EXPLOITATION. THE ORIENTAL POLICY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOT AN OPPORTUNISTIC MANEUVER BUT A SINCERE ENDEAVOR TO HELP THE DOWNTRODDEN MASSES OF THE EAST IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE OPPRESSORS." IN 1918, K. TROYANOVSKY IN VOSTOK I REVOLUTSIA WROTE AS FOLLOWS ON THE PLACE OF IRAN IN THE STRATEGY OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS: "THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSIA FOR THE CREATION OF THE ORIENTAL INTERNATIONAL IS CONSIDERABLE. IF, HOWEVER, THE PRIMARY TASK OF PERSIA IS TO CONSTITUTE THE NATURAL "BASIN" FOR THE MOVEMENT OF POLITICAL EMANCIPATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THIS BASIN BE FREED OF THE SEDIMENT AND WASTE WHICH ACCUMULATE IN ITS RESERVOIRS AND LIKEWISE IN ITS CANALS. THEN ONLY WILL PERSIA

BE IN A POSITION TO FULFILL THE MISSION WHICH HISTORY AND NATURE ASSIGNED TO HER. THE BEST FRIEND OF THE PERSIAN PEOPLE IS PROLETARIAN RUSSIA, THE RUSSIA OF BOLSHEVISM... REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA IS THE SINCERE AND DISINTERESTED INSPIRATION OF PERSIA, A PRECIOUS COUNSELOR, A GUIDE WORTHY OF CONFIDENCE TO ORIENT HER TOWARD DEMOCRACY.

"OUR POLICY WITH REGARD TO PERSIA MUST BE SIMPLY A REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC POLICY. HENCE, OUR INTERESTS COINCIDE PERFECTLY WITH THOSE OF THE PERSIAN PEOPLE. THE PURIFICATION OF THE NATURAL BASIN OF ASIA IS AS IMPORTANT TO THE PERSIANS AS TO THE RUSSIANS. IF PERSIA IS THE DOOR THROUGH WHICH ONE HAS TO GO IN ORDER TO INVAD E THE CITADEL OF THE REVOLUTION TO THE ORIENT, THAT IS TO SAY INDIA, WE MUST FOMENT THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION...THE PERSIAN UPRISING WILL BE THE SIGNAL FOR A SERIES OF REVOLUTIONS THAT WILL SPREAD THROUGH ALL OF ASIA AND PART OF AFRICA.

"A POLITICAL SITUATION FAVORABLE TO DEMOCRACY IN PERSIA HAS AN EXTRAORDINARY IMPORTANCE FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE ENTIRE ORIENT. A PROPITIOUS TERRAIN FOR THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION HAS LONG BEEN PREPARED. THE IMPERIALISTS OF ENGLAND, RUSSIA, FRANCE, AND GERMANY HAVE LABORED THERE. ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS AN IMPULSE FROM THE OUTSIDE, AN EXTERNAL AID, AN INITIATIVE, AND A RESOLUTE DECISION. THIS IMPULSE, THIS INITIATIVE, THIS RESOLUTENESS, CAN COME FROM OUR RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARIES THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE RUSSIAN MOSLEMS.

"INDIA IS OUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE. PERSIA IS THE ONLY PATH OPEN TO INDIA. THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION IS THE KEY TO THE REVOLUTION OF ALL OF THE ORIENT, JUST AS EGYPT AND THE SUEZ CANAL ARE THE KEY TO THE BRITISH DOMINATION OF THE ORIENT. PERSIA IS THE SUEZ CANAL OF THE REVOLUTION.

IF WE SHIFT THE POLITICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TO PERSIA, THE SUEZ CANAL LOSES ITS STRATEGIC VALUE AND IMPORTANCE... FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE ORIENTAL REVOLUTION PERSIA IS THE FIRST NATION THAT MUST BE CONQUERED BY THE SOVIETS. THIS PRECIOUS KEY TO THE UPRISING OF THE ORIENT MUST BE IN THE HANDS OF BOLSHEVISM, COST WHAT IT MAY...PERSIA MUST BE OURS; PERSIA MUST BELONG TO THE REVOLUTION."

IN SPITE OF HER INTENTIONS, SOVIET RUSSIA WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACT; THEREFORE ALL CLAIMS TO AGGRANDIZEMENT IN IRAN WERE RENOUNCED BY THE TREATY OF 26 FEBRUARY 1921, AND THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF IRAN WERE RECOGNIZED. THE TREATY PROVIDED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES SHOULD KEEP OUT TROOPS OF A THIRD COUNTRY WHICH THREATENED THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER. LIKEWISE, SHOULD A THIRD POWER CREATE A THREAT WITHIN IRAN, OR ATTEMPT TO TURN IRAN INTO A MILITARY BASE FOR ACTION AGAINST RUSSIA, OR IF IRAN SHOULD BE UNABLE TO COPE WITH THE DANGER, RUSSIA RESERVED THE RIGHT TO SEND HER TROOPS INTO IRAN IN SELF-DEFENSE. SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT POINTS, HOWEVER, WERE EITHER LEFT OPEN FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OR ELSE TO GIVE THE SOVIETS AN EXCUSE FOR INTERFERENCE AT A LATER DATE. THE PROBLEMS OF THE IRANIAN TARIFFS AND THE CASPIAN FISHERIES WERE LEFT TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

IN ESSENCE, THE TREATY OF 1921 MERELY PUT ASIDE THE IRANIAN QUESTION FOR THE TIME BEING, TO BE OPENED LATER WHEN MORE FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES COULD BE FOUND. SOVIET RUSSIA WAS FOLLOWING THE CZARIST PATTERN OF EXPANSION IN PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.

DURING THE YEARS FOLLOWING THE 1921 AGREEMENT, RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN IRAN WERE HELD TO A MINIMUM, BEING LARGELY DIRECTED TOWARD ORGANIZING THE TUDEH PARTY AS A POTENTIAL FIFTH

COLUMN. THIS WAS AT A TIME, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN POINTED OUT, WHEN THE SOVIET INTERNAL ORGANIZATION WAS UNDERGOING CONSOLIDATION, AND LITVINOV WAS SHOWING OFF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AS A MODEL OF COOPERATION AND PEACE. DURING THIS LULL, THERE WAS NOTHING TO INDICATE A CHANGE IN RUSSIAN INTENTIONS, FOR THE SOVIET NON-AGGRESSION PACTS OF THIS ERA COULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN WHAT THEY SAID THEY MEANT. NATIONS WHICH HAD FELT THE HAND OF AGGRESSION DOUBTED THE SINCERITY OF A BLAND GESTURE OF GOOD WILL.

THE DISSEMBLANCE CAME TO AN ABRUPT END IN 1941. OSTENSIBLY TO FORESTALL NAZI STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SOVIETS INVADDED IRAN. BRITAIN, AGAIN ALERT TO THE DANGERS OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION, ALSO INVADED THE COUNTRY UNDER THE GUISE OF COOPERATING WITH A WARTIME ALLY IN AN OCCUPATION MADE NECESSARY BY THE SUCCESS OF GERMAN ARMS, BUT IN THIS DOUBLE OCCUPATION, THE SOVIETS FOUND THEMSELVES CONFRONTED AGAIN BY THE SAME WATCHFUL POWER, WHICH, AS OF OLD, WAS DETERMINED TO CHECK THEIR ADVANCE TO THE PERSIAN GULF. OCCUPATION CONTINUED UNTIL 1946, WITH AMERICAN TROOPS JOINING BRITISH SOLDIERS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF IRAN, THERE TO ASSIST IN PROTECTING THE OIL FIELDS AND TO START LEND-LEASE MATERIALS FROM THE SEA INTO RUSSIA.

IN THIS OCCUPATION, BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES MADE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID INTERFERENCE IN IRANIAN LOCAL AFFAIRS--NOT SO THE RUSSIANS. A MAJOR PORTION OF THE TERRITORY WHICH THEY OCCUPIED WAS TREATED AS THOUGH IT WERE RUSSIAN TERRITORY. THE AREA WAS CLOSED TO NON-RUSSIANS, INCLUDING THE ALLIES, THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION CAME UNDER THE SURVEILLANCE OF THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES. IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE EVEN PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING SOME OF THE AREAS, MAKING EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION IMPOSSIBLE.



DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE OCCUPATION PERIOD, A SOVIET DELEGATION OF MORE THAN NINETY PERSONS, SPECIALISTS IN ALL BRANCHES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, CAME TO TEHRAN IN SEPTEMBER 1944. SERGEI KAVTARADZE, VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WAS THE LEADER OF THE DELEGATION. HE SOUGHT OIL AND MINERAL CONCESSIONS IN NORTHEASTERN AND EASTERN IRAN, TOGETHER WITH EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS FOR EXPLOITING THESE RESOURCES. IN EFFECT, THE RUSSIANS WERE DEMANDING AN ECONOMIC MONOPOLY OVER ALL OF NORTHERN IRAN, AN AREA OF ABOUT 216,000 SQUARE MILES. LATER, THEY EVEN SUGGESTED THE CONSTRUCTION OF A RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED PIPELINE FROM THE PERSIAN GULF TO THE RUSSIAN BORDERS.

THIS ECONOMIC PENETRATION WAS CONSIDERED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AS BUT A PRELUDE TO RUSSIAN ANNEXATION, A MOVE OBVIOUSLY SUPPORTED BY RUSSIAN POLICY OF MANY CENTURIES. BUT THE IRANIANS FOUND MEANS TO STALL. ASSISTED BY AMERICAN AND BRITISH DIPLOMACY, THEY JOINED THIS WITH OTHER ISSUES (FOR EXAMPLE, IRANIAN SOIL BEING OCCUPIED BY FOREIGN TROOPS), AND FINALLY BROUGHT IT BEFORE THE FORUM OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN EARLY 1946. IT BECAME MANIFEST THAT NOT ONLY WERE RUSSIAN TROOPS CONTINUING TO BE QUARTERED UPON THE IRANIANS IN THE NORTH, BUT ALSO THAT RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN WAS BEING VIGOROUSLY PROMOTED. SOVIET POLICY INSISTED THAT A RUSSIA-CONTROLLED JOINT STOCK COMPANY BE ORGANIZED FOR EXPLOITING IRANIAN OIL IN THE NORTH, AND THAT AZERBAIJAN BE GIVEN AUTONOMY, AS THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EVACUATION OF SOVIET TROOPS. THIS WAS IN 1946, A YEAR AFTER THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY, WHOSE AGGRESSION IN 1941 HAD GIVEN THE RUSSIANS THE ORIGINAL PRETEXT FOR OCCUPYING IRAN.

AT THE TIME, SOVIET DIPLOMACY HAD NOT YET REACHED THE STAGE OF BOY-

COTTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH OFFERED A MEANS OF SPREADING PROPAGANDA AND OF CREATING DISSENTION AMONG OTHER POWERS. THE IRANIANS WERE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS FACT. SUPPORTED BY A GROWING OPINION AMONG NATIONS THAT RUSSIAN MOTIVES IN IRAN WERE UNFRIENDLY, IRAN STRONGLY ASSERTED ITS POSITION. SUDDENLY, THE SOVIETS GAVE WAY, AND RETURNED TO THEIR OWN FRONTIERS. THAT THEIR MOVE WAS ANYTHING OTHER THAN A TACTICAL ONE IS INDICATED BY THE CONTINUED RUSSIAN-INSPIRED AGITATION THAT PERSISTS IN THAT AREA, AND THE AGE-LONG OBJECTIVES OF THE RUSSIAN NATION TO REACH THE PERSIAN GULF.

EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE BUT PART OF THE WORLD-WIDE PATTERN OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION. BLOCKED IN IRAN, IN TURKEY, IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE SOVIETS, IN THEIR LATEST ADVENTURE, HAVE TURNED THEIR ATTENTION TO THE FAR EAST. HERE SUCCESS WOULD ENABLE THEM TO BEAR UPON INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA FROM A DIRECTION THAT WOULD MAKE IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN EASY VICTIMS TO RENEWED PRESSURE.

#### RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE FAR EAST

RUSSIA'S EXPANSION EASTWARD MOVED SLOWLY BUT INEXORABLY FOR ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED YEARS BEFORE IT REACHED THE EDGE OF THE ASIAN CONTINENT BORDERING THE PACIFIC OCEAN. THEN, IN A PERIOD OF A CENTURY, FROM 1850 TO THE PRESENT, RUSSIA GREW FROM A POWER ONLY INCIDENTALLY INTERESTED IN THE FAR EAST TO THE MOST AGGRESSIVE AND MOST DANGEROUS SINGLE NATION FRONTING THE VAST PACIFIC. THE STORY OF THIS URGE TOWARD THE EAST IS IN ITSELF INDICATIVE OF RUSSIA'S PARAMOUNT CONCERN WITH TERRITORIAL AGGRANDIZEMENT, AND THE FACT THAT UNTIL THE CLOSE OF WORLD WAR II THIS EASTWARD COMPULSION ATTRACTED RELATIVELY LITTLE NOTICE EXPLAINS IN PART THE ASTONISHMENT OF THE WESTERN WORLD AT RUSSIA'S PRESENT SUCCESS IN THE FAR EAST.

BEGINNING IN THE 13TH CENTURY, OCCASIONAL SETTLERS PUSHED EASTWARD ACROSS THE URALS AND OCCUPIED THE EXTENSIVE LANDS OF SIBERIA. GRADUALLY, DURING THE NEXT TWO HUNDRED YEARS, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SLAVIC PEOPLES REACHED FURTHER AND FURTHER IN THE DIRECTION OF CHINA. LESS THAN A CENTURY LATER, IN 1637, RUSSIAN PIONEERS HAD ACTUALLY REACHED THE PACIFIC. HOWEVER, THESE ADVENTURERS WERE FEW AND UNSUPPORTED. THE SLOWER, BUT MORE PERMANENT ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY WENT ON, AND BY THE MIDDLE OF THE 17TH CENTURY RUSSIAN CONTROL EXTENDED AS FAR AS LAKE BAIKAL. THEN THE AMUR RIVER BECAME THE GOAL AND IN THE COURSE OF THE LATTER HALF OF THE CENTURY A NUMBER OF RUSSIAN SETTLEMENTS APPEARED ALONG THE RIVER AND IN ITS RICH HINTERLANDS.

UNTIL THIS TIME, RUSSIAN EXPANSION EASTWARD HAD BEEN INTO COMPARATIVELY UNOCCUPIED TERRITORY OR INTO AREAS POORLY DEFENDED BY THE ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS. HOWEVER, THE AMUR RIVER COUNTRY WAS TENANTED BY A MORE NUMEROUS AND MILITARILY VIGOROUS PEOPLE, THE CHINESE. IN 1689 CONFLICT WITH THE CHINESE RESULTING FROM THIS RUSSIAN PENETRATION LED TO THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF NERCHINSK IN WHICH RUSSIA RECOGNIZED THE WHOLE AMUR REGION AS A PART OF CHINA AND WITHDREW FROM THE OCCUPIED AREAS. THIS DIPLOMATIC VICTORY FOR THE CHINESE CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS SETBACK FOR RUSSIAN AMBITIONS AND FOR 150 YEARS FOLLOWING THE TREATY THE RUSSIANS WERE FORCED TO CONFINE THEIR ACTIVITIES TO THE LANDS WEST OF THE AMUR TERRITORY.

MEANWHILE, THE CZARS CAST THEIR ACQUISITIVE GLANCES ELSEWHERE IN THE PACIFIC AND EXPLORATIONS TO THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST CAPTURED THEIR ATTENTION. BY THE LATE 1700'S THE BERING SEA NO LONGER STOOD AS AN OBSTACLE AND THE RUSSIANS MOVED ONTO THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT SETTLING A NUMBER OF POSTS IN ALASKA, MAINLY FOR PUR-

POSES OF FUR-TRADING. IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE 19TH CENTURY THE RUSSIANS PENETRATED DOWN THE CALIFORNIA COAST, REACHING WITHIN ABOUT SIXTY MILES OF THE PRESENT SITE OF SAN FRANCISCO. NONE OF THESE NORTH AMERICAN OUTPOSTS WERE HEAVILY COLONIZED, BUT THEY DID PROVIDE FOOTHOLDS ON THE FAR SIDE OF THE PACIFIC WHILE RUSSIA'S AMBITIONS IN EASTERN ASIA WERE STYMIED.

BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF THE 19TH CENTURY RUSSIA MADE ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO EXPAND HER SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN THE AMUR BASIN. AFTER SEVERAL UNCERTAIN MOVES, THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR IN PEKING NEGOTIATED A TREATY WHEREBY THE AMUR TERRITORY WAS CEDED TO RUSSIA. THIS WAS THE TREATY OF AIGUN OF 1858, SUPPLEMENTED BY THE TREATY OF PEKING IN 1860. AT LAST THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE REACHED FROM THE REGION OF POLAND IN EUROPE TO THE PACIFIC LITTORAL. FIVE CENTURIES OF STEADY, IF OCCASIONALLY FUMBLING, PROGRESS HAD EXTENDED THE ORIGINAL TERRITORIES OF THE SLAV TRIBES TO COVER THE VAST EURASIAN LAND MASS, AND THREE CENTURIES HAD ELAPSED FROM THE TIME WHEN IVAN THE TERRIBLE BECAME THE FIRST CZAR IN THE LONG LINE OF AUTOCRATIC RUSSIAN RULERS BENT ON EXTENDING THE SWAY OF THE THRONE OVER VAST DOMAINS.

SO FAR THE PATTERN OF EASTWARD EXPANSION HAD FAMILIAR ASPECTS--THE SPUR OF EXPLORATION, THE HUNT FOR GOLD, FURS, AND OTHER VALUABLE COMMODITIES, THE DESIRE TO SUBDUCE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, THE ENLARGEMENT OF TERRITORY FOR THE SIMPLE SAKE OF POWER AND GLORY, THE SPREAD OF SUCH ELEMENTS OF CIVILIZATION AS LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND RELIGION. BUT WITH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF DOMINATION OVER LANDS SO FAR FROM THE CENTER OF CZARIST ADMINISTRATION, THE PATTERN BECOMES MORE MODERN, MORE CALCULATING, AND MORE INDICATIVE OF FUTURE PORTENTS.

LONG INVOLVED WITH THE NATIONS OF



CENTRAL AND WESTERN EUROPE, RUSSIA WAS NOW FINDING HERSELF IN CONFLICT WITH, OR AT LEAST IN POSITIONS OF INVOLVEMENT WITH LANDS AND CULTURES FAR REMOVED FROM HER USUAL ORBIT OF DIPLOMATIC INTEREST.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT OF 1902 AFFIRMING THE SPECIAL INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN IN CHINA AND OF JAPAN IN CHINA AND KOREA MARKED A SETBACK TO RUSSIAN HOPES IN THE FAR EAST.

JAPAN AND RUSSIA COULD NOT AGREE ON A SETTLEMENT OF THE MANCHURIAN SITUATION AND LATE IN 1903 JAPAN DECLARED WAR UPON THE CZARIST EMPIRE. THE STORY OF RUSSIA'S IGNOMINIOUS DEFEAT AT THE HANDS OF THE JAPANESE IS A FAMILIAR ONE. AT THE END OF THE WAR IN 1905, RUSSIA'S FORTUNES IN THE FAR EAST HAD DECLINED TO A LOW POINT; HER IMPERIALISTIC VENTURE HAD FAILED FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, AND THIS FAILURE WAS IN PART RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNREST AT THE GOVERNMENT CENTERS OF EUROPEAN RUSSIA WHICH CULMINATED IN THE ABORTIVE REVOLTS OF 1905-1906.

AS A RESULT OF THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH AT THE CLOSE OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR RUSSIA LOST THE SOUTHERN HALF OF SAKHALIN ISLAND BELOW THE 50° PARALLEL, THUS FURTHER WEAKENING HER FAR EASTERN HOLDINGS. WITH KOREA, MANCHURIA, AND SOUTHERN SAKHALIN DENIED HER, RUSSIA TURNED HER ATTENTION TO MONGOLIA, AN AREA IN WHICH HER INTEREST HAD LONG BEEN PRIMARILY COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC. NOW THE CZARIST REGIME WAS ANXIOUS TO ERECT A BARRIER AGAINST THE POSSIBLE EMERGENCE OF CHINA AS A POWER OF CONSEQUENCE IN THE FAR EAST. FOLLOWING THE CHINESE REVOLUTION OF 1911, THE MONGOLS, DECLARING THEIR INDEPENDENCE OF THE MANCHUS, TURNED TO RUSSIA FOR PROTECTION. AFTER EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS, THE SITUATION WAS RESOLVED ON THE SURFACE IN 1915 BY A RUSSO-CHINESE MONGOLIAN AGREEMENT WHEREBY MONGOLIA BECAME AN AU-

TONOMOUS STATE, UNDER CHINESE SUZERAINTY BUT WITH RUSSIA ACCORDED VALUABLE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES. THE GREAT WAR, AS WORLD WAR I WAS THEN CALLED, ENDED FOR THE TIME BEING ANY FURTHER DESIGNS RUSSIA HAD UPON FAR EASTERN TERRITORY.

IN REVIEW, IT CAN BE SAID THAT CZARIST RUSSIA PURSUED AN AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF EXPANSION IN THE FAR EAST WITH OVER-ALL SUCCESS, DESPITE THE NUMEROUS WITHDRAWALS AND MISADVENTURES WHICH MARKED THE SURGE TOWARD DOMINATION OF THE PACIFIC COAST OF THE NORTH ASIAN CONTINENT. HOWEVER, THE SUCCESS OF THE VENTURE CAME NOT SO MUCH AS THE RESULT OF CLEVER PLANNING AND ADROIT DIPLOMACY. IT CAME RATHER AS THE NATURAL EVOLUTION OF A GROWING TENDENCY ON THE PART OF A VIGOROUS PEOPLE TO SPREAD OUT IN DIRECTIONS STILL OPEN TO THEM FOR COLONIZATION AND EXPLOITATION. THE METHODS USED WERE CERTAINLY NOT NOVEL, AND IN SOME CASES WERE ACTUALLY NAIVE. BUT THE RESULTS COUNTED, AND IF A BALANCE SHEET IS STRUCK AS OF 1914-1916 IT SEEMS EVIDENT THAT IMPERIAL RUSSIA ASSEMBLED ITS FAR EASTERN EMPIRE IN A FASHION THAT MIGHT SERVE AS A MODEL OF ECONOMY OF EFFORT AND MANPOWER IN A COUNTRY WHERE THE FORMER WAS PRODIGAL AND THE LATTER LIMITLESS. ONLY IN THE DISASTROUS RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR DID RUSSIA'S GRASP FOR FAR EASTERN POWER OUTREACH HER STRENGTH.

WITH THE ADVENT OF THE BOLSHEVIKS IN 1917 RUSSIAN ATTENTION IN THE FAR EAST WAS DIVERTED FROM EXPANSION TO DEFENSE. THE OCCUPATION OF VLADIVOSTOK AND EASTERN SIBERIA BY FORCES FROM THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, FRANCE, CHINA, AND JAPAN, AND THE MARCH OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEGION EASTWARD HAMPERED THE BOLSHEVIKS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THE REVOLUTION IN THE FAR EAST. WHEN THE RED ARMIES OVERCAME ADMIRAL KOLCHAK AND HIS ANTI-BOLSHEVIK FORCES IN 1920, THE ALLIES WITHDREW THEIR OCCUPATION TROOPS, LEAVING ONLY JAPAN

IN CONTROL OF RUSSIAN AREAS. MEANWHILE, THE RUSSIANS WERE AT WORK TO CREATE A BUFFER STATE IN TERRITORY EAST OF LAKE BAIKAL. FINALLY, IN OCTOBER 1920, THERE CAME INTO BEING THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC, CLEARLY A CREATION AND A TOOL OF MOSCOW IN ITS ATTEMPT TO WIN BACK FULL RUSSIAN CONTROL OF THE FAR EASTERN REGIONS WHERE THE WAR AND THE REVOLUTION HAD WEAKENED THE RULE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

IN THE MAIN, BOLSHEVIK EXPANSION IN THE FAR EAST WAS CARRIED ON BY POLITICAL PENETRATION RATHER THAN BY TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION. IN JULY 1921 MONGOLIA CAME UNDER THE RULE OF A MOSCOW-INSPIRED, AND PROBABLY SUPPORTED, REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. THAT SAME SPRING THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC CEDED THE PENINSULA OF KAMCHATKA TO THE SOVIETS, PRESUMABLY TO PERMIT THE MOSCOW GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN A FOOTHOLD ON TERRITORY TOUCHED BY THE PACIFIC OCEAN. RED TROOPS OCCUPIED MONGOLIA LATER IN 1921 ON THE PRETENSE OF KEEPING ORDER IN THE INFANT REPUBLIC AND OF PROTECTING THE BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION. AND, IN OCTOBER 1922 WHEN JAPAN WITHDREW HER FORCES FROM VLADIVOSTOK AS A RESULT OF AGREEMENTS AT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, TROOPS OF THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC MOVED IN. LESS THAN A MONTH LATER THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC WAS ANNEXED TO THE SOVIET UNION.

GRADUALLY THE NEW RUSSIA WAS REGAINING THE TERRITORY LOST THROUGH THE CZARIST AND THE EARLY BOLSHEVIK REVERSES. IN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE JAPANESE WITHDRAWAL FROM VLADIVOSTOK RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND TOKYO WERE RELATIVELY QUIESCENT. RUSSIAN ATTENTION, INSOFAR AS THE FAR EAST WAS CONCERNED, BECAME CENTERED UPON CHINA WHERE THROUGH AGENTS AND PROPAGANDA THE SOVIETS SUPPORTED THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT OF THE 1920'S. HERE THEY REVEALED THE NEW ORIENTATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY--THE POLITICAL

AND IDEOLOGICAL DOMINATION OF GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES BEYOND THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION. THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THEY DESIRED AS MUCH IN THE WAY OF VALUABLE LANDS AND ACCESS TO OPEN SEAS AS DID THE CZARS. BUT THEY WANTED MORE--THE MINDS AND THE HEARTS OF MEN IN NATIONS NOT INCLUDED IN RUSSIA'S PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES.

IN SPITE OF ENERGETIC EFFORTS, RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH CHINA DETERIORATED RAPIDLY IN THE PERIOD AFTER 1920. THE RISE OF THE KUOMINTANG TO POWER UNDER CHIANG KAI-SHEK MEANT THE TEMPORARY ECLIPSE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AS ABETTERS OF THE SOVIET POLICY OF POLITICAL EXPANSION. FINALLY, THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS CULMINATED IN A CHINESE NATIONALIST SEIZURE OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY AT HARBIN, MANCHURIA. FOLLOWING SOME MINOR SKIRMISHES BETWEEN MILITARY ELEMENTS, THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON DECEMBER 22, 1929 FOR A STATUS QUO RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS ON THE RAILROAD.

FOR ALMOST A DECADE RUSSIA AND JAPAN, WHILE CAREFULLY WATCHING EACH OTHER IN THE FAR EAST, REMAINED ON OUTWARDLY GOOD TERMS. BUT THE JAPANESE INVASION OF MANCHURIA IN 1931 CAUSED THE SOVIETS TO TAKE ALARM OVER THE POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF JAPAN'S POWER TO THE NORTH MANCHURIAN AREA ON THE SOVIET BORDER. AT THE SAME TIME, JAPAN'S ACTIONS LED RUSSIA AND CHINA TO REGARD EACH OTHER WITH INCREASED FRIENDLINESS. THE SUCCESS OF THE JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA MEANT THAT THE SOVIETS FACED THE LOSS NOT ONLY OF OPPORTUNITIES TO EXTEND THEIR TERRITORIAL HOLDINGS BUT ALSO OF CHANCES OF COMMUNIZE FURTHER AREAS OF PACIFIC ASIA. MOREOVER, INTERNAL DISSENSION IN THE SOVIET UNION LIMITED ASPIRATIONS OF EXPANSION AND, IN MARCH 1935, AFTER SEVERAL YEARS OF NEGOTIATION, RUSSIA SOLD ITS INTEREST IN THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY, THEREBY LEAVING JA-



PAN A FREE HAND IN THE PUPPET STATE OF MANCHUKUO. AGAIN THE SOVIETS HAD RETREATED IN THE FACE OF GREATER FORCE. HOWEVER, THREE YEARS LATER WHEN OPEN WARFARE BROKE OUT BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE TROOPS ON THE SIBERIAN-MANCHUKUAN FRONTIER, THE RUSSIANS SHOWED UNEXPECTED STRENGTH AND THE JAPANESE CHOSE NOT TO PUSH FURTHER AT THAT TIME.

THE PERIOD OF WORLD WAR II, UP UNTIL 1945, MARKED A TIME OF WATCHFUL WAITING WHERE JAPAN AND RUSSIA WERE CONCERNED. THE NAZI-TOKYO ANTI-COM-INTERN PACT OF 1936 HAD GIVEN THE SOVIETS NOTICE THAT THEY COULD EXPECT A POTENTIAL FOE ON THEIR EASTERN SIDE IF A RUSSO-GERMAN CONFLICT BROKE OUT. HOW MUCH THIS PROSPECT INFLUENCED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE NAZI-SOVIET NON-AGGRESSION PACT OF AUGUST 1939 IS NOW ASCERTAINABLE. HITLER'S GOVERNMENT FOUND IT NECESSARY TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT JAPAN WOULD NOT POSE A THREAT IN THE EAST. LATER, IN APRIL 1941, THE RUSSIANS SIGNED A NEUTRALITY AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN, THUS ASSURING THEMSELVES OF COMPARATIVE SAFETY IN ASIA WHILE RELATIONS WITH BERLIN HUNG ON THE BRINK OF WAR. WHEN JAPAN BEGAN ITS LONG FIGHT AGAINST CHINA IN 1937 THE SOVIETS BREATHED EASIER FOR THEY BELIEVED THAT THIS VENTURE MEANT THAT JAPAN HAD NO IMMEDIATE INTENT OF EMBROILING ITSELF IN A WAR WITH RUSSIA. NOW, THE NEUTRALITY AGREEMENT GAVE FURTHER HOPES THAT JAPAN'S ATTENTION WOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. RUSSIA GAVE WHAT AID COULD BE SPARED TO THE CHINESE, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WERE DRAWN INTO THE COMMON FRONT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE JAPANESE INVADERS.

IF THE SOVIETS HAD ANY THOUGHTS OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION IN THE FAR EAST FROM 1940 UNTIL 1945 THEY WERE KEPT WELL CONCEALED. RUSSIA'S STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL IN THE WEST DID NOT PERMIT A DIVERSION IN THESE YEARS.

ONLY WHEN GERMANY WAS ON THE VERGE OF DEFEAT AND THE ALLIES WERE WINNING IN THE PACIFIC DID RUSSIA LOOM LARGE ONCE MORE AS AN ASIATIC POWER. AS A RESULT OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT YALTA, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 5, 1945, RENOUNCED THE NEUTRALITY PACT WITH JAPAN. THEN, ON THE EVE OF JAPAN'S SURRENDER, RUSSIA DECLARED WAR UPON THE TOKYO GOVERNMENT ON AUGUST 8, 1945. A FEW CLASHES BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FAR EASTERN ARMY AND JAPANESE FORCES PUNCTUATED THE CLOSING DAYS OF THE WAR, BUT RUSSIA'S VICTORIES IN THE FAR EAST HAD BEEN WON AT THE COUNCIL TABLE RATHER THAN UPON THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

THE JAPANESE SURRENDER TERMS GAVE THE SOVIETS THE SOUTHERN HALF OF SAKHALIN ISLAND AND THE KURILE CHAIN STRETCHING TOWARD KAMCHATKA PENINSULA. RUSSIA'S PARAMOUNT INTEREST IN MANCHURIA ASSERTED ITSELF AND THE RUSSIAN FORCES REMOVED VAST STORES OF WAR BOOTY WHILE EXTENDING THEIR OCCUPATION OF THIS OSTENSIBLY CHINESE TERRITORY. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE REPUBLIC OF TANNU TUVA IN OUTER MONGOLIA WAS MADE A PART OF THE U.S.S.R. AND, AS A SINISTER PORTENT OF THINGS TO COME, THE SOVIETS OCCUPIED NORTHERN KOREA JUST BEFORE JAPAN'S CAPITULATION. SOVIET TROOPS WERE IN KOREA, THEREFORE, WHEN GENERAL MACARTHUR INSTRUCTED THE JAPANESE ARMIES IN THAT COUNTRY TO SURRENDER TO THE RUSSIANS IF THEY WERE ABOVE THE 38TH PARALLEL, AND TO SURRENDER TO AMERICAN FORCES IF THEY WERE SOUTH OF THAT LINE. ONCE MORE, THE RUSSIANS HAD ADDED CONSIDERABLE TERRITORY TO THEIR HOLDINGS—ON THIS OCCASION BY JOINING A WAR WHEN ITS OUTCOME WAS ALREADY KNOWN.

NOW THAT JAPAN HAD BEEN DEFEATED, CHINA ENFEEBLED BY YEARS OF WARFARE AND INTERNAL DISSENSION, BRITAIN BLEED WHITE AT HOME AND RELINQUISHING ITS POSITION AS THE WORLD'S LEADING COLONIAL POWER, FRANCE CRIPPLED AND CONFUSED, GERMANY HUMBLER, AND THE

WORLD IN A MOOD OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE FUTURE, RUSSIA FOUND ITSELF AT ALMOST EVERY POINT IN THE FAR EAST CONFRONTED BY ONLY ONE VIGOROUS ADVERSARY--THE UNITED STATES. AMERICAN OCCUPATION FORCES WERE IN JAPAN AND SOUTHERN KOREA. AMERICAN AIR POWER COULD UTILIZE ALASKAN AND PACIFIC ISLAND BASES TO REACH THE ASIATIC MAINLAND READILY. AND AMERICAN SEA POWER POSED AN EVER-PRESENT THREAT TO RUSSIAN EXPANSIONIST AMBITIONS ALONG THE FAR EASTERN SHORES.

HAPPILY FOR RUSSIA, AMERICA DEMOBILIZED WITH A PRECIPITATION WHICH MUST HAVE CAUSED SELF-CONGRATULATION IN THE KREMLIN. FOR A WHILE, THEREFORE, THE SOVIETS COULD PURSUE THEIR AMBITIONS IN THE FAR EAST IN THE GUISE OF SPREADING DEMOCRACY, ENCOURAGING LAND REFORMS, SUPPORTING POPULARLY CHOSEN GOVERNMENTS, AND REOPENING THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CHANNELS CLOSED BY THE WAR. AS THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS INCREASED THEIR STRENGTH IN MANCHURIA AND IN CHINA PROPER, RUSSIA PROCEEDED TO AID MAO TSE-TUNG IN HIS FIGHT AGAINST CHIANG KAI-SHEK. THE RESULT IS WELL KNOWN. WITHOUT DIRECT RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT, THE TERRITORY OF NATIONALIST CHINA WAS OVERRUN BY THE COMMUNIST FORCES SO THAT CHIANG WAS FINALLY FORCED TO FLEE TO FORMOSA AND THE ENTIRE CONTINENTAL AREA OF THE GREAT CHINESE NATION CAME COMPLETELY UNDER THE DOMINATION OF THE REDS. THE SOVIETS WITHDREW THEIR TROOPS FROM NORTHERN KOREA, BUT LEFT BEHIND A MILITANT ORGANIZATION, OBVIOUSLY WELL TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TO CARRY ON THE FIGHT FOR THE SUBJUGATION OF THE ENTIRE PENINSULA. MOSCOW-INSPIRED AGITATION IN MALAYA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA, INDONESIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES IMMOBILIZED DEMOCRATIC FORCES THAT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE AVAILABLE TO DELAY SOVIET PENETRATION IN THE NORTHERN PACIFIC.

IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II, THE PATTERN OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION

IN THE FAR EAST HAS BEEN A CHECKERED ONE, BUT A PATTERN WHICH HAS DEFINITE OUTLINES AND DISCERNIBLE DESIGNS. SO FAR, IT HAS BEEN BASED UPON A RUSSIAN POLICY OF LETTING SATELLITE AND SUBSIDIARY COUNTRIES OR NATIONAL PARTIES DO THE ACTUAL FIGHTING NECESSARY TO GAIN POWER, HOLD TERRITORY, OR EXTEND THE LIMITS OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE. IF SUCCESS ATTENDS THESE EFFORTS--AND IT HAS, ESPECIALLY IN CHINA--RUSSIA REAPS BENEFITS. IF STRONG OPPOSITION DEVELOPS OR IF FAILURE RESULTS, RUSSIA CAN REMAIN ALOOF, READY TO DISOWN THE NATIVE COMMUNIST BUNGLERS, OR TO PLAY INTERNAL FACTIONS ONE AGAINST ANOTHER. THE ADDITIONS TO RUSSIAN TERRITORY SINCE 1945 ARE NOT GREAT IN COMPARISON WITH THE VAST ACQUISITIONS OF EARLIER CENTURIES. BUT THEY ARE STRATEGIC ADDITIONS AND THEY DO CARRY ON THE OUTWARD EXTENSION OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE FAR EAST FOR FIVE HUNDRED YEARS AND MORE.

THE PERIOD 1945-1950 IS A SHORT SPAN AS WORLD HISTORY GOES. THE PERSPECTIVE IS TOO CLOSE TO PERMIT MORE THAN TENTATIVE GENERALIZATION. THERE APPEARS TO BE A SUBTLE SHIFT IN THE OVER-ALL DESIGN OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE FAR EAST. PERHAPS IT IS AS TEMPORARY AS IT IS SUBTLE. THE BASIC TREND OF CZARIST FOREIGN POLICY IN THE PACIFIC AREA WAS A SLOW, BUT PROGRESSIVE ADVANCE TO THE EAST, WITH GAINS CONSOLIDATED AND REINFORCED, AND LOSSES RECOUPED AT A LATER DATE. THE BOLSHEVIKS, ONCE THEY HAD SAFEGUARDED THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION, CARRIED ON WITH LITTLE ALTERATION THE CZARIST PLAN. WHEN WE LOOK AT SOVIET ACTIONS SINCE 1945 WE DISCOVER VERY LITTLE ACTUAL ADDITION OF TERRITORY BUT VERY GREAT INCREASES IN THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM IN ASIA. THIS CHANGE IN EMPHASIS, OR IN METHOD, MARKS THE NEW STYLE SOVIET AGGRESSION IN THE FAR EAST, FOR AGGRESSION IT IS.



# ATOMIC ENERGY AND RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

The thirteenth and fourteenth in a series of twenty chapters

## CHAPTER XIII

### PERSONNEL DESTRUCTION

JUST AS THE ATOMIC BOMB CAUSED UNPRECEDENTED DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES, SO IT CAUSED AN UNPARALLELED NUMBER OF DEATHS AND INJURIES TO PERSONNEL. AT HIROSHIMA, THE BOMB KILLED 93% OF THE PEOPLE WITHIN 1000 FEET FROM GROUND ZERO, 92% OF THOSE BETWEEN 1000 AND 2000 FEET FROM GROUND ZERO, 86% OF THOSE BETWEEN 2000 AND 3000 FEET FROM GROUND ZERO, AND 49% OF THOSE A MILE FROM GROUND ZERO.

FOR EASE OF UNDERSTANDING, THE TYPES OF INJURIES SUSTAINED CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THREE CLASSES:

1. INJURIES FROM BLAST, FROM FALLING OR FLYING DEBRIS, AND FROM FIRES.
2. FLASH BURNS.
3. RADIATION INJURIES.

BECAUSE THOSE CLOSE TO GROUND ZERO (SAY 3000 FEET OR LESS) DIED SO MANY DEATHS AT ONCE--THAT IS, WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY STRUCK BY MANY DIFFERENT KINDS OF BLOWS, EACH OF WHICH ALONE WOULD HAVE KILLED THEM--IT IS DIFFICULT TO CALCULATE THE RELATIVE DEADLINESS OF EACH OF THE LETHAL PHENOMENA. IN GENERAL, THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY CALCULATED THAT AT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI BETWEEN 50% AND 60% OF THE DEATHS WERE CAUSED BY SECONDARY INJURIES (FROM FIRE AND FLYING OR FALLING OBJECTS), BETWEEN 20% AND 30% BY FLASH BURNS, AND BETWEEN 15% AND 20% BY RADIATION SICKNESS.

NOTICE THAT BLAST IS NOT LISTED HERE. LIVING THINGS ARE FAR MORE RESISTANT TO BLAST INJURIES THAN ARE BUILDINGS, AND FEW DIED OF BLAST. THIS IS BORNE OUT BY THE FACT THAT A TOTAL OF ONLY 17 RUPTURED EAR DRUMS WERE REPORTED AT HIROSHIMA AND 22 AT NAGASAKI.

THE NUMBER OF THOSE INJURED BY THE SECONDARY EFFECTS OF THE BLAST, FALLING AND FLYING DEBRIS, HOWEVER, WAS GREAT. THE COLLAPSE OF BUILDINGS WAS QUITE SUDDEN AND PINNED LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE UNDERNEATH. BESIDES, MOST OF THE STRUCTURES WERE OF WOOD CONSTRUCTION AND THERE WERE INNUMERABLE SPLINTERS FLYING THROUGH THE AIR. IN ADDITION THERE WERE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH JAPANESE CUSTOM, MANY LARGE WINDOWS IN HOMES AND OFFICES, AND THIS GLASS WAS THE CAUSE OF MANY INJURIES. SUCH INJURIES, THOUGH GREAT IN NUMBER, WERE RARELY SERIOUS ENOUGH TO CAUSE DEATH. THE INFORMATION NOW AVAILABLE SHOWS THAT SECONDARY INJURIES OCCURRED UP TO ABOUT THREE MILES FROM GROUND ZERO, BUT THOSE OF A FATAL NATURE BEGAN TO FALL OFF RAPIDLY BEYOND A MILE AND A HALF, FOR, IN GENERAL, HOUSES COLLAPSED ONLY AS FAR OUT AS A MILE AND A HALF.

SECONDARY BURNS, SUCH AS THOSE CAUSED BY BURNING BUILDINGS, ALSO ACCOUNTED FOR A GREAT NUMBER OF INJURIES. THOUGH THE FIRES SPREAD COMPARATIVELY SLOWLY AND MANY WERE ABLE TO FLEE THE DAMAGED AREAS WITHOUT INJURIES FROM BURNS, MANY OTHERS WERE PINNED UNDER DEBRIS AND DIED LATER FROM THE HEAT AND BURNING OF THESE COLLAPSED STRUCTURES. SOME PEOPLE WERE SEVERELY BURNED WHEN THEY TRIED



Clothing Protected Against Radiant Heat.

TO EXTRACT MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES FROM THE WRECKAGE.

THE DURATION OF THE FLASH FROM THE BOMB WAS VERY SHORT, BUT THE BURNS THAT RESULTED WERE, IN MANY CASES, EXTREME AND CAUSED A NUMBER OF DEATHS. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THE EFFECT OF THIS FLASH ON THE FABRIC WORN BY THE PEOPLE. ONE PERSON WAS WEARING A WHITE COTTON BLOUSE WITH FLOWERS PRINTED ON IT. THE WHITE WAS LEFT BUT THE DARKER COLORS WERE BURNED OUT. ONE MAN WAS WEARING A STRIPED SHIRT OF ALTERNATING DARK AND LIGHT GRAY STRIPES, AND AFTER THE FLASH THE STRIPES WERE BURNED ONTO HIS BODY. THE DARK GRAY BURNED THROUGH, WHILE THE LIGHT GRAY REFLECTED THE HEAT.

PEOPLE THAT WERE IN THE OPEN DIRECTLY UNDER THE EXPLOSION WERE SO SEVERELY BURNED THAT THEIR SKIN TURNED DARK GROWN OR BLACK, AND

DEATH WAS PROBABLY INSTANTANEOUS. BURNS OF UNPROTECTED SKIN OCCURRED AS FAR AS TWO AND ONE-HALF MILES AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS UP TO ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF A MILE. THE FLASH EFFECT WAS FELT AS FAR OUT AS FIVE MILES. THESE MORE DISTANT FLASH BURNS WERE MOSTLY CONFINED TO UNPROTECTED PORTIONS OF THE BODY. THICK CLOTHING SEEMED TO GIVE QUITE GOOD PROTECTION AGAINST THIS INJURY AT THE GREATER DISTANCES.

IN THOSE CASES RECEIVING MINOR BURNS, THE BURNED AREAS OF THE BODY SHOWED EVIDENCE OF BURNS ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE EXPLOSION. AT FIRST THERE WAS ERYTHEMA (REDDENING OF THE SKIN) AND THEN, DEPENDING ON THE DEGREE OF BURN, OTHER SYMPTOMS APPEARED WITHIN A FEW MINUTES TO HOURS. THE SYMPTOMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BURNS VARIED FROM CASE TO CASE BUT TENDED TO FOLLOW A FAIRLY DEFIN-





Flash Burns

ITE PATTERN. ON INDIVIDUALS CLOSE IN, BLISTERS WERE APPARENT IN FIVE MINUTES. FURTHER OUT, AT ABOUT A MILE, BURNS APPEARED IN TWO-HOURS' TIME AND BLISTERS IN FOUR TO SIX HOURS. AT ABOUT A MILE AND A HALF, THE BURNS APPEARED IN ABOUT THREE HOURS AND THE BLISTERS AFTER A LAPSE OF TEN HOURS.

THE FLASH CAME IN A DIRECT LINE, LIKE ANY OTHER KIND OF LIGHT, AND ONLY SURFACES DIRECTLY EXPOSED TO THE RAYS WERE AFFECTED BY THEM. THUS, THERE RESULTED THE SO-CALLED "PROFILE" BURNS IN WHICH SHADOWS OF OBJECTS IN THE PATH OF THE FLASH WERE BURNED INTO THE SKIN. EVEN CLUMPS OF GRASS AND LEAVES OFFERED SOME PROTECTION TO THE PORTIONS OF THE SKIN THEY SHADED. IN ONE INSTANCE A MAN WRITING BEFORE A WINDOW HAD HIS HANDS SERIOUSLY BURNED BY THE FLASH BECAUSE IT HIT THEM DIRECTLY, BUT HAD ONLY MINOR BURNS OF THE HEAD AND NECK BECAUSE THEY WERE SHADED FROM THE DIRECT LINE OF THE FLASH AND RECEIVED ONLY REFLECTIONS OF THE FLASH FROM THE PAPER ON WHICH HE WAS WRITING.

AMONG THE STRIKING FEATURES OF THESE BURNS WERE THE CHANGES IN PIGMENTATION. UP TO ABOUT TWO MILES

FROM GROUND ZERO, EXPOSED SKIN WAS BLEACHED, BUT AROUND THE MARGINS OF THESE BLEACHED ZONES THERE WERE NARROW BANDS WHERE THE COLOR OF THE SKIN WAS MUCH DARKER THAN NORMAL. BEYOND TWO MILES FROM GROUND ZERO, THE EXPOSED SKIN BECAME EXTREMELY DARK, RESEMBLING A WALNUT STAIN; AROUND THIS DARKENED SKIN WERE BANDS OF SKIN IN WHICH THE COLOR WAS FAR LIGHTER THAN NORMAL. APPARENTLY THE VISIBLE AND NEAR-VISIBLE RADIATIONS FROM THE ATOMIC BOMB CAUSED PIGMENTATION TO MOVE FROM THE EXPOSED TO THE UNEXPOSED ZONES AND VICE VERSA, DEPENDING ON THE DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO. THESE PIGMENTATION EFFECTS FADED VERY SLOWLY AND IN MANY CASES STILL PERSIST.

THE UNIQUE TYPE OF INJURY CAUSED BY THE ATOM BOMB WAS, OF COURSE, FROM NUCLEAR RADIATION. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THIS RADIATION KILLED ALL OF THOSE NOT KILLED BY OTHER CAUSES WITHIN THREE-FOURTHS OF A MILE FROM GROUND ZERO, HAD MODERATE EFFECTS ON THOSE UP TO ONE AND ONE-HALF MILES FROM GROUND ZERO, AND MILD EFFECTS UP TO TWO MILES FROM GROUND ZERO.

OF THE FOUR TYPES OF NUCLEAR RADIATION--ALPHA, BETA, GAMMA, AND NEUTRONS--ONLY THE GAMMA RADIATION AND



Flash Burns (Close-up)

NEUTRONS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DEATH-DEALING WHEN THE SOURCES OF RADIATION ARE OUTSIDE THE BODY. ALPHA PARTICLES HAVE LITTLE PENETRATING QUALITY. IN FACT, THEY COULD NOT PENETRATE THIS SHEET OF PAPER. BETA PARTICLES CAN PENETRATE, ON THE AVERAGE, ONLY A LITTLE MORE THAN AN INCH OF AIR OR A THIN LAYER OF METAL OR FLESH. THEREFORE, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF EXTERNAL RADIATION, THEY CAUSE NO INJURIES AT ALL. NEUTRONS ARE FAR MORE PENETRATING, BUT IN MOST CASES THEIR RANGE OF EFFECTIVENESS IS STILL NEGLIGIBLE IN COMPARISON WITH THAT OF GAMMA RAYS. GAMMA RAYS VARY CONSIDERABLY IN THEIR PENETRATING QUALITIES, DEPENDING ON THEIR DEGREE OF "HARDNESS" OR ENERGY LEVEL, BUT WHEN THERE IS A GREAT QUANTITY OF GAMMA RADIATION, AS WHEN AN ATOMIC BOMB EXPLODES, ENOUGH OF THESE RAYS CAN PENETRATE SHIELDS OF STEEL SEVERAL INCHES THICK AND OF CONCRETE SEVERAL FEET THICK TO CAUSE DEATH.

THE GENERAL SYMPTOMS OF RADIATION SICKNESS RESULTING FROM AN OVERDOSE OF GAMMA RAYS ARE LOSS OF HAIR, SKIN DAMAGE FROM REDNESS TO SEVERE ULCERATION, DIARRHEA, VOMITING, HEMORRHAGE, AND GENERAL LOSS OF ENERGY. FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, THE RAYS DESTROY BODY CELLS, PARTICULARLY THOSE JUST FORMING, ATTACK THE BLOOD PLATELETS WHICH CAUSE THE BLOOD TO CLOT, AND KILL THE WHITE BLOOD CELLS WHICH PREVENT DISEASE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, PERSONS THAT RECEIVE AN OVERDOSE OF GAMMA RAYS SUFFER NOT ONLY FROM THE RESULTS OF RADIATION SICKNESS ITSELF BUT ARE ALSO EXTREMELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO OTHER KINDS OF DISEASE.

LOSS OF HAIR (EPILATION) WAS A GENERAL OCCURRENCE AMONG PERSONS WHO HAD BEEN CLOSE TO THE BOMB AND SURVIVED FOR MORE THAN TWO WEEKS. APPROXIMATELY 75% OF THOSE WITHIN ONE-HALF MILE SUFFERED FROM IT. COMPLETE LOSS OF HAIR, HOWEVER, DID NOT

NECESSARILY INDICATE THE LIKELIHOOD OF DEATH, AND CONTRARIWISE, 14% OF ALL THOSE WHO DIED OF RADIATION EFFECT BY THE END OF THE FOURTH WEEK AFTER THE BOMBING HAD NO EPILATION AT ALL. FURTHERMORE, THE LOSS OF HAIR WAS ONLY TEMPORARY, FOR EVEN IN SEVERE CASES THE HAIR EVENTUALLY GREW BACK IN.

MANY OF THESE WHO HAD RECEIVED HEAVY DOSES OF RADIATION SUFFERED FROM SEVERE NAUSEA AND VOMITING AS EARLY AS THIRTY MINUTES AFTER THE DETONATION. THIRTY-TWO PERCENT OF THOSE WITHIN ONE MILE OF GROUND ZERO, AND 23% OF THOSE BETWEEN ONE AND ONE-HALF MILES AWAY SUFFERED FROM VOMITING ON THE DAY OF THE BOMBING. OF THOSE WHO WERE BEYOND TWO MILES, ONLY 6% HAD SUCH SYMPTOMS. IN MANY CASES, DIARRHEA, SOMETIMES BLOODY, OCCURRED WITHIN THE FIRST FEW DAYS. MANY OF THOSE WHO WERE WITHIN A MILE OF GROUND ZERO SUFFERED FROM TEMPORARY STERILITY (ABILITY TO CONCEIVE), BUT VERY FEW LOST THEIR POTENCY (DESIRE AND ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP). MOST OF THE WOMEN WITHIN SEVERAL MILES OF GROUND ZERO EXPERIENCED MENSTRUAL DISORDERS, BUT A YEAR LATER THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE CASE OF MENSTRUAL DISORDER AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBING.

A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF HEMORRHAGE OCCURRED AMONG THOSE WHO WERE WITHIN A MILE OF GROUND ZERO. ASIDE FROM THE DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY THESE HEMORRHAGES THEMSELVES, THERE WAS A REDUCTION IN THESE PEOPLE OF THE RATE AT WHICH WOUNDS AND LACERATIONS HEALED. IN ADDITION, AS MENTIONED BEFORE, THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE INCIDENCE OF INFECTION AND DISEASE DUE TO THE LOWERING OF THE BODY'S RESISTANCE.

WHILE ALL THESE EFFECTS WERE, IN MOST CASES, UNAVOIDABLE, THOUSANDS OF LIVES COULD HAVE BEEN SAVED IF PROPER MEDICAL ATTENTION HAD BEEN AVAILABLE AND IF THE PEOPLE IN THOSE



CITIES HAD BEEN BETTER INFORMED.

## CHAPTER XIV

### CONTAMINATION


IN THE ESTIMATES OF ATOMIC BOMB DAMAGE MADE THUS FAR IN THIS SERIES, CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN ONLY TO THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE EXPLOSION. THE LONG-RANGE EFFECT--THAT IS, THE LINGERING HAZARD RESULTING FROM THE RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION OF STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT--HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AT ALL. THOUGH IT IS NOT NEARLY AS GREAT AS THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS, CONTAMINATION IN A SENSE MAY PRODUCE AN APPRECIABLE AMOUNT OF DESTRUCTION IN THAT CONTAMINATED AREAS MAY NOT BE USABLE FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AND PEOPLE MAY SUFFER SEVERE INJURY, EVEN DEATH, FROM INHALING, SWALLOWING, OR OTHERWISE ADMITTING CONTAMINATED MATTER INTO THEIR BODIES. ANOTHER REMARKABLE FEATURE OF CONTAMINATION DAMAGE IS THAT IT MAY OCCUR FAR AWAY, IN TIME OR IN SPACE, FROM THE POINT OF THE EXPLOSION.

RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION FROM AN ATOMIC EXPLOSION CONSISTS OF THREE TYPES OF MATERIALS--FISSION PRODUCTS OF THE BOMB, UNFISSIONED MATERIAL FROM WITHIN THE BOMB, AND STABLE MATERIALS IN WHICH RADIOACTIVITY IS INDUCED BY NEUTRONS HOT OUT FROM THE BOMB.

THE FISSION PRODUCTS--IN OTHER WORDS, THE PRODUCTS OF URANIUM OR PLUTONIUM FISSION WITHIN THE BOMB--COMPRISE A LARGE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT ELEMENTS, ALMOST ALL UNSTABLE, WHICH UNDERGO RADIOACTIVE DECAY AND EMIT GAMMA RAYS, BETA PARTICLES, OR BOTH. THESE FISSION PRODUCTS ARE THE MOST DANGEROUS OF THE THREE TYPES OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION GUASED BY THE BOMB. THE GAMMA RAYS, SIMILAR TO X-RAYS, ARE VERY PENETRATING AND CONSTITUTE A REAL MENACE TO LIVING THINGS. WHILE THE BETA PARTICLES

(HIGH-ENERGY ELECTRONS) HAVE RELATIVELY LITTLE PENETRATING POWER AND CANNOT PRODUCE APPRECIABLE EFFECTS MORE THAN A FEW YARDS FROM THE SOURCE, THEY CAN CAUSE SEVERE ILLNESS AND DEATH IF BITS OF MATTER THAT EMIT THEM GAIN ENTRANCE TO THE BODY.

IN ANY ATOMIC BOMB, NO MATTER HOW GREAT ITS EFFICIENCY, THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WHICH DOES NOT UNDERGO FISSION AT THE MOMENT OF EXPLOSION. THIS MATERIAL, HOWEVER, IS "HOT" AND WHEREVER IT LANDS CONTINUES TO BE RADIOACTIVE FOR MANY YEARS, DECAYING VERY SLOWLY BY THE EMISSION OF ALPHA PARTICLES. LIKE BETA PARTICLES, ALPHA PARTICLES HAVE LITTLE PENETRATING POWER AND WHEN OUTSIDE THE BODY DO NOT CONSTITUTE A RADIATION HAZARD. BUT IF ALPHA EMMITTERS GET INTO THE BODY, EITHER BY BEING SWALLOWED, BREATHED IN, OR ADMITTED VIA A WOUND, THEY CAN CAUSE SERIOUS INJURY.



Rise and Spread of Atomic Cloud.

THE THIRD TYPE OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION CREATED BY AN ATOMIC BOMB EXPLOSION IS THE RESULT OF INDUCED RADIOACTIVITY. MANY OF THE BILLIONS OF HIGH-ENERGY NEUTRONS (NEUTRON FLUX) SHOT OUT FROM A FISSIONING ATOM BOMB ARE ABSORBED OR CAPTURED BY ATOMS IN THE AIR, WATER, STRUCTURES, AND OBJECTS WITHIN A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM THE POINT OF EXPLOSION AND CAUSE THESE MATERIALS TO BECOME RADIOACTIVE. SUCH RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS EMIT GAMMA RAYS AND CONSTITUTE A SLIGHT ADDITIONAL EXTERNAL RADIATION HAZARD.

THE AMOUNT AND THE EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION PRODUCED BY AN ATOMIC BOMB EXPLOSION DEPEND LARGELY ON THE TYPE OF EXPLOSION. THE TWO EXPLOSIONS IN JAPAN AND THE ABLE TEST EXPLOSION WERE OF THE AIR-BURST TYPE AND LEFT FEW RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVE PRODUCTS. THIS WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT IN AN AIR-BURST ABOUT 99% OF THESE RESIDUAL PRODUCTS ARE SUCKED UP INTO THE CLOUD THAT RISES TO THE STRATOSPHERE SHORTLY AFTER THE EXPLOSION. BEING VERY LIGHT, THESE PARTICLES FLOAT IN THE ATMOSPHERE UNTIL THEY ARE CARRIED TO THE EARTH BY ATTACHMENT TO HEAVIER PARTICLES, SUCH AS RAINDROPS.

GENERALLY, THE RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES FROM THE CLOUD "FALL OUT" GRADUALLY AND ARE DISSIPATED OVER SO WIDE AN AREA THAT THEIR MENACE IS NEGLIGIBLE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE RATE OF "FALL OUT" FROM THE CLOUD DEPENDS ON THE SIZE OF THE ATMOSPHERIC OR DUST PARTICLES TO WHICH THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL ADHERES AND THE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITION OF THE ATMOSPHERE, THERE WILL BE OCCASIONS WHEN THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF "FALL-OUT" OVER A RELATIVELY SMALL AREA. THUS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT METEOROLOGICAL PHENOMENA, SUCH AS HEAVY RAIN, WILL BRING DOWN ENOUGH RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN A LOCALIZED AREA TO MAKE IT DANGEROUS TO LIFE.

CONTAMINATION DANGER FROM AN AIR-BURST IS THEREFORE POSSIBLE BUT NOT PROBABLE.

THE CONTAMINATION PRODUCED BY AN UNDER-WATER EXPLOSION, AS IN THE BAKER TEST, IS FAR MORE CONCENTRATED AND IS AN ALMOST SURE CONSEQUENCE OF THE EXPLOSION. IN AN UNDER-WATER DETONATION OF THE BOMB, ALMOST ALL OF THE FISSION PRODUCTS, UNFISSIONED MATERIAL, AND MATERIAL IN WHICH RADIOACTIVITY IS INDUCED, REMAIN IN THE IMMENSE COLUMN OF WATER THROWN UP BY THE EXPLOSION. WHEN THIS COLUMN FALLS, THERE SHOOTS OUT FROM ITS BASE A CONCENTRATED CLOUD OF MIST, CALLED THE BASE SURGE, WHICH SPREADS THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OVER A CONSIDERABLE AREA. THE SIZE OF THE AREA IN WHICH CONTAMINATION IS DEPOSITED DEPENDS ON THE WIND VELOCITY, BUT AS A ROUGH APPROXIMATION, THE LETHAL AREA MAY BE CONSIDERED TO EXTEND ABOUT ONE AND ONE-HALF MILES UPWIND AND TWO OR MORE MILES DOWNWIND FROM THE POINT OF DETONATION. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SERIOUS CONTAMINATION OVER A MUCH LARGER AREA. AT BIKINI, NEARLY ALL THE TARGET SHIPS WHICH WERE OTHERWISE UNDAMAGED, WERE HEAVILY CONTAMINATED. ALL POROUS OBJECTS ON THESE SHIPS, SUCH AS WOOD, ROPE, AND THE LIKE, BECAME EXTREMELY RADIOACTIVE. SO DID THE FISH IN THE LAGOON AND THE MARINE PLANT LIFE. IN FACT, SOME FISH ABSORBED SO MUCH RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL THAT WHEN THEY WERE CAUGHT AND PLACED ON PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM THEY EMITTED ENOUGH RADIATION TO PRODUCE PICTURES OF THEMSELVES ON THE FILM.

IF THE BOMB WERE DETONATED OFFSHORE OF SOME LARGE CITY, THE RESULTS OF CONTAMINATION MIGHT WELL BE CATASTROPHIC. IN SUCH A CASE, THE CITY MIGHT SUFFER LITTLE VISIBLE DAMAGE, AND YET BE ESSENTIALLY A GHOST CITY. MOST OF THE INHABITANTS AT THE TIME OF EXPLOSION WOULD BE KILLED, EVACUATION WOULD BE REQUIRED



FOR ALL OTHERS, AND RE-ENTRY OF PERSONNEL WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO LIMITED PERIODS. IF THE CITY WERE A PORT, THE CONTAMINATION THAT WOULD REMAIN IN THE WATERS OF THE HARBOR WOULD ALSO CONSTITUTE A GRAVE MENACE.

IN THE WATERS OF THE BIKINI LAGOON, THE FISSION PRODUCTS WERE RAPIDLY DILUTED, FOR THEY WERE CONTAINED IN A LARGE BODY OF WATER. NEVERTHELESS, INTENSITIES ABOVE TOLERANCE WERE MEASURED FOR ALMOST A WEEK, AND EVEN VESSELS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN PART OF THE TARGET ARRAY BECAME CONTAMINATED AFTER A SHORT STAY IN THE TARGET AREA, FOR THEY ABSORBED THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS ON THEIR HULLS, ESPECIALLY ALONG THE WATER LINE AND AT RUSTY AND OILY AREAS, AND IN ALL THEIR EQUIPMENT IN WHICH THE LAGOON WATER WAS CIRCULATED. IF AN ATOMIC BOMB WERE EXPLODED UNDER-WATER IN A PLACE WHERE THERE WOULD BE LITTLE DILUTION, FOR EXAMPLE, PEARL HARBOR, WHERE THE VOLUME OF WATER IS SMALL AND THERE IS LITTLE EXCHANGE OF WATER WITH THE OUTSIDE OCEAN, RADIOACTIVITY WOULD BE EXTREMELY SEVERE.

THE DESCRIPTIONS OF EXTREME CONTAMINATION OF SHIPS AND BUILDINGS AND THE FREQUENT USE OF SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS "LINGERING HAZARDS" AND "UNINHABITABLE FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME" NATURALLY LEAD TO THE QUESTIONS: ISN'T IT POSSIBLE TO REMOVE THIS CONTAMINATION? ARE THERE NO CHEMICALS, PERHAPS LIKE THOSE USED FOR AREAS CONTAMINATED BY POISON GASES, WHICH WILL NEUTRALIZE THE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION?

UNFORTUNATELY, IT IS NOT SO EASY. IN THE DECONTAMINATION OF POISON GASES, IT IS POSSIBLE TO NEUTRALIZE THE GAS WITH ANOTHER CHEMICAL AND COMPLETELY DESTROY THE CONTAMINATION. RADIOACTIVITY, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE DESTROYED. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL MUST EITHER BE AVOIDED UNTIL IT DECAYS AND BECOMES HARMLESS IN


ITS OWN NATURAL TIME, OR IT MUST BE REMOVED TO A SECLUDED PLACE WHERE NO ONE HAS TO WORK. CHEMICALS MAY BE USED IN THE DECONTAMINATION OF RADIOACTIVITY BUT ONLY TO HELP LOOSEN THE PARTICLES. THEY CANNOT DESTROY RADIOACTIVITY.

THE DECREASE IN THE RADIOACTIVITY OF CONTAMINATED MATERIALS AND OBJECTS IS RAPID AT FIRST BUT SLOWS DOWN CONSIDERABLY AS TIME GOES ON. THE RATE OF RADIOACTIVE DECAY OF CONTAMINATED MATERIALS IS GENERALLY BY THE FORMULA

$$I = \frac{1}{T}, \text{ OR}$$

INTENSITY IS INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO TIME. THUS, RADIATION FROM CONTAMINATION AT THE END OF ONE DAY WOULD BE 1/24TH OF THAT AT THE END OF AN HOUR. AT THE END OF A MONTH IT WOULD BE 1/30TH OF THAT AT THE END OF A DAY. THIS MEANS THAT, IN TIME, THE DANGER FROM EXTERNAL RADIATION DECREASES.

THE DANGER FROM INTERNAL RADIATION, HOWEVER, REMAINS SERIOUS. THIS IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT LONG-LIVED FISSION PRODUCTS AND UNFISSIONED MATERIALS MAY BE ABSORBED INTO THE SYSTEM BY BREATHING IN DUST OR BY



Radioactive Decay Curve.



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EATING CONTAMINATED FOODSTUFFS. SUCH LONG-LIVED RADIOACTIVE PRODUCTS, WHILE THEY ARE NOT DANGEROUS WHEN THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE BODY, CONSTITUTE A REAL THREAT TO HEALTH WHEN THEY ARE WITHIN THE BODY. AS A RESULT, UNLESS SUCH PRODUCTS CAN BE REMOVED, LARGE AREAS CONTAMINATED BY AN ATOMIC BOMB EXPLOSION MIGHT BE UNINHABITABLE FOR YEARS.

DECONTAMINATION, THE PROCESS OF REMOVING CONTAMINATION FROM AN OBJECT, A STRUCTURE OR AN AREA, TAKES A VARIETY OF FORMS. IF THE RADIOACTIVE SPRAY OR DUST HAS BEEN ABSORBED BY SMALL OBJECTS SUCH AS CLOTHES, TOOLS, AND THE LIKE, TWO ALTERNATIVES ARE POSSIBLE. A SMALL OBJECT CAN BE WASHED AND SCRUBBED UNTIL IT IS FREE OF CONTAMINATION, OR, IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, IT CAN BE REMOVED AND BURIED OR PUT IN SOME OTHER PLACE WHERE THE CONTAMINATION WILL NOT BE A HAZARD TO LIVING THINGS. WHEN LARGE OBJECTS, SUCH AS BUILDINGS, SHIPS, OR STREETS ARE CONTAMINATED, THE PROBLEM IS A FAR MORE DIFFICULT ONE, ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE POROUS SURFACES.

THE PERSISTENCE OF CONTAMINATION IS WELL ILLUSTRATED BY WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SHIPS IN THE BIKINI LAGOON. THE FIRST METHOD OF DECONTAMINATION TRIED WAS TO SEND TUGS ALONG SIDE THE "HOT" SHIPS TO PUMP STRONG STREAMS OF WATER OVER THEIR ENTIRE STRUCTURES. INVESTIGATION SOON REVEALED, THOUGH, THAT MUCH OF THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL HAD NOT BEEN WASHED AWAY AND THAT A LARGE PART OF THAT WHICH HAD BEEN WASHED AWAY HAD COLLECTED IN OTHER PARTS OF THE VESSEL AND HAD BECOME CONCENTRATED THERE.

A NUMBER OF OTHER METHODS WERE THEN TRIED, INCLUDING SPRAYING WITH BOILER COMPOUND, SPRAYING WITH LYE AND BOILER COMPOUND, SPRAYING WITH FOAMITE, AND SPRAYING WITH GROUND CORN COB MIXED WITH THESE SOLUTIONS.

NONE OF THESE METHODS PROVED ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY.

THE SAME TYPES OF DIFFICULTIES THAT WERE ENCOUNTERED IN CONNECTION WITH THE METAL SURFACES OF THE SHIPS WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED WITH THE CONCRETE AND BRICK SURFACES OF BUILDINGS AND WITH THE CONCRETE OR ASPHALT SURFACES OF STREETS AND ROADS. MOREOVER, IN CONNECTION WITH BUILDINGS AND STREETS, THE PROBLEM WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT VERY LARGE AREAS WOULD HAVE TO BE DECONTAMINATED INSTEAD OF THE RELATIVELY SMALL AREAS ON THE SHIPS. QUITE CLEARLY, THEN, LARGE AREAS THAT WERE SEVERELY CONTAMINATED WOULD BE USELESS FOR LONG PERIODS.

(AFTRC MANUAL 52-355-1

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### FRONT COVER:


THE F-84G, FIRST OPERATIONAL JET FIGHTER PLANE FULLY EQUIPPED FOR MID-AIR REFUELING BY TANKER PLANES. AN OPERATOR IN THE TAIL OF THE TANKER PLANE OPERATES A TELESCOPING BOOM WITH DIRECTIONAL CONTROL SURFACES TO GUIDE THE BOOM INTO THE WING RECEPTACLE OF THE CLOSE-FLYING FIGHTER. AFTER THE BOOM NOZZLE ENGAGES THE FIGHTER, FUEL TRANSFER BECOMES AUTOMATIC.

### BACK COVER:

F-84G ON THE GROUND WITH ENLARGED VIEW OF WING RECEPTACLE.



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# La-17 Specification and Performance Data

## DIMENSIONS

Span..... 36 ft.  
Length..... 36 ft.  
Height, standing..... 11.3 ft.

## WEIGHT

Gross..... 16,000 lbs. (appr.)

## POWERPLANT

Model..... Chelomey-Nene  
Type..... Centrifugal flow  
Rating sea level..... 5000-5500 lbs. s.t.

## PERFORMANCE

Max. speed @ sea level..... 650 mph. (appr.)  
Initial climb..... 6600 ft./min.  
Service ceiling..... 40,500 ft.


Cutaway of the La-17 showing: (1) Split air intake to ducts around cockpit; (2) built-in landing light (presumed); (3) gunlight behind armor-glass windshield; (4) rear armor-glass; (5) radio equipment; (6) 38-deg. swept wing of high speed section, containing three-quarter span built-in fuel tanks; (7) main gas intake and rocket fuel tank; (8) airflow control baffle fences; (9) fuel tank; (10) fuel tank; (11) fuel tank; (12) fuel tank; (13) fuel tank; (14) fuel tank; (15) fuel tank; (16) fuel tank; (17) fuel tank; (18) fuel tank; (19) fuel tank; (20) fuel tank; (21) fuel tank; (22) fuel tank; (23) fuel tank; (24) fuel tank; (25) fuel tank; (26) fuel tank; (27) fuel tank; (28) fuel tank; (29) fuel tank; (30) fuel tank; (31) fuel tank; (32) fuel tank; (33) fuel tank; (34) fuel tank.

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# CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND

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